#### NDIA 18<sup>th</sup> Annual Systems Engineering Conference Track 6 - ESOH AFLCMC... Providing the Warfighter's Edge



**U.S. AIR FORCE** 

### Replacement Tanker for USAF – ESOH Protection Using Systems Engineering

John Stallings AFLCMC/WKC



### **Acquisition Process Beginnings**



- The KC-135 Recapitalization Program was Impacted by AoA
- Evaluation included the Use of Commercial Derivative Aircraft
- Capabilities Based on KC-135
- Initiated at Acquisition Stage B rather than A
- Incorporated FAA requirements into SRD
  - Flight Safety Standards
  - Air Contaminant Emission Standards
  - Far Field/Community Noise Limits
- Also included DoD requirements
  - No Class I ODS
  - Elimination/Reduction of Cr6+
- Fixed Price Incentive Firm

## ESOH Systems Engineering Process



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- Acquisition Program Initiated in ASC (AFLCMC)
- Developed SRD based on CDD from MAJCOM (AMC)
  - Chief Engineer led team preparing SRD
  - System Engineering concepts were keys (SS, Environmental Eng, RM & MOSA)
  - Requirements coordinated with AMC
- RFP included Instructions to Offerors for Sys Eng & ESOH
  - Provide SEP incorporating detailed ESOH plan
  - Airworthiness Certification incorporated FAA requirements
  - SRD, example SOO and CDRLs
- ESOH in System Engineering requirements
  - Included in IMP


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Included in PDR, CDR, TRR



### **ESOH** in IMP





### **Program of Record**

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- KC-46 begins replacement of aging tanker fleet
  - Acquires 179 aircraft; delivery of first 18 tankers by 2017
  - Production ramps up to 15 tankers per year through 2027
- Missions
  - Air refueling
  - Cargo/passenger transport
  - Aeromedical evacuation
- Implements Better Buying Power concepts
  - Fixed Price Incentive Firm contract awarded 24 Feb 11
  - Success depends on stable funding and requirements
- KC-46 Program Team
  - KC-46 built in the Boeing Everett WA factory and modified in the Puget Sound Area
  - Boeing Program Office also located at Everett WA factory site
  - Air Force Program Office located at WPAFB, OH
- Numerous teammates, including:
  - AMC
  - AETC
  - FAA Military Certification Office (MCO)
  - DCMA

• 412 TW, Edwards—Responsible Test Organization (RTO)

AF Sustainment Center

- AFOTEC, Kirtland AFB—Operational Test Agency (OTA)
- USN
- United Kingdom










#### Aircraft Development with FAA






### **Key Capabilities**



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#### **SS Hazard Risk Acceptance Process**



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#### MIL-STD-882E

- Systematic Hazard Analysis Process
- Severity category and probability level are determined across all systems
- Risks expressed as combination of a severity level and a probability level (RAC)
- Risks are eliminated or reduced by verifiable mitigation processes
- Catastrophic Severity < 1X 10-6 for Improbable Frequency – Medium Risk

#### FAA AC 25-1309-1A

- Depending on Probability Hazard risks are either acceptable or unacceptable (Flight Safety)
- Extremely Improbable < 1X10-9
- Catastrophic Severity Acceptable (meet Flight Safety Standard)
- Residual Risks not accepted

KC-46 requires equivalent probability of FAA standard for MTC.



