

Peter Huessy, Speech before the PSA-NDIA Conference March 17, 2015,

Springfield, Virginia

BROKEN WINDOWS AND A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY POLICY

Part 1:

In 1982, after another year of record lawlessness in New York City, two college professors advanced — or, more accurately, rekindled — a plausibly

uncomplicated theory that would revolutionize law enforcement in the city:

Maintaining public order also helps prevent crime. “If a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken,”

Professors George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson wrote in The Atlantic.

Critics denounce the theory as neoconservative pabulum resulting in overpolicing and mass incarceration for relatively minor offenses that disproportionately target

poor, black and Hispanic people. Moreover, they say it was not derived from

scientific evidence and its connection to the city’s drastic decline in major crime remains unproven.

But the theory has been buttressed by one incidental measure. According to the

Census Bureau’s latest American Housing Survey, the number of broken windows in the millions of homes and apartments in the New York metropolitan area

plunged during the last decade.

And broken-windows policing produces another benefit beyond reducing crime, Professor Kelling added: “In an urbanized society, in a world of strangers, civility and orderliness is an end in itself.

The NYPD’s critics object, in particular, to the department’s long-standing practice of maintaining order in public spaces. This practice, widely referred to as Broken Windows or quality-of-life or order-maintenance policing, asserts that, in communities contending with high levels of disruption, maintaining order not only improves the quality of life for residents; it also reduces opportunities for more serious crime. Indeed, the Broken Windows metaphor is one of deterioration: a building where a broken window goes unrepaired will soon be subject to far more extensive vandalism—because it sends a message that the building owners (and, by extension, the police) cannot or will not control minor crimes, and thus will be unable to deter more serious ones. A neighborhood where minor offenses go unchallenged soon becomes a breeding ground for more serious criminal activity and, ultimately, for violence.

Today, by far the largest and densest city in the United States has a lower murder rate, at four per 100,000, than the nation as a whole, at 4.5 per 100,000. In 1993, New York accounted for about 7.9 percent of the nation’s homicides; last year, the city’s share was just 2.4 percent. While the national murder rate per 100,000

people has been cut in half since 1994, the rate in New York has declined by more than six times.

Between 1992-2008 law enforcement personnel rose by 141,000; adult incarceration rate doubled from 1990-2000; more cops on the street more bad guys behind bars

PART 2

Bret Stephens of the WSJ in his new book ("America in Retreat") argues that there may indeed be a broken windows policy cure for our increasingly disorganized world.

How did we arrive at a broken windows world he asks?

Well, when rules are invoked but not enforced. When principles are idealized but not defended.

When international law is treated as superior to geopolitical leadership--as when leaders proclaim that "moral leadership is more powerful than any weapon"--Patton's Seventh Army men of WW II and the Battle of the Bulge might disagree.

When rules are not enforced they will be flouted.

Stephens continues:

If no red line is enforced in Syria, what persuades Iran from not marching across the red lines of the IAEA?

Or Russia from playing what I term post Soviet-Pac Man with the Crimea, or Georgia or Moldova?

What stops China from its adventures in the South China Sea?

And if the US will not honor the Budapest memorandum with Ukraine, why would Israel or Japan trust similar paper agreements?

Now some have proffered a new American strategy. Strategic patience they explain should, for example, let the violence in Ukraine play itself out because Putin will eventually tire of this as his economy flounders.

But Putin says on March 16 he was surprised how easy it was to take Crimea and eastern Ukraine--he thought he would have had to deploy and threaten the use of nuclear weapons to pull it off, but he said "it did not come to that". Does this sound like someone who is going to tire of aggression?

What about "leading from behind"? This policy assumes a forward US presence makes many potential allies unwilling to follow because they see the US as a bully. Under this policy, we take extra care not to "offend anyone". The push to close

Gitmo was based almost entirely on the strange idea that putting murdering jihadis in the slammer some-how encouraged more jihadis to volunteer to join terror groups because they are angry the US is not following progressive moral standards by having a jail such as Guantanamo Bay.

