

REPORT
of the
COMMISSION ON
GOVERNMENT
SECURITY

The report of the Commission stresses the dangers to national security that arise out of **overclassification** of information which retards scientific and technological progress, and thus tend to deprive the country of the lead time that results from the free exchange of ideas and information.

INDUSTRIAL SECURITY.—**Uniformity of regulations,** of procedures their application, and of administration appeared as the needed goal of any reform of the present industrial security program. Therefore, the Commission recommends the establishment of a Central Security Office in the executive branch of the Government, as previously noted. With this arrangement, the hazards of consolidation of all industrial security programs into a single agency are avoided, but the benefits of a unified program will be available by means of a monitoring system exercised through such a central office. The Director of the Central Security Office will advise with the heads of the various government agencies as to issuance of uniform regulations, the interchangeability and transference of clearances from one agency to another, the adoption and use of uniform forms for applicants for clearance, and the provision for hearing officers to preside over hearings afforded applicants for clearance whose clearance has been denied or revoked.

Uniformity and simplification is REQUIRED

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To insure uniformity within the armed services with respect to the Department of Defense Industrial Security Programs, the Commission recommends establishment of an Office of Security within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This office would integrate, control, and supervise the industrial security programs of the three services, thus eliminating duplicate clearances, investigations, fingerprinting and repetitious execution of clearance applicant and related forms, and accomplishing a streamlined administrative pattern eliminating delay resulting from use of chain-of-command communications regarding security matters. Classification guides would be issued by such office, and close scrutiny maintained on the classification of materials contracted for by the services. Downgrading and declassification programs would be monitored from this office, as well as disposition of classified material upon completion of contracts.



PROGRAM AND ADMINISTRATION


Consolidation of the Industrial Security Program in a Single Agency

The Commission recommends that the industrial security programs of all agencies should not be consolidated in a single agency, but that an act of Congress should be passed or an Executive order issued, specifying the policy and the major procedures governing all agencies of Government having need for an industrial security program.

The Commission does recommend consolidation of the industrial security programs of the various branches of the military services into a single, integrated program, devised, controlled, supervised, and operated by an Office of Security in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This single program would cover all the security aspects of the military industrial security program.


Under such proposal, there would be a single set of regulations promulgated by the Defense Department binding on the Army, Navy, Air Force.

Security personnel, including inspectors, would work under and be subject to the Office of Security in the Office of the Secretary of Defense rather than to Army, Navy, or Air Force.



Replacement of the present security standard by a more practical and positively worded one is recommended, namely, that clearance for access to classified material should be denied or revoked if it is determined on the basis of all available information that "access to classified information and materials will endanger the common defense and security." Also, ambiguous

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Consolidated Cost

Transfer of Clearance; Delay in Clearance

The Commission recommends that to avoid delay in contractor employee clearance there should be transfer of personnel security clearance between:

- Government employment and industry
- Military service and industry
- One Department of Defense contractor and another
- An Atomic Energy Commission contractor and a Department of Defense Contractor

Between one facility and another within the same company, all under the circumstances hereinafter set forth:

The creation of a central industrial security index in the Office of the Secretary of Defense should facilitate the exchange of clearances and eliminate duplicate investigations, fingerprinting, and the execution of unnecessary forms.


It is recommended that a current Department of Defense clearance for "secret" and "top secret" issued by the Office of Security in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, be recognized without further investigation by all facilities within the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense.

Where the standard for clearance as between agencies is the same and where the scope of the investigations is comparable and where the investigation in the opinion of the head of the transferee agency is current, the head of the transferee agency should accept the clearance in the absence of facts indicating to him the need for further evaluation.

Cost of the Industrial Security Program


The Commission believes that the departments and agencies conducting industrial security programs do not maintain adequate accounting records as to the costs of such programs. Considering the enormous costs of the industrial security programs, certainly the Department of Defense and other departments and agencies having such programs should establish a system of accounting for such costs. It is unrealistic that such a system of accounting has not been established in the past, and it is essential that it be established as soon as possible. Recognizing that it may be too expensive to require a highly-detailed cost analysis in this program, nevertheless we believe that there should be as much of a cost breakdown as is practicable.

In considering the cost aspect of the Department of Defense industrial security program, the Commission on Government Security was, after diligent effort, unsuccessful in obtaining comprehensive or reliable current or estimated future costs. Such cost figures were unobtainable because neither the Department of Defense nor the Armed Services maintain them. Figures made available to the Commission on Government Security gave only a partial cost picture at best, and reasons advanced for such deficiency were both illogical and unpersuasive.



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..... from the 84th Congress in 1957



Actual excerpts from the findings of the commission