Explosives Safety Munitions Risk Management (ESMRM)
Compelling Past,
Active Present, Uncertain Future
UPDATE
August 2018

Mr. Thierry Chiapello
Executive Director
Overview

- May 2015 MSIAC Article
  Documenting ESMRM History, Challenges, and Strategy to implement
- Operational use
- Strategy
  - Requirements
  - Outreach and Implementation
  - Background and Problem Statement
- Actions Since Dec 2017, Remaining Risks, and Potential Outcome
- Conclusions
May 2015 MSIAC Article
Documenting ESMRM History, Challenges, and Strategy to implement

http://www.msiac.nato.int/news/newsletter/download

History – Events in Afghanistan (~2000-2010) created conditions that revealed lack of institutionalized processes or ability to address munitions risks in when two or more NATO nations were engaged in operations.
  o Kanduhar Tri-national ASP
ESMRM: Compelling Past, Active Present, Uncertain Future

- Mar 2009 – Report “Challenges in Afghanistan” identified chain of command challenges, importance of Lead Nation responsibilities and adhering to established NATO doctrine

- Report focused on tactical and operational levels and stopped short of addressing root causes (i.e. lack of requirements within NATO and lack of clear processes for deviations and chain of command responsibilities)

- Very important report that brought awareness to explosives safety “challenges” in operations
The NATO Consumer Logistics Process as detailed from Allied Logistic Publication (ALP)-4.2(A), “Land Forces Logistic Doctrine”

Details the phases of logistics that support military operations

ALP-16, “Explosives Safety and Munitions Risk Management (ESMRM) in NATO Planning, Training, and Operations” details risk assessments, chain of command responsibilities required during each phase in the logistics process.
ESMRM Strategy

1. Requirements
   Development and Harmonization
   - Developing and promulgating ESMRM Policy
   - Developing and promulgating STANAG 2617 / ALP 16
   - Closing gaps in 12 NATO Logistics documents
   - Harmonizing AASTPs 1 and 5 with ESMRM Requirements

2. Communication
   - ESMRM Smart Defence Project 1.32

3. Implementation
   - Assessing Plans, exercises, and operations
   - ESMRM assessment capability
   - Imbedding training within NATO

4. Outreach
   - Inform Leadership
   - Educate and Train NATO Staff
   - Training the NATO Trainers

Source: Explosives Safety and Munitions Risk Management - Compelling Past, Active Present, Uncertain Future
5/5/2015
ESMRM Strategy

1. Requirements Development and Harmonization
   - Developing and promulgating ESMRM Policy
   - Developing and promulgating STANAG 2617/ALP 16
   - Closing gaps in 12 NATO Logistics documents
   - Harmonizing AASTPs 1 and 5 with ESMRM Requirements

2. Communication
   - ESMRM Smart Defence Project 1.32

3. Implementation
   - Establishing partnerships between AC/305 LC, ACO, ACT, and AC/326
   - Assessing Plans, exercises, and operations
   - ESMRM assessment capability
   - Imbedding training within NATO

4. Outreach
   - Inform Leadership
   - Educate and Train NATO Staff
   - Training the NATO Trainers

Source: Explosives Safety and Munitions Risk Management - Compelling Past, Active Present, Uncertain Future
5/5/2015
ESMRM Strategy

1. Requirements Development and Harmonization
   - Developing and promulgating ESMRM Policy
   - Developing and promulgating STANAG 2617/ALP 16
   - Closing gaps in 12 NATO Logistics documents
   - Harmonizing AASTPs 1 and 5 with ESMRM Requirements

2. Communication
   - ESMRM Smart Defence Project 1.32
   - Establishing partnerships between AC/305 LC, ACO, ACT, and AC/326

3. Implementation
   - Assessing Plans, exercises, and operations
   - ESMRM assessment capability
   - Imbedding training within NATO