For example, the rules of engagement in Iraq require a General officer to review video of the target and certify that no civilian collateral damage will occur before a strike is authorized. Because we are so worried that pictures of civilian casualties will appear on the evening news, our airstrikes against ISIS can be characterized says Mitchell Institute Dean retired General David Deptula, as a drizzle and not a thunderstorm. But as a new JINSA study by four retired American Generals explains, the evil act is in placing civilians in harm's way, not those who take out the bad guys who put them there in the first place.

PILLARS OF A BROKEN WINDOWS SECURITY POLICY

I think we can do better than “Leading from Behind” in a climate of “Strategic Patience”.

Bret Stephens suggests there are five pillars of such a new security policy: Presence, Reciprocity, Action, Priorities and Speed. Let’s examine how we might think of each of these.

PRESENCE:

This is the opposite of minimizing the American presence in the world. In 1984, we had 557 Navy ships while we have 289 today and are heading to 240.

Yes, while our ships are more capable now than they were in the past--we cannot as a Navy be two places simultaneously.

Presence is important. Let us look simply at the business dimension. In 1961 the US traded with the world was \$80 billion. It is now \$3.7 trillion. In 1961, DOD budget was \$49 billion out of \$100 billion Federal spending (or nearly 50%). It is now a base budget of \$520 billion out of a Federal budget of \$4 trillion, or 13%. Add in the OCO accounts and the percent is higher, around 15%,

Iran's RGC leader has said Tehran knows where the 32 most critical infrastructure nodes are in the United States. He also claims Iran and its allies now sit astride 3 of the top 5 trade route straits in the world--the Persian Gulf, the Suez and Panama Canal. We need a presence where these threats are.

Would you move to a new neighborhood and ask the realtor, "There aren't too many police in the neighborhood are there?"

RECIPROCITY

While we are right to insist that our allies contribute a greater percent of their GDP to defense, in the first decade of this century the US wasted \$46 billion on cancelled acquisitions, appointment made most recently by Senator John McCain at a CSIS meeting the morning of March 26th. Acquisition we did undertake was truncated: we bought 3 Sea Wolf subs and not the planned 29; we purchased 187 F-22s and not the planned 650; and we built 3 DDG 1000 Zumwalt class ship not the 32 planned. And we have seen defense spending cut by a cumulative \$1.5-\$2.0 trillion since 2009.

Let us put things in perspective.

In 1979 at the height of the British post WWII economic decline, when Margaret Thatcher began to rescue the alliance, Great Britain spent 4.9% of its GDP on defense. Estonia, Poland the UK and US are the only countries in NATO that now spend even 2% or more on defense. A first principle would be that the current budget caps on defense be eliminated and we set an example for our allies to follow.

ACTION

We should, writes Mr. Stephens, make harsh examples of what he calls "misbehaving tyrants" although I caution we should not try to build a replica of the labor department or EPA in Baghdad or Kabul. [Parenthetically, the Iranians call the widely examined rules of the road adopted by most of the world since WW II "the great arrogance" which they wish to replace, in part, with Islamic Shariah law.]

Let's look at some history....

- oIsrael took out Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor on June 7, 1981.

Stephens notes we got rid of the communist regime in Grenada (1993)--[by the way the first time since the start of the Cold War when the communists literally lost ground.]

- oWe went after Libya for its bombing of the disco in Germany where American soldiers were killed on April 14, 1986.

- oWe reflagged the Kuwaiti tankers and stomped on the Iranian attackers (1988).

- oWe ended a narco regime in Panama (1989).

- oWe restored Kuwait's sovereignty (1991).

- oWe stopped the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo,(1995-6).

oWe eliminated the Khan “Nukes ‘R Us” network and the Libyan nuclear program in 2006.

oIsrael took out the Syria's al-Kibar nuclear facility on September 6, 2007.

PRIORITIES

What should our security priorities be?

The day prior to Russia's invasion of Ukraine the secretary of state was giving a speech on climate change in Jakarta. We were completely blind to Moscow's pending aggression? Or was it not a priority to even watch what Putin was up to?

Did we think “reset” had solved that problem?

The former head of the IAEA, Hans Blix told me in a 2006 Senate briefing that “Global Warming” was a more serious threat to mankind than nuclear proliferation. He said none of the five nuclear powers should have nuclear weapons, “any more than Sweden” he said. And he further noted that if the US had nuclear weapons, how was it that we could demand that Iran and North Korea not have such weapons.

