The Air Force View of IAMD in a Joint Environment

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Air Force View

Homeland Defense

Regional Challenges

Air Force IAMD Lines-of-Effort
  - Operational C2
  - Tactical C2/C3
  - Sensors
  - Engagement Systems
Air Force View of IAMD

JP 3-01: Countering air and missile threats requires a holistic approach that includes:
- OCA attack ops
- Active AMD
- Passive AMD
- C2 and ISR framework

COUNTERAIR

OFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR
- Attack Operations
  - Attacks on missile sites, airfields, command and control, infrastructure
- Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
- Fighter Escort
- Fighter Sweep

DEFENSIVE COUNTEAIR
- Active Air & Missile Defense
  - Air Defense
  - Ballistic Missile Defense
- Passive Air & Missile Defense
  - Detection & Warning
  - CBRN Defenses
  - Camouflage, Concealment, & Deception
  - Hardening
  - Reconstitution
  - Dispersion
  - Redundancy
  - Mobility
Homeland Defense

- Missile Defense
- Missile Warning
- Air Defense
- C2
- Deterrence
Regional Challenges

Our focus should always be on returning to the offense – we cannot be content to play catch.
A2/AD Challenges Force Projection

- Networked
- Integrated
- Attack in Depth
- Disrupt
- Destroy
- Defeat

- Offensive Counter Space
- Secure Communications
- Battlespace Awareness
- Electronic Attack
- Qualitatively Superior Units
- Advanced Aircraft SAMs
- ASUW
- ASBM
- ASCM
- LACM
- Offensive Counter Cyber
- Strategic Mobility
- Expeditionary Land Basing
- Sea Basing
- Homeland as Sanctuary
- Expeditionary Operations

- Permissive
- Contested
- Highly Contested

- US Sovereign Territory
- 3rd Party Sovereign Territory
- Adversary Sovereign Territory
- Submarine Mines

- Space
- Cyber
- Air
- Land
- Maritime

Integrity - Service - Excellence
Four Pillars of IAMD

- No Threat: Deny or limit enemy capability
- No Launch: Prevent or limit launch
- No Impact: Minimize impacts
- No Consequences: Mitigate effects

Non-Proliferation
Deterrence
Offensive Operations
Active Defense
Passive Defense

IAMD Pillars

Battle Management, Command & Control, Communication, and Intelligence

POLITICAL
Air Force IAMD Lines-of-Effort

- Command and Control
- Sensors
- Engagement Systems
1. JFMCC and JFLCC are supporting commanders to JFACC/AADC for IAMD
2. Navy retains OPCON/TACON of multi-mission IAMD ships; Army retains OPCON/TACN of Army ADA forces
3. AADC engagement control and authority for multi-mission IAMD ships is normally through a RADC designated by JFACC and approved by the JFMCC
Tactical C2/C3

- CRC Modernization
- AWACS 40/45
- Joint Aerial Layer Network
- 5\textsuperscript{th} – 4\textsuperscript{th} Integration
- Joint Track Management Capability
Sensors

- 3DELRR
- TACAIR sensors
- AWACS sensor way ahead
- BMD tracking and discrimination
- Space sensors
Engagement Systems

- Air-to-Air
- Air base defense
- BMD engagement
Airborne Weapons Layer Concept

- Fighter aircraft as launch platforms
- Leverages evolving sensor and weapon technologies to develop
  - Upper-tier weapon focused on exo-atmospheric intercepts – long range, fast (approx 3.5 km/s at burnout)
  - Lower-tier weapon focused on endo-atmospheric intercepts – AMRAAM body, shorter range, slower (approx 1.75 km/s burnout)
Questions?