4. Outreach
   - Inform Leadership
   - Educate and Train NATO Staff
   - Training the NATO Trainers

Source: Explosives Safety and Munitions Risk Management - Compelling Past, Active Present, Uncertain Future
5/5/2015
Background and Problem Statement

• **Background.** 2018 marks 3rd year of DDESB/NATO ESMRM Panel working with SHAPE to implement ESMRM into NATO plans, exercises, ops, and education and training processes

• June 2017 SACEUR requested DDESB:
  o Assess Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) program and provide results
  o Brief JFC CDRs and staffs to educate and inform about available level of support
  o Include ESMRM in SAGE 2020

• Jun-Dec 2017 - minimal progress; staffs receptive but required intent
• Jan 2018 – present significant progress (events and timeline slide)

• **Revised Problem Statement**
  o Although significant progress has been made to institutionalize ESMRM within NATO (HQ and ACO), risks remain.
  o Unless action is taken to eliminate, risks will likely result in ESMRM not being institutionalized within NATO and recreating high-risk operating conditions in future operations, similar to those previously found in Afghanistan.
  o More than conjecture – we are already witnessing precursors…
Actions Since Dec 2017, Remaining Risks, and Potential Outcome

- **Actions Since Dec 2017.** SHAPE, JFC Brunssum and Naples engaged at leadership and staff level (J4s primarily)

  - SHAPE, JFC, ACT Actions include:
    - Developing implementing instructions, hosting implementing forums within ACO and JFCs
    - JFCBS integrated ESMRM guidance into revised Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) guidance
    - Incorporating ESMRM language into SAGE 2020
    - Working toward including ESMRM requirements from STANAG 2763/ALP-16 into Graduated Response Plans
    - Formalizing training process with ACT (IAW Bi-SC Dir 75-2, Global Programming)
    - Education and Training
      - Incorporating ESMRM into Annual Discipline Alignment Plan and Logistics Strategic Training Plan
      - DDESB developed and began teaching ESMRM module as part of NATO Log Officers Course at NATO School O’Gau (NSO) starting in March 2018
      - DDESB developing ESMRM Train-the-Trainer course in partnership with NSO and other NATO organizations/partners

- **Risks.** Although SHAPE and NATO HQ making progress toward institutionalizing ESMRM, two main risks remain.
  - SACEUR departs before key SHAPE actions accomplished
  - NATO Log Committee (AC/305) leaves ESMRM out of Principles & Policies for Log MC0319/3 and Log Handbook

- **Potential Outcome.** NATO operational planning continues without ESMRM processes and Risk Decisions in place; nations’ munitions-related ops and supporting infrastructure create risk to each other, NATO mission, and HN lives
Conclusions

• Although important, ESMRM is currently a niche function
  o Importance waxes and wanes based on how recent catastrophes are in the minds of leadership and the public or
  o Senior leadership personal interest and engagement

• 2 Main ESMRM Goals (Integration into the NATO Enterprise and Culture Change)
  o Integrate into NATO planning, education and operations - and as importantly…
  o Drive a culture change that results in Commanders, logisticians, and planners asking about munitions risk management and if ESMRM is part of plans, exercises, and operations.

• Integrating ESMRM and changing the NATO Culture requires:
  o Institutionalizing ESMRM both in NATO AC/305 (Logistics Committee) doctrine and supporting documents (Principles & Policies for Log MC0319/3, the Logistics Handbook, and other key docs) and for
  o Allied Command Operations (SHAPE) to publish (SHAPE and Joint Forces Command) level implementing instructions and
  o Add ammunition officer on SHAPE and JFC staffs to manage munitions-related issues (including ESMRM) in planning, training, and execution.
Conclusions