Now you can understand how North Korea, Iran Libya and Pakistan all developed nuclear weapons under his regime.

The US government spends \$5 billion annually on global warming research--on a subject we are told where the science is settled. And we spend \$7 billion on green

alternative fuels in the Department of Defense according to the Heritage Foundation. Should these really be priorities?

On the other hand, we are told that spending 4-5% of the annual defense budget on the entire nuclear deterrent enterprise [\$24 billion a year] is a "trillion dollar program" [if measured over thirty years] and therefore unaffordable.

But the US treasury department tells GAO that tax fraud alone in the EITC and the CTC nets crooks some \$20 billion a year--much of its to organized crime elements who often use illegal aliens as claim filers.

On top of which, if you measure means tested poverty programs for the past thirty years, (adjusted for inflation) by comparison, it comes to \$17 trillion even as poverty rates have increased.

Thirty years of this tax fraud and "green research" is amazingly \$960 billion.

So what's affordable?

PUT FIRES OUT QUICKLY

As the specter of tyranny moves closer to the core of the democratic world, says Stephens, "the world becomes a less hospitable place"--such as Columbia and Venezuela, Pakistan and India, Russia and Ukraine.

Thus if we are going to send the fire brigades to the fire, we have to put these fires out quickly.....

Stephens asks whether a firefighter would put out a fire only after it had burned down the house--- under the theory that then the fire would be easier to put out.

He notes a cruise missile taking out a single radio tower in Rwanda prevents the Hutus from broadcasting their plan of attack against the Tutsis during the 1994 genocide. Millions of lives could have been saved. My own proposal: a few cruise missiles would take out the few Iranian refineries....

So intimidated have we become that German Chancellor Mrs. Merkel—whom I like and support-- sadly says she cannot support any lethal aid to Ukraine—not because Ukraine doesn't need such equipment, but because she says there is no military push back that will persuade Mr Putin from stopping his aggression against Ukraine.

ISN'T THIS SOMEONE ELSE'S JOB?

Many pundits left and right declare America is a war weary nation. That it is someone else's job to "do the heavy lifting", to stop bad guys from doing bad things. That it does not matter whose flag is planted in some country half way around the globe. And many Americans do not see the benefits right now of a forward deployed and engaged military.

Why the gloomy outlook? We have just recently in broad historical terms--- been markedly successful in making the world "safe for democracy". And simultaneously we ushered in the fastest growing economy in the world over nearly a 25 year period from 1983-2007. Senator McCain in the CSIS address mentioned above eloquently explained how the established rules after World War II led to unprecedented peace and prosperity were undergirded by US and allied military force. He made the point that soft power lay in the shadow of America's hard power.

For example, Freedom House tracks the trend of democracy in the world.

In a recent report, there has been a clear upward trend in the last 40 years especially between 1983-92.

This trend holds true for both electoral democracies and liberal democracies.

For example, by 2010 there were 115 electoral democracies in the world (out of 194 countries).

This is almost 3 times the number of the early 1970s when there were 45 democracies.

When Reagan came into office there were 55 such regimes; when Reagan left in 1980 there were 80.

And 108 when President George H. W. Bush left office in 1992...

And 120 when Clinton left office in 2000, with that number increasing modestly to 123 in 2007 but sliding to 122 in 2014.

THE REAGAN REVIVAL

The revival the United States experienced during the Reagan presidency confounded the gloomy conventional wisdom of the 1970s that lamented the inevitability of America's decline.

President Reagan chartered not only to the demise of the Soviet Union, but to the vast expansion of democracy around the world. His economic policies—based on free markets, low taxes, and less intrusive government regulation of private enterprise—catalyzed three decades of unprecedented economic dynamism and laid the foundation for America's military primacy, on which the robustness of freedom still depends.

THE DECADE BEFORE

But the revival did not “just happen”. It is not as if the previous trends inevitably pointed to “good times ahead”.

In an excellent report "The First Principles of Ronald Reagan's Foreign Policy", from the Heritage Foundation (First Principles Series Report #40 on Political Thought, November 1, 2011), Robert G. Kaufman sums up the decade of neglect so well I am going to both cite and paraphrase it at length.