### **KC-46 ESOH Hazard Risk Matrix**



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Mishap Severity Airworthiness MIL-STD- 882D (Dollar figures modified by DoDI 6055.07)	<ul> <li>All failure conditions which preclude the continued safe flight and landing of the aircraft</li> <li>Could result in death, permanent total disability, loss exceeding \$10M, or irreversible severe environmental damage that violates law or regulation</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Physical distress or exsuch that the flightcrew upon to perform their ta completely; or</li> <li>Serious or fatal injuries small number of perso flightcrew</li> <li>Could result in permandisability, injuries or oc that may result in hosp least three personnel, \$1M but less than \$10 environmental damage violation of law or regularity</li> </ul>	cannot be relied asks accurately or to a relatively ns other than the rent partial cupational illness italization of at loss exceeding M, or reversible e causing a	Wifig Pl ca in Ca oc oc or ex \$ da re	workload or in conditions impairing flightcrew efficiency; or Physical distress to passengers or cabin crew, possibly including injuries Could result in injury or occupational illness resulting in one or more lost work days(s), loss exceeding \$100K but less than \$1M, or mitigatible environmental damage without violation of law or regulation where restoration		margins capabiliti Slight inc workload plan cha Some ph passeng Could reu loss exc than \$10 environm	rease in flightcrew I, such as routine flight	<ul> <li>Slight reduction in safety margins</li> </ul>
	Software Functional DAL (DO-178B) Hardware Functional DAL (DO-254)				Level B	Le	vel C	Level D	Level E
FAA (AC 25.1	FAA (AC 25.1309-1B draft)		A Catastrophic	с	B Hazardous	С	Major	<b>D</b> Minor	E No Effect
	FAA (AC 25.1309-1A)		Catastrophic		ajor Mir		inor		
			Catastrophic I		Critical II	Març	jinal <b>III</b>	Negligible <b>IV</b>	Designed Out V
No Probability Requirement		A Frequent	1		3		7	13	21
Probable	0 <sup>-3</sup> Probable	B Probable Will occur frequently	2		5		9	16	22
Remote	-	0 <sup>-5</sup> C Occasional <sup>10</sup> <sup>-</sup> Will occur several times	5 4		6		11	18	23
Extremely <sup>10</sup> Remote	0-7 Improbable	D Remote 10 <sup>-</sup> Unlikely, but can reasonably be expected to occur	5 8		10		14	19	24
Extremely 10 Improbable	0 <sup>-9</sup> Extremely 10 Improbable	0-9 E Improbable 10- Unlikely to occur, but possible	12		15		17	20	25
	ESOH HRI Matrix (R1.0 PC12) KC-46 NewGen Tanker				Unacceptable				



### **EHS Hazard Risk Reviews**



- Environment, Occupational Health, and Occupational Safety (EHS) (Hazard Assessment Categories)
  - Environment Water, Air, Noise, D3, HM spills, HW clean up
  - OH Chemical Safety, Heat/Cold, Radiation, Confined Space, Ergonomics, Hazard Communication, Hearing Protection
  - OS Fall Protection, Ordinance, Haz Energy, PPE, GSE
- KC-46 Commodity Listings
  - Aircraft decomposed into "commodity groups"
  - A group is a new capability for 767 or significant impact to baseline 767 – 52 identified (example – centerline drogue)
  - Reviews lead by Boeing EHS and included MQE and HSI representatives.
  - Ranked from 1 EHS unmitigated hazard to 5 No EHS issues (118 hazards identified)



### **EHS Risk Acceptance Process**



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- MIL-STD-882E methodology used to identify EHS hazards and mitigate risks with Systems Engineering process
- EHS hazard analyses include human responses to processes and mitigations applied to reduce impacts dominated by human error causal factors compared with quantitative hazard risk analyses based on functional failure conditions for hardware and software performance
- Hazard analysis review and technical agreement of mitigated risk begins with the ESOH Working Group with final coordination by SSG prior to PM Acceptance
- Hazard categories are grouped into final acceptance packages
  - Include quad chart summarizing hazards, risks and mitigations
  - Detailed briefings for each hazard risk
  - Basis for frequency estimates



### **EHS Matrix**



EHS SEVERITY	Catastrophic (I)	Critical (II)	Marginal (III)	Negligible (IV)
Effect on Personnel	Death, permanent	Permanent partial	Injury or occupational	Injury or illness not
Effect on Personner	total disability	disability or occupation illness that may result in hospitalization of at least three personnel	illness resulting in one or	resulting in a lost work day
Effect on Environment	Irreversible severe environmental damage that violates law or regulation	Reversible environmental damage causing a violation of law or regulation	Mitigatible environmental damage without violation of law or regulation where restoration activities can be accomplished	Minimal environmental damage not violating law or regulation
Monetary Damages	Damage exceeding \$10M	Loss exceeding \$1M but less than \$10M	Loss exceeding \$100K but less than \$1M	Loss less than \$100K
EHS PROBABILITY	Catastrophic I	Critical II	Marginal III	Negligible IV
A Frequent Occurs at least once a month	IA	II A	III A	IV A
B Probable Occurs no more than once a month	IB	ШВ	III B	IV B
C Occasional Occurs no more than 4 times a year	IC)	ШС	ШС	1IV C
D Remote Occurs not more than once a year	ID	ll D	III D	IV D
E Improbable Occurs no more than once in 5 years	IE	ШЕ	ШЕ	IV E
F Eliminated Does Not Occur		I	VF	
4-7         SERIOUS         KC-46         Program E           8-12         MEDIUM         KC-46         Program M           13-17         LOW         KC-46         Chief Eng	tion Executive Approval Required xecutive Officer Approval Required Manager Approval Required ineer Approval Required ems Engineer Approval Required			



