NATO’s Military Role in WMD Non-Proliferation Focusing on Future Capabilities and Needs

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We remain deeply concerned by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as their means of delivery and related materials, by states and non-state actors, which represents a growing threat to our populations, territory, and forces. Addressing this threat remains an urgent international priority. Continued use of chemical weapons in Syria, and the United Kingdom, underscore the evolving and increasing WMD threat to the Alliance. NATO will ensure that Allies can protect their populations, forces, and territories by deterring, defending against, responding to, and mitigating the consequences of the full spectrum of the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats, including with trained and rapidly-deployable forces.

We call on all states to enhance efforts to effectively combat the proliferation of WMD through the universalisation and full implementation of the CWC and BTWC, the NPT, and through the UNSC resolutions 1540 and 2325, and initiatives on nuclear disarmament verification.

Building on our DAT POW, we will continue to improve our capabilities and technologies, including to defend against IEDs and CBRN threats, and ....
• Just as in 2015 Political Guidance (PG15), CBRN Defence capability planning aspects were considered in PG19

• 2018 Brussels Summit Declaration, along with real-life incidents (Salisbury), and other emerging threats, facilitated the inclusion of CBRN Defence capability planning aspects into PG19

• PG19 sets additional guidance for the conduct of the NATO Defence Planning Process
HQ SACT & ACO

Allied Command Transformation

- Supreme Allied Command Transformation Headquarters (Norfolk, USA)
  - Joint Analysis Lessons Learned Centre (Portugal)
  - Joint Force Training Centre (Poland)
  - Joint Warfare Centre (Norway)

Allied Command Operations

- Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (Mons, Belgium)
  - Headquarters Joint Force Command Brunssum (Netherlands)
  - Headquarters Joint Force Command Naples (Italy)
  - Air Command (Germany)
  - Land Command (Turkey)
  - Maritime Command (United Kingdom)
  - NATO Communication Information Services Group (Belgium)
NATO’s Instruments

- Committee on Proliferation (CP) in Defence and Politico-Military format;
- ACDC (former WMD Non-Proliferation Centre);
- IS/IMS CBRN Group;
- Public Diplomacy;
- Centres of Excellence (CBRN, DAT, C-IED, EOD, MilMed) and NMIOTC;
- NATO Programmes (SPS, DAT PoW, etc.).
Agenda

- CONTEXT
- NATO's CBRN Defence Structure
- NATO's Military Role
a. Build awareness and support for NATO WMD non-proliferation and CBRN Defence in order to reassure Allied populations and demonstrate the Alliance’s increasing ability to protect against such threats.

b. Communicate Alliance intent and demonstrate NATO CBRN prevention, protection, and recovery capabilities in order to contribute to deterrence of potential adversaries.

c. Engage and inform audiences in non-NATO countries in Europe, wider Middle East, and Asia on the purpose and importance of WMD non-proliferation and NATO’s capabilities in CBRN Defence, including required capabilities, in order to foster their active cooperation.

d. In the context of NATO’s narrative on CBRN Defence, counter Russian and other anti-NATO disinformation and hostile information activities in order to maintain the credibility of the Alliance with all audiences.
NATO CBRN Military Role

- (CZE - ACO) Policy – MC, MCM
- (ITA - ACO) Education, Training, Evaluation, Exercise
- (USA - ACO) Standardization – AJP, ATP, AEP, ANEP, etc
- (USA – ACO) Capability development – MERT, WMD Disablement
- (USA - ACO) Capability review / Capability requirements – CC/CS
- (DEU – HQ SACT) Concepts, Experimentation, Implementation – TRJU, TRJE, Toxic Valley, Toxic Trip, Brave Beduin, etc.
NATO CBRN Military Role

- StratCom Framework
- Civ / Mil cooperation – Civil Emergency Planning
- Land, Sea, Air
- Technical Exploitation
- CBRN-related Intelligence
- Deterrence and Defence
- Liaison efforts – JIntWG, CBRN MedWG
NATO CBRN Military Role

- CJ-CBRND-TF
- CBRN Reachback
- Technology Watch Keeper
  - Strategic Foresight Analysis 2017 Report
  - Technological Trends Report 2017
  - Framework for Future Alliance Operations 2018 (FFAO)
  - Science and Technology Organization (STO)
  - Long Term Aspects (LTA)
Science and Technology Organization

Technology Trends Report 2017

Empowering the Alliance's Technological Edge

NATO SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY BOARD

STO Tech Trends Report 2017

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INSTABILITY SITUATIONS*

- WMD PROLIFERATION/THREAT/USE
- CONVENTIONAL WAR
- THREAT ESCALATION
- HYBRID WAR
- IRREGULAR WAR
- TERRORISM
- GLOBAL COMMONS DISRUPTION
- CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ATTACK
- INFORMATION WARFARE
- CYBERATTACK
- GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES
- ENDANGERMENET OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONS
- MASS MIGRATION
- PANDEMIC DISEASE
- NATURAL/MAN-MADE DISASTERS

*NOT EXHAUSTIVE

CENTRAL IDEA

To keep the military edge and prevail in future operations, NATO forces must continually evolve, adapt, and innovate and be credible, networked, aware, agile, and resilient.