The Arab oil boycott followed the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, and this in turn led to further oil shocks of 1978–1979. The fall of the Shah of Iran simply

underlined the then stagflation (low growth, high interest rates, high inflation), that was ravaging the American economy.

By the final year of the Carter Administration, and including the subsequent double-dip recession, the economy had plummeted to post–World War II lows, with inflation reaching 14 percent, interest rates soaring to a 21 percent prime rate and unemployment hitting 10.4%. That’s a misery index of 45%. Compare that to 1989: inflation at 2%; unemployment at 5.4%; interest rates at 7.2% or roughly 15%.

By 1980, defense spending had dropped to 4.8 percent of GDP, less than half of the amounts that Presidents Harry Truman, John Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson had spent to keep the nation secure.

The Iranian takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran in November 1979 epitomized the enervating self-doubt about the credibility and capability of American power.

For 444 days, the militant mullahs held 52 Americans hostage, [Ironically, former President Carter later would boast that he was most proud of the fact that not once

did he send American troops into harm's way for his entire Presidency—Desert One didn't count he explained because the mission never really got underway].

What made America's predicament more ominous was that it coincided with the rising power and assertiveness of the Soviet Union. During the 1970s, the Soviet Union engaged in a massive peacetime military buildup in history, consuming upwards of 35-45% of its GDP.

Correspondingly, Soviet expansionism surged, culminating in the Red Army's invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 after the fall of some 22 other nations to communism or tyranny during the decade. The Soviet dictators were confident that the correlation of forces had changed irrevocably in their favor. A virulently anti-American Third World bloc at the United Nations also reached its peak of influence, with American ideals and interests relentlessly under assault.

Three key events—I term it the “evil trifecta”—took place at the very end of the decade. Saddam Hussein took power 1978 and invaded Iran in 1980. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979. And the Mullahs took power in Tehran in 1979. A third of a century later we are still entangled in the legacy of these events.

Fortuitously, at the same time, over a period of 24 months and 19 days, Margaret Thatcher came to power as Prime Minister in Great Britain on May 4, 1979; Karol Józef Wojtyła became Pope John Paul II on the 16th of October 1978; and Ronald Reagan was elected November 4, 1980 President of the United States. [And this of course proves there is indeed a God that watches over us and saves us from our foolishness.]

RESULTS UNDER REAGAN

Reagan closed his presidency with as one commentator put it, “a new sense of excitement, even perhaps felt by those who lived in Jefferson’s time: a sense of new possibilities for the idea of popular government. Only this time, it is not just a single nation at issue: It is the whole world where popular government might flourish and prosper.”

Said former Secretary of State George Shultz who marveled in retrospect at Reagan’s foresight:

"I recall President Reagan’s Westminster speech in 1982—that communism would be consigned to the ash heap of history. And what happened. Between 1980 and 1990 a number of countries that were classified as free or mostly free increased by

50 percent. Open political systems have been gaining ground and there's good reason for it. They work better."

THE DECADE AFTER

President Reagan said you could lose freedom in one generation. So what happened in the decade after the end of the Cold War?

At the end of the Cold War the DOD budget in 1991 was \$316 billion; in 2001 it had recovered to \$282 billion but had dropped to \$244 billion in 1996, the lowest of the Cold War budgets to date.

This trough was a cumulative \$400 billion below the FY1991 end of Cold War budget which itself reflected reductions allowed by the big arms control treaties—the INF, START and CFE.

But we underfunded by 40% all major remaining acquisition programs --compared to what force structure was determined to be required and called for in the budget requests vs. what the annual acquisition budgets would actually buy.

And the 1992-2000 period was not all peaceful although no major wars occurred and prosperity was robust—a tribute to both the Clinton administration and the

Gingrich led Congress that together reformed welfare, balanced the budget, enhanced the child tax credit and cut taxes on investments,

But we also had the WTC and CIA attacks of 1993; Khobar Towers in 1995; the African Embassy bombings of 1998; the Murrah building terror attack in 1996; and the USS Cole in 1998.

What has been called the "velocity of instability" was acquiring strength as the decade waned.

