



U.S. ARMY COMBAT CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT COMMAND – ARMAMENTS CENTER

Safe from the Start: Using MBSE for Safety Engineering

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
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SCOPE & CONTEXT



Safety Modeling makes for Happier Safety Engineers





STARTING POINT AND TEAMING



MIL-STD-882-E

Establish Safety Criteria and Requirements
 Apply the Safety Order of Precedence
 Hazard Mitigation/Testing/Verification
 Guides Hazard Monitoring and Control

SSWG

Safety Plans
 Safety Guidance and Design
 Safety Board Presentations & Certifications
 Identify & Mitigate Hazards
 Identify Safety Related & Safety Critical Functions
 Document Safety Analyses thoroughly

MBSE

Support Safety Analysis using SSWG Deliverables and the MBSE Models
 Incorporate SSWG recommendations and supporting data into functional analysis
 Create and publish model based deliverables


- Manage Mishaps
- Manage Functional Hazards
- Manage Safety Causes and Effects
- Manage Function Safety Ratings
- Manage Safety Requirements
- Traceability to Standards and Guidelines



DEVELOPING THE SAFETY ARCHITECTURE



Inputs: System Need, Capability Gaps, ConOps, and/or Requirements



Outputs: Consistent views depicting the system and safety architecture

Activity Diagrams

Function ID	Function Name	Function Description	Safety Function Rating
116			Safety-Critical

System Function Ratings

Signal ID	Name	Safety Rating of Associated Functions
1000		
1001		

Signal Impact Analysis

Op Safety Rating
○ Safety-Critical
○ Safety-Related
○ Not Safety Significant
○ Safety-Critical

Software Function Ratings

Name	Op Safety Rating
○ Calculate Somet	○ Safety-Critical
○ Set Some Result	○ Safety-Related
○ Display Result	○ Not Safety Significant
○ Provide Emerger	○ Safety-Critical

Mishaps & Hazards

Level Mishaps: nothing zardous, level Mishaps: thing Very zardous, Level Mishaps: Another riazardous Result

The Bottom Line: Functional & Safety Analyses are aligned with one another using Model-Based Systems Engineering techniques



SAFETY MODEL ELEMENTS



- **Use Case Elements are informed by the ConOps:**
 - Functional Hazards
 - Safety Causes
 - Safety Effects
 - Top Level Mishaps
- **System-Level Functions must have an 882E rating and the following attributes:**
 - Safety Rating: Safety Critical, Safety Related, Not Safety Significant (MIL-STD-882E)
 - Safety Rating Rationale: Detailed documentation of why the rating was assigned and the date of assignment
 - Needs Safety Review: TRUE or FALSE for tracking purposes
 - Safety Status: Additional Tag for any Notes on open actions or open questions the SSWG has
- **Software-Level Functions:**
 - Use stereotype tags to capture all SSWG information
 - These are used to support the development and management of FSHA and FMEA
- **Signals:**
 - AOP-52 dictates safety criticality of information and how it is consumed and supplied
 - Table created to automatically search signal usages and their interactions with function ratings



Model & Profile Demonstration



FUNCTIONAL HAZARDS AND MISHAPS




uc [Package] 01 Hazard Analysis [Main Capability]

«comment»

Hazards can be discovered during system use case development.
For each way users interact with the system, ask:
"What could go wrong?", and, "What are the consequences?"

Track the mishaps as special types of use cases to prevent and mitigate them.

System of Interest






SYSTEM LEVEL FUNCTIONS



FunctionID	Name	Safety Function Rating	Safety Rating Rationale	Safety Status	Needs Safety Review
100	Process XYZ Algorithm	Safety-Related		17Oct2019: New input added to	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> true
101	Control System Safety	Safety-Critical			<input type="checkbox"/> false
102	Stow System	Not Safety Significant	17Oct2019: Stowing is a featur		<input type="checkbox"/> false





HARDWARE FUNCTION ANALYSIS



TABLE III. Risk assessment matrix

RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX				
SEVERITY PROBABILITY	Catastrophic (1)	Critical (2)	Marginal (3)	Negligible (4)
Frequent (A)	High	High	Serious	Medium
Probable (B)	High	High	Serious	Medium
Occasional (C)	High	Serious	Medium	Low
Remote (D)	Serious	Medium	Medium	Low
Improbable (E)	Medium	Medium	Medium	Low
Eliminated (F)	Eliminated			