• **Bottom line** - ESMRM is a systematic approach that when successfully institutionalized will result in a culture change directly contributing to:
  o Improved readiness
  o Increased operational capabilities
  o More realistic plans and exercises
  o Quantified/qualified (and often reduced) munitions-risks, and
  o Increased commanders awareness about his/her ability to perform the mission
Explosion of the USS Mt. Hood (AE-11), Admiralty Islands, 10 November 1944. While moored at the Manus Naval Base, Admiralty Islands, the Mount Hood’s cargo ~2.3M pounds of munitions detonated. Damage and casualties were inflicted on ships anchored as far as 2000 yards away. Personnel casualties on Mount Hood and on other vessels totaled 45 known dead, 327 missing and 371 injured. Over 30 large ships damaged, including the USS Mindanao (ARG-3), pictured above. 13 small boats and landing craft were sunk, destroyed or damaged beyond repair and 33 were damaged but repairable.
Backup Slides
Strategic Policy, STANAG, Guidance

Key Orgs & Stakeholders

NATO Defense Investment Div.

AC/305 Logistics Committee

ACO/SHAPE

J4, J3, MILENG, J5

Interim Standing JLSG

JFC Brunsum

J4, J3, MILENG, J5

JLSG

AC/305 ESMRM Panel

SACEUR

ACT/JFT

MLCC

Component Commands

- Land
- Air
- Maritime

Tasks to Close Gaps

AC/305 LC Tasks to ESMRM Panel

Insert ESMRM anchoring language into NATO policy and doctrine

Integrate ESMRM requirements and processes into OPP, exercises, and ops

Integrate ESMRM requirements and processes into OPP, exercises, and ops

Develop ESMRM Munitions Risk Assessment Capability

Assess plans, Exercises & Ops upon request

Gaps

Risk Assessment Process Not Integrated

ESMRM not in NATO E&T, OPP, or Exercises

Policy Gaps

Principles & Policies for Log MC0319/3

ACT Strategic Training Plan

NATO Log Doctrine Gap Analysis 2011

SHAPE/JFC Plans

NATO Logistics Handbook 2012

Existing & Relevant

SACEUR Strategic Guidance

Principles & Policies for Log MC0319/3

NATO LC ESMRM Policy, AC/305(EAPC)D(2013)0008

STANAG 2617/ALP 16 (2014)

NATO Logistics Handbook 2012
Operational Policy, STANAG, Guidance

Key Orgs & Stakeholders
- ACO/SHAPE
  - J4, J3, MILENG, J5
- Interim Standing JLSG
- JFC Brunsum
  - J4, J3, MILENG, J5
- JFC Naples
  - J4, J3, MILENG, J5
- Component Commands
  - Land
  - Air
  - Maritime
- JLSG
- AC/30S ESMRM Panel

Tasks to Close Gaps
- ACO/SHAPE ESMRM Operational Roadmap
  - Publish ESMRM Roadmap
  - Integrate ESMRM requirements and processes into SAGE, GRP, and COPD
  - Develop ESMRM templates and SOPs
  - Assess plans, exercises, and ops
  - Produce ESMRM Assessment for CDR risk decision

Gaps
- No SHAPE Guidance for:
  - SHAPE Risk Decision Authority
  - SAGE, GRP, COPD
  - Templates & SOPs
  - SHAPE ESMRM Operational Roadmap
  - STP
Tactical Policy, STANAG Guidance, Key Orgs & Stakeholders, Gaps, Tasks to Close Gaps, Courses, GRP, COPD, SHAPE ESMRM Operational Roadmap, Policy, STANAG, Guidance, ACT/JFT, Add details, NATO School O’Gau - Log Course - MLOPC, NATO Defense College, MILENG COE, ACO/SHAPE ESMRM Operational Roadmap, Develop ESMRM course modules, Present courses, Annually train SHAPE and JFC staff, Assess plans, exercises, and ops, Produce ESMRM Assessment for CDR risk decision, Gaps, No SHAPE Guidance for: SHAPE Risk Decision Authority, SAGE, GRP, COPD, Templates & SOPs, SHAPE ESMRM Operational Roadmap, STP.
When fully developed, implemented, and integrated the ESMRM process and outputs improve NATO’s operational capability and enable NATO Commanders to make informed munitions-related risk-decisions in support of the NATO mission.