Breaking News from an Unnamed Source Who Requested Anonymity...........

REPORT
of the
COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT SECURITY

leaking of milestones and progress to release new NISPOM with Changes !!
The report of the Commission stresses the dangers to national security that arise out of overclassification of information which retards scientific and technological progress, and thus tend to deprive the country of the lead time that results from the free exchange of ideas and information.

INDUSTRIAL SECURITY—Uniformity of regulations, of procedures, of their application, and of administration appeared as the needed goal of any reform of the present industrial security program. Therefore, the Commission recommends the establishment of a Central Security Office in the executive branch of the Government, as previously noted. With this arrangement, the hazards of consolidation of all industrial security programs into a single agency are avoided, but the benefits of a unified program will be available by means of a monitoring system exercised through such a central office. The Director of the Central Security Office will advise with the heads of the various government agencies as to issuance of uniform regulations, the interchangeability and transference of clearances from one agency to another, the adoption and use of uniform forms for applicants for clearance, and the provision for hearing officers to preside over hearings afforded applicants for clearance whose clearance has been denied or revoked.
Mandate for the Program Office

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New Office Reporting direct to SECDEF

Congressional Mandate for the Program Office

Complete Overhaul

Actual excerpts from the findings of the commission
Transfer of Clearance; Delay in Clearance

The Commission recommends that to avoid delay in contractor employee clearance there should be transfer of personnel security clearance between:

- Government employment and industry
- Military service and industry
- One Department of Defense contractor and another
- An Atomic Energy Commission contractor and a Department of Defense Contractor

Between one facility and another within the same company, all under the circumstances hereinafter set forth:

The creation of a central industrial security index in the Office of the Secretary of Defense should facilitate the exchange of clearances and eliminate duplicate investigations, fingerprinting, and the execution of unnecessary forms.

It is recommended that a current Department of Defense clearance for “secret” and “top secret” issued by the Office of Security in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, be recognized without further investigation by all facilities within the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense.

Where the standard for clearance as between agencies is the same and where the scope of the investigations is comparable and where the investigation in the opinion of the head of the transferor agency is current, the head of the transferee agency should accept the clearance in the absence of facts indicating to him the need for further evaluation.

Cost of the Industrial Security Program

The Commission believes that the departments and agencies conducting industrial security programs do not maintain adequate accounting records as to the costs of such programs. Considering the enormous costs of the industrial security programs, certainly the Department of Defense and other departments and agencies having such programs should establish a system of accounting for such costs. It is unrealistic that such a system of accounting has not been established in the past, and it is essential that it be established as soon as possible. Recognizing that it may be too expensive to require a highly-detailed cost analysis in this program, nevertheless we believe that there should be as much of a cost breakdown as is practicable.

In considering the cost aspect of the Department of Defense industrial security program, the Commission on Government Security was, after diligent effort, unsuccessful in obtaining comprehensive or reliable current or estimated future costs. Such cost figures were unattainable because neither the Department of Defense nor the Armed Services maintain them. Figures made available to the Commission on Government Security gave only a partial cost picture at best, and reasons advanced for such deficiency were both illogical and unpersuasive.
Actual excerpts from the findings of the commission