Model is aligned with the Risk Assessment Matrix for hardware items

Name	Safety Function Rating	Probability	Severity	Risk Assessment	Needs Safety Review	Safety Rating Rationale	Standard Status	Safety Status
◇ Lock Component	Safety-Related	Remote	Marginal	Medium	<input type="checkbox"/> false	Because of important reasons	MIL-STD-882E	
◇ Display Result	Not Safety Significant	Occasional	Negligible	Low	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> true	Rationale goes here	MIL-STD-882E	



SOFTWARE FUNCTION ANALYSIS



TABLE V. Software safety criticality matrix

SOFTWARE SAFETY CRITICALITY MATRIX				
	SEVERITY CATEGORY			
SOFTWARE CONTROL CATEGORY	Catastrophic (1)	Critical (2)	Marginal (3)	Negligible (4)
1	SwCI 1	SwCI 1	SwCI 3	SwCI 4
2	SwCI 1	SwCI 2	SwCI 3	SwCI 4
3	SwCI 2	SwCI 3	SwCI 4	SwCI 4
4	SwCI 3	SwCI 4	SwCI 4	SwCI 4
5	SwCI 5	SwCI 5	SwCI 5	SwCI 5

Model is aligned with the Software Safety Criticality Matrix and supporting text for software items.

SwCI	Level of Rigor Tasks
SwCI 1	Program shall perform analysis of requirements, architecture, design, and code; and conduct in-depth safety-specific testing.
SwCI 2	Program shall perform analysis of requirements, architecture, and design; and conduct in-depth safety-specific testing.
SwCI 3	Program shall perform analysis of requirements and architecture; and conduct in-depth safety-specific testing.
SwCI 4	Program shall conduct safety-specific testing.
SwCI 5	Once assessed by safety engineering as Not Safety, then no safety specific analysis or verification is required.


NOTE: Consult the Joint Software Systems Safety Engineering Handbook and AOP 52 for additional guidance on how to conduct required software analyses.



Name	Software Control Category	Severity Category	SWCI	Safety Function Rating	Safety Status	Safety Rating Rationale	Needs Safety Review	Standard Status
○ Calculate Something	3	Critical	SwCI 3	Safety-Critical		17Oct2019: Rating was	<input type="checkbox"/> false	AOP 52 Edition 1
○ Set Some Result	5	Marginal	SwCI 5	Safety-Related	17Oct2019: Need stan		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> true	
○ Provide Emergency Stop				Safety-Critical			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> true	MIL-STD-882E



SIGNAL IMPACT ANALYSIS



Type: Single Value

Metachain Navigation Edit Use as... Remove

Operation Name:

Metaclass or Stereotype	Property
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Signal	_typedElementOfType
<input type="checkbox"/> Pin	Owner
<input type="checkbox"/> CallOperationAction	Operation
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Operation	Op Safety Rating

Insert Remove

Metachains in MagicDraw find usages and relationships in the model.

Signal ID	Name	Safety Rating of Associated Functions
1000	<input type="checkbox"/> Data	<input checked="" type="radio"/> Safety-Critical <input checked="" type="radio"/> Safety-Related
1001	<input type="checkbox"/> Result	<input checked="" type="radio"/> Safety-Related <input checked="" type="radio"/> Not Safety Significant



OUTCOMES OF ANALYSES




Re-usable profile can be leveraged to enable Safety Analyses

- **Managing Functional Hazards and Mishaps**
- **Discovery of Safety Critical or Non-Safety Critical features**
- **Easy ID and quantification of safety criticality levels for system, hardware, and software level functions**
- **Clear delineation of Level of Rigor needed for SW development process: SWCI Level distinction**
- **Automated views that indicate potential problematic signal flows**
- **Clear communication of rationale**
- **Safety architecture → System architecture incorporation**

Environment & Language: MagicDraw 18.5, SysML V1.4
Standards: MIL-STD-882E System Safety Military Standard,
AOP-52 Guidance on Software Safety Design



Questions?



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