Very importantly, but little noticed, was a June 2000, meeting on Capitol Hill. The top administration counter-terrorism expert, Richard Clarke, told a private Congressional briefing led by Congressman Chris Shays that, "we [the U.S.] could not prioritize the terrorist threats we faced because there were too many" and to try and do so "would be silly". And when asked whether the administration could "prioritize how to spend counter-terrorism funds", he said such a task was something the "administration was thinking about", this some 88 months after the World Trade Center bombing of 1993. Was such a strategy going to stop an attack such as 9-11?

AMERICA IN RETREAT? 2009-2015

Where are we today?

According to former Ambassador John Bolton, speaking just days ago at a High Frontier and Center for Security Policy forum in South Carolina, our Navy may soon be as small as 240-276 ships compared to 610 at the height of the Reagan modernization plan. The USAF after projected cuts from the budget caps will be the smallest in its history and the Army will be smaller than at any other time since just before World War II.

General Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, says there are now more terror groups and threats to the US than at any time over the past 40 years.

Conflicts in Yemen, Somalia, Ukraine, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iraq, Nigeria, Mali, Kenya, as well as threats from North Korea, China and Russia are serious cause for concern.

Now each of these conflicts, threats or challenges---nation centric as they are--do not include the associated terror groups or what are known as transnational issues such as energy security, Ebola type issues, trade or cyber warfare. But in putting together a policy for any one of these challenges, it will be folded into a larger strategic defense strategy that will no doubt address these issues as well—especially counter terrorism and counter proliferation.

AMERICA UNDER REPAIR

Looking at our successful history of repairing American power and diplomacy, what would the "Principles of a Broken Window Theory of Security Policy" look like, keeping in mind what has worked and what has not worked in the past?

Let's call them the magnificent seven [as Bret Stephens lays them out]:

- 1. There is no substitute for American power.*
- 2. A strong defense is the best deterrent.*
- 3. The order in the international neighborhood matters.*
- 4. Regime types matter.*
- 5. Think geopolitically.*
- 6. Embrace American exceptionalism.*
- 7. Different times call for different strategies one size does NOT fit all.*

DIPLOMACY AND MILITARY FORCE

And lastly, how should we deal with this artificial division of diplomacy and war?

Many critics believe that the only substitute for diplomacy is war.

One letter this last week to the Wall Street Journal complained that Amb John Bolton's call for American "bold leadership" inevitably would lead to American young men and women putting their boots on the ground and that was a prescription "for another Iraqi type war."

Other pundits and “experts are nearly unanimous in their dismissal of critics of the Iran negotiations, for example, because they assert without hesitation that the only alternative to the current diplomatic P5+1 negotiation is war.

Similarly, a very prominent US Senator said in 2006 that had her party been in office, “We would have brought peace to the Middle East because we would emphasize diplomacy”.

But as Angelo Codevilla has eloquently explained:

"Emphasizing diplomacy is inherently meaningless. To speak thus is to pretend either that the war's issues are trivial or that words can make them so. Such pretense enables the further pretense that the speaker is not on either side, rather than on the side of peace..."

On January 21, 2007, Henry Kissinger put it equally well when he wrote in the Washington Post, “A free standing diplomacy is an ancient American illusion. History offers few examples of it. The attempt to separate diplomacy and power results in power lacking direction and diplomacy being deprived of incentives”.

Or to put it more simply, as two former Senators laid it out, diplomacy and power combined work. Said former Senator and SASC chairman Sam Nunn, 'In effect, we won the Cold War because we were tenacious, and because we had strength” as he also reminded us that “The most successful alliance in history has been NATO”.

Former Senator Malcolm Wallop put it this way in his farewell Senate address, in October 1994, "Diplomacy without the threat of force is but prayer".

Should we fix the broken windows? That will require military force. And economic sanctions. And Treasury restrictions on trade and investment. And cyber attacks. And blockades. And most importantly, the judgment to know which windows to fix and when.

In short, referring back to our pillars of a new security policy, we could summarize an American security policy this way:

By our Presence and by our allies Reciprocity, we will take Action guided by Priorities, at all deliberate Speed. These could be the new five watchwords of the next /new American century.