#### **Risk Acceptance Management Level**



Risk AssessmentRiskValueCategory		Risk Acceptance Management Level		
I A to II A	High	Air Force Acquisition Executive		
I C to II C	Serious	Program Executive Office for Tankers		
I D to I E Medium		KC-46 System Program Manager		
IV A to IV E	Low	KC-46 System Program Manager		
IV F	Eliminated	Not Required		



#### KC-46 EHS Hazard Risk Assessment Summary



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SEVERITY	CATASTOPHIC I	CRITICAL II	MARGINAL III	NEGLIGIBLE IV	
PROBABILITY					
A FREQENT Occurs at least once a month	(IA) <b>[0]</b>	(IIA) <b>[0]</b>	(IIIA) <b>[0]</b>	(IVA) <b>[3]</b>	
B PROBABLE Occurs no more than once a month	(IB) <b>[0]</b>	(IIB) <b>[0]</b>	(IIIB) <b>[0]</b>	(IVB) <b>[4]</b>	
C OCCASIONAL Occurs no more than 4 times a year	(IC) <b>[0]</b>	(IIC) <b>[0]</b>	(IIIC) <b>[1]</b>	(IVC) <b>[1]</b>	
D REMOTE Occurs not more than once a year	(ID) <b>[0]</b>	(IID) <b>[3]</b>	(IIID) <b>[28]</b>	(IVD) <b>[1]</b>	
E IMPROBABLE Occurs no more than once in 5 years	(IE) <b>[23]</b>	(IIE) <b>[15]</b>	(IIIE) <b>[27]</b>	(IVE) <b>[1]</b>	
F ELIMINATED Does not occur	(I∨) <b>[11]</b>				



### **EHS Hazard Risk by Category**



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	Risk Level					
Hazard Category	Medium	Low	Eliminated	Totals		
Occupational Health - Confined Space	6	0	1	7		
Occupational Safety - Fall from Elevation	8	5	2	15		
Occupational Health - Others*	8	8	1	17		
Occupational Safety - Hazardous Energy	3	7	1	11		
Occupational Safety - Ordnance	1	0	0	1		
Occupational Health - Ergonomics	1	40	4	45		
Occupational Safety - Fall on Same Level	0	6	0	6		
Environment	0	12	2	14		
Occupational Safety - Others**	0	2	0	2		
Totals	27	80	11	118		

\*Chemical exposure, ionizing and non-ionizing radiation, noise

\*\*Body strike, multiple safety hazards



#### Value of Systems Engineering Process to ESOH



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- Systems Engineering is best fit for ESOH
  - Broad coverage for Weapon System throughout Life Cycle
  - Systems Engineering is Separate Team in KC-46 under Development IPT
  - Tracks Specification Implementation through initial/detailed design to final verification (all report to SE with evaluations)
  - Manages Airwothiness and MFR process for SPM
  - ESOH Capabilities were added early in process
    - Started with SRD preparation (based on AMC developed CDD)
    - RFP preparation (SOO & example CRDLs, Recommendations for Offerors)
    - PESHE
  - Contract Award (start of Milestone activities)



#### **Lessons Learned**



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- As always, the earlier the better
- Vigilance is required by ESOH acquisition practitioners!
- Input from user on adverse ESOH impact is great!
- If isn't in the contract it will not happen (difficult to support EIS) if HM, pollutant and noise reduction are not in RFP & contract!
- Templates used to create acquisition documents may not incorporate ESOH (check everything)
- ESOH, HM elimination or reduction requirements and technologies change during acquisition process







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John H. Stallings (937) 255-5944 Air Force Life Cycle Management Center Tanker Directorate KC-46 Program john.stallings@us.af.mil





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# QUESTIONS?