



The Rise and Fall of Space Sanctuary

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“We can no longer view space as a **sanctuary.”**

- Doug Loverro, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy,
March 2015

**“Because of their actions, space
is no longer a **sanctuary**”**

- Patrick Shanahan, acting Secretary of
Defense, April 2019

“In the view of many, space has been, until recently, a “sanctuary**” from
intentional attack, but that **sanctuary** status has now eroded or vanished.”**

- Gen. William L. Shelton (Ret.), former Commander of US Air Force Space Command, March 2017

“Outer Space, long considered a **sanctuary, is now **contested.**”**

- James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, June 2017

**“Our strategy recognizes that – due to actions by our competitors
and potential adversaries – the space domain is not a **sanctuary.**”**

- Kenneth Rapuano, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Global Security, April 2019

“Space is no longer a **sanctuary
from conflict.”**

- Adm. Cecil Haney, Commander of
STRATCOM, February 2016

**“We now recognize that space can
no longer be considered a
sanctuary.”**

- Gen. Larry Spencer, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air
Force, April 2015

**“Space is no longer the sole province of world
powers or a **sanctuary** for the U.S.”**

- Heather Wilson, Gen. David Goldfein, Gen. John Raymond, and Lt Gen
Samuel Greaves, May 2017



3. Treat Space as a Sanctuary

This option would forego development of a U. S. anti-satellite, emphasizing further arms control measures to restrict anti-satellite capabilities. It would undertake development of alternate counters to Soviet threats such as long-range anti-ship missiles.

The last of these options, treating space as a sanctuary, is neither enforceable nor verifiable, as pointed out by the Panel.

The first option, all-out competition in space, is the path ADCOM has been indirectly supporting for some time; however, it has major budgetary and other

1976

Final Report of the Ad Hoc NSC Space Panel

1993


Final Report to the President on the U.S. Space Program

Supporters of an ASAT system have argued that the capability to deny the use of space to an adversary can add great protection to U S land, sea, and air forces during hostile military action. Its opponents, however, have argued that U S. interests are best protected by seeking to avoid an "ASAT race" with the former Soviet Union, thereby preserving a "space sanctuary." But the proliferation of space systems has changed profoundly the space control equation, and the "space sanctuary" concept has been overtaken by events. Sixteen nations today have some degree of indigenous capability to employ militarily useful satellites. That number is expected to double by the



Space Policy Dichotomy

A framework for comparing policy approaches to the space domain




Not a perfectly clean dichotomy: elements of one policy may exist even while the other is dominant



Hard to Have One US Policy in a Pluralist System

Senior-Level

The President, National Security Council, top DOD civilian and joint staff



Service-Level

Service leadership (primarily Air Force) +
Operational-level: combatant commanders, etc



Congress


Varied in how directly Congress attempted to influence space policy





Contested Space Dominated Since 1976

4 Eras, Marked by Events that Dominated the Space Policy Debate




Policy continuity since 1976 for contested space: deter and, if necessary, defend against attacks on U.S. space assets; ensure U.S. freedom of action and deny it to adversaries



The Role of Key Events in Space Policy

Each event was discussed as a 'turning point' or a 'wake-up call', but since 1976 each event is actually used to reinforce the space control policy that already dominated



Common themes: asymmetry, vulnerability, sanctuary as 'no longer viable' or 'overtaken by events'




Space (Arms) Control

Both activities occurred under both policies, but priorities reversed

“Anti-satellite activities... may become a subject of domestic controversy and stir foreign concern and reaction. A question may well be raised as to U.S. intentions since we have recently concluded a permanent treaty and an interim agreement with the U.S.S.R.”

- Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush, June 1973



“Our intention is that these discussions [with Russian officials] not lead to arrangements that would impede US capabilities we determine are necessary for space control.”

-Secretary of Defense William Cohen, September 1998

When contested space became the dominant policy, arms control lost priority to space control even in administrations perceived as less committed to contesting space

Conclusion



Concerns about the survivability of U.S. satellites and architectures are clearly a lasting challenge confronted in national security space policies. A past U.S. policy of treating space as a sanctuary cannot be used to justify the impression of vulnerability today because this policy has not existed for decades. To understand the root causes of current space vulnerability and the fear that the United States has not yet done enough to secure its assets in space, one must go beyond national security space policy and look at other factors.



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