



#### **Cybersecurity T&E and the National Cyber Range**

#### "Top 10" Lessons Learned

Prepared for 31ST ANNUAL NATIONAL TEST & EVALUATION CONFERENCE 2-3 March 2016

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


# What, Why and How?



- What do we want to accomplish?
  - Provide some Cybersecurity T&E Lessons Learned from the NCR Team
- Why is this important?
  - Six Phased Approach to Cybersecurity T&E is being implemented across DOD
  - NCR Team has been working closely with DOD Testing and Training Customers
  - Lessons Learned can help other programs
- How will we do it?
  - Review Six Phased Approach to Cybersecurity T&E and the NCR
  - Discuss Process and Range Lessons Learned







Cyber Threats WORDLE



Defense Acquisition WORDLE





Cyber Goths Graphic Source: WIKIPEDIA Commons



# Historically: DOD Cybersecurity Policy and Practice Created Technical Debt!

- Technical Debt: Cost of work that must be accomplished before a job can be completed
  - Type 1 Debt: Incurred unintentionally as a consequence of a flawed design or implementation
  - Type 2 Debt: Incurred intentionally when an organization makes a decision to optimize for the present rather than for the future
- Historically DOD Cybersecurity processes create "Technical Debt"
  - Type 1: Cybersecurity Requirements definition deferred and SSE processes poorly executed
  - Type 2: Controls Verification deferred until just prior to Initial Operational Test and Evaluation





#### New DASD DT&E "Shift Left" initiatives intended to reduce Technical Debt!



# New/Ongoing Cybersecurity Policy and Guidance Activities


- Revision of DoDI 5000.02: Issued 6 Jan 2015
  - New/better guidance for both developmental and operational testing of IT
- Revision of DoD 8500.01, Cybersecurity: 14 Mar 2014
  - Expanded scope and specificity
- DoDI 8510.01 Risk Management Framework (RMF) for DoD IT: 14 Mar 2014
  - Provides policy, clarity and guidance on the RMF and compliance
- Six Phase Cybersecurity T&E Process: Planned Sep 2015 Incorporated into Defense Acquisition Guidebook Chapter 9
- OSD DOT&E- Procedures for Operational Test and Evaluation of Cybersecurity in Acquisition Programs: 01 Aug 2014
  - Formalizes OT&E Phases
- Cybersecurity Implementation Guidebook for PMs: Issued 26 May 2015
  - Address Cybersecurity T&E across the acquisition lifecycle
- Cybersecurity T&E Guidebook: Issued July 2015







#### Cybersecurity T&E Reduces Technical Debt and Manages Mission Risk



- Phases 1 and 2 complement "Program" SSE and RMF Activities
  - Guides T&E WIPT as they develop TEMP & Development Evaluation Framework
  - Early SCA/DT&E provides empirical data to verify PPP and RMF requirements
- Cybersecurity DT&E/OT&E reduces technical debt and mission risk!
  - T&E Phases 3/5 seek to identify and close exposed vulnerabilities
  - T&E Phases 4/6 seek to understand "Mission Risk" and resiliency

CYF



# Cybersecurity T&E Process Lessons Learned




- 1. Start Small and grow
  - Crawl, Walk, Run Approach to Vulnerability Assessments has been most successful:
- 2. Testing is an important Engineering and Design Tool that can be used to refine requirements
  - T&E Community should engage with SE and SSE to influence requirements as early as possible in the acquisition:
- 3. Cyber Table Top is an effective tool to prioritize Risks for testing
  - RMF Manages Program Risk. Cybersecurity T&E Manages Mission Risk:
- 4. Focus on the Mission
  - Programs are overwhelmed with policy and guidance, technical and operational requirements don't know where to start
- 5. Cybersecurity Testing must be executed with Cyber Mission Forces
  - Inherited protection mechanisms from Common Control Providers are documented on paper but not been verified and in Mission Context




LL 1: Start Small and Grow Cybersecurity T&E Complements SSE and RMF to Positively Impact Cost Schedule and Performance!



- Cybersecurity T&E is Iterative and Incremental
  - Collaborative activity involving all "responsible" stakeholders
  - Started as early as possible in Acquisition
  - Verify requirements and baseline capabilities
  - Evaluate exposed "Attack Surface"
  - Identify and help close exposed vulnerabilities
  - Evaluate system resilience in operational context
  - Provide early feedback to "responsible" stakeholders
  - Reduce Cost, improve schedule and inform LRIP
  - Improve OT&E Outcomes










# LL 2: Cyber Testing Engineering and Design Tool




- Testing is an important Engineering and Design Tool that can be used to refine requirements
  - Reduce technical debt, ID exposed vulnerabilities and provide engineering alternatives
  - New Cyber Requirements often exposed and residual vulnerabilities always remain!





#### LL 2: Cyber Testing Engineering and Design Tool Compliance Testing is Necessary But...





hicle to Vehic

Source: : University of California, San Diego: Stephen Checkoway, Damon McCoy, Brian Kantor, Danny Anderson, Hovav Shacham, and Stefan Savage University of Washington: Karl Koscher, Alexei Czeskis, Franziska Roesner, and Tadayoshi Kohno



Graphics Source: DoDI 8510.01 – Risk Management Framework (RMF) for DoD IT: Issued 14 Mar 2014

#### SCA verifies compliance...DT&E validates design!



#### LL 3: Where do I begin? The Old Good Days.... Looks Good...




Limited Attack Surface....Easy Test





LL 3: Where do I begin? Attack Surface of the Internet of Things (IoT) is Massive!





Source: Mario Morales, IDC

#### According to Mario Morales (IDC) more than 25+ billion devices will be connected to the IoT (Internet of Everything) by 2020



#### LL3: Cyber Table Top (CTT) Risk Based Tool to Prioritize Testing


- What is a Cyber Table Top?
  - · Low technology, low cost, intellectually intensive wargame
  - Introduces and explores the Offensive Cyber Effects on Operations
  - Assess Mission Risk to System, SoS or FoS
- Why is it used?
  - Help identify, size and scope the test effort in the Cyber Security focus area
  - Identify: potential threat vectors, Risks associated with Threat Vectors, Potential threats from boundary systems
- What does it produce?
  - Initial categorization of family of threats into 3 categories
    - Threats that must be tested against due to risk to mission (e.g. NCR)
    - Threats that require detailed analysis
    - Threats that will not be tested due to low risk to mission
  - Cybersecurity risk matrices
  - Recommendations for next steps in the cybersecurity test process















## LL 3/4: Start Small and Grow Based Upon Prioritized Risks Example NAVAIR Use of CTT





# LL 4: Focus on the Mission








Source: University of California, San Diego: Stephen Checkoway, Damon McCoy, Brian Kantor, Danny Anderson, Howay Shacharn, and Sitelan Sawage University of Washington: Karl Koscher, Alexei Czeskis, Franziska Roesner, and Tadayoshi Kohno


Modern Automobile



**GSM Cellular Architecture** 



Typical Aircraft



Scheduled Airline Traffic 2009 Graphics Source: WIKIPEDIA Commons

# Attack Surface: A system's exposure to reachable and exploitable cyber vulnerabilities (Not Just "Within the System Boundaries!")


Modified from SANS Attack Surface Problem: http://www.sans.edu/research/security-laboratory/article/did-attack-surface



### LL 4: USS SECURE Pilot Test #1

NSWC Dahlgren/CDSA, Philly, Corona, Crane, NCR, Navy/Army Red Team








# LL 5: Cybersecurity Testing must be executed with Cyber Mission Forces



#### Understand Mission Risk and evaluate and enhance resiliency!

CNDSP and CPTs Operators should be engaged to defend the system!



MITRE: Cyber Attack Lifecycle



601st Air and Space Operations Center Tyndall AFB, Florida



National Security Operations Center



Central Control Facility Eglin Air Force Base



# National Cyber Range Overview



- NCR Background
  - Originally developed by Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in the 2009-2012 timeframe
  - Transitioned from DARPA to the DoD Test Resources Management Center (TRMC) in October 2012
  - TRMC was charged with "operationalizing" the capabilities for use by the DOD test, training, and experimentation communities
- Vision
  - Be recognized as the cyberspace test range of choice for providing mission tailored, hi-fidelity cyber environments that enable independent and objective testing and evaluation of advanced cyberspace capabilities
- NCR Mission Statement
  - Provide secure facilities, innovative technologies, repeatable processes, and the skilled workforce
  - Create hi-fidelity, mission representative cyberspace environments
  - Facilitate the integration of the cyberspace T&E infrastructure through partnerships with key stakeholders across DoD, DHS, industry, and academia



# What is the National Cyber Range?



#### **Computing Assets/Facility Encapsulation Architecture &** (LMCO Orlando, FL) **Operational Procedures** Range Operations Corre one and Becapit rige fappent Cert **Cyber Test Team** certiganativis tant Saite 2 otty Data Con **Secure Connectivity Integrated Cyber Event Tool Suite** via JIOR and JMN Realistic Mission Environments **RSDPs** JMN **PSDPs** Ì



# **NCR Unique Capabilities**



- \* Multiple Independent Levels of Security (MILS) architecture supports four independent tests beds at varying classification levels
  - DIA Accredited for testing up to Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information
- \*Automation provides significant efficiencies that enable more frequent and more accurate events
  - Reduces timelines from weeks or months to hours or days
  - Minimizes human error and allows for greater repeatability
- \*Rapid emulation of complex, operationally representative network environments
  - Can scale up to thousands virtual nodes
  - Red/Blue/Gray support, including specialized systems (e.g., weapon systems)
- \*Sanitization to restore all exposed systems to a known, clean state
  - Allows assets to be reused even when they are exposed to the most malicious and sophisticated uncharacterized code
- Supports a diverse user base by accommodating a wide variety of event types and communities
  - (R&D, OT&E, information assurance, compliance, malware analysis, etc.)
  - (testing, training, research, etc.)


#### \*DARPA Hard Problems: MILS Architecture, Rapid Emulation, Automation, & Sanitization!



# NCR Cybersecurity T&E Event Execution Lessons Learned




- 6. Customers need Cybersecurity T&E "As a Service"
  - Commodity computing resources are needed for Dev Test Environments
- 7. Multidisciplinary approach to event design and execution is critical
  - Operational, SE, T&E IT and Network Disciplines
- 8. Effective Test Team understands Cyber Offense and Defense
- 9. Reusable Content, Automated Verification and Sanitization is critical to create efficiencies in environment design, development and deployment
- 10. Connectivity makes range location irrelevant
- 11. Exposed Vulnerabilities should be verified and evaluated for Mission Impact to prioritize remediation activities





# LL 7: Multidisciplinary Approach to Event Design and Execution Critical!








# LL 8: Effective Test Teams Understand Cyber Offense and Defense




MITRE: Cyber Attack Lifecycle



Cyber Attack Lifecycle: Framework to understand and anticipate the moves of cyber adversaries at each stage of an attack.

#### Typical adversary attack stages include:

Reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, control, execution, and persistence.






#### LL 9: Reusable Content, Automated Verification and Sanitization Creates Efficiencies!




- NCR Reusable Content Includes:
  - ADNS Emulation
  - Round-robin NTP
  - Full DNS infrastructure
  - Whois
  - Various Exchange Server versions and architectures
  - DNS registrar
  - Anonymization frameworks
  - Webmail
  - eCommerce sites
  - Content Management Systems (CMS)

Integrated Cyber Event Tool Suite



Encapsulation Architecture & Operational Procedures






# LL 10: Connectivity Makes Range Location Irrelevant!



- NCR demonstrated ability to support Major Training Exercises!
  - Remotely supported 1000's of Users
  - Connected numerous Logical Ranges
  - 100's of Enclaves & Subnets
  - Thousands of Nodes
- NCR demonstrated ability to support remote Testing
  - NCR now has JMN Connectivity!
  - Used remotely for Army CP CE Event





# National Cyber Range Overview Day

March 10 2016



- When :
- Where:
- What:

9:00 AM to 2:30 PM NCR in Orlando, FL An overview of the NCR will be presented including:

- What type of testing you can do with the NCR
- How to plan an NCR event
- Example of Testing with the NCR
- Example Training Event Environments Produced with the NCR
- Who: Government (or SETA) personnel who are interested in using the NCR
- Requirements:
- Contact:

Minimum of SECRET Clearance

Meredith Brehm meredith.brehm@Imco.com

for more information about attending



# Conclusions



- 1. Start Small and grow
- 2. Testing is an important Engineering and Design Tool
- 3. Cyber Table Top is an effective tool to prioritize Risks
- 4. Focus on the Mission
- 5. Cybersecurity Testing must be executed with Cyber Mission Forces
- 6. Customers need Cybersecurity T&E "As a Service"
- 7. Multidisciplinary approach to event design and execution is critical
- 8. Effective Test Team understands Cyber Offense and Defense
- 9. Reusable Content, Automated Verification and Sanitization creates efficiencies
- 10. Connectivity makes range location irrelevant
- 11. Bonus: Exposed Vulnerabilities should be verified and evaluated for Mission Impact to prioritize remediation activities

#### Lessons Learned and the NCR are Institutionally Funded by TRMC! Find out More at Customer Day!





# **Questions?**

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