Development of Strategic Guidance

- New Strategic Guidance
  President, January 2012

- Defense Strategy
  December 2011

- Strategic Choices Review
  October-November 2011

- Defense Program Guidance
  June-September 2011

- Comprehensive Review
  Sec Def Gates, April-May 2011

- Budget Control Act
  August 2011
• The Department of Defense needed to make a strategic shift regardless of the nation’s fiscal situation
• The guidance is the first step to build the joint force of 2020, a force sized and shaped differently than the military of the Cold War, the post-Cold War, or the force built over the past decade to engage in large-scale ground wars.

• Four Overarching Principles guided development:
  1. Maintain the world’s finest military
  2. Avoid a hollow force – Smaller, ready, and well-equipped is preferable
  3. Savings must be achieved in a balanced manner
  4. Preserve the quality of the all-volunteer force

• Structure and pace the reductions to the ground forces in a way that they can surge, regenerate and mobilize capabilities needed for any contingency
One way to “Move Past Acceptance”
Army Strategy (as nested with the Defense Strategy) in a fiscally constrained environment requires us to change vehicle procurement: fleet size, vehicle cost and the acquisition strategies for procurement.

I. Review of TWV Strategy and Fleets

II. Re-examining Modularity

III. Equipping or Modernizing

IV. The Iron Triangle Applied

V. How to best Modernize

VI. Buy less, more often

VII. Conclusions
Purpose: The Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Portfolio provides movement of personnel and cargo, and mobility for a majority of mission support systems, i.e., Prophet, ITAS, LRAS, etc.

TWV Objectives

Transform
Develop, acquire and field the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle

- JLTV Program Replaces ~ 1/3 of LTV Fleet
- Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) Tech Demonstrators

Replace
Replace legacy platforms with systems capable of meeting the threats of today and tomorrow

- Selected Replacement w/Existing Vehicles
- MRAP Family of Vehicles

Improve
Conduct recapitalization of current vehicles so they remain relevant and capable

- Buys Back:
  - Performance
  - Mobility
  - Armor Capability (HEMTT & PLS)
- Integrates Network
- Extends Service Life

TWV Means

Fleet Operations
- Equip forces IAW ARFORGEN to meet all mission requirements
- Equip Army with vehicle training sets and simulation devices

Fleet Size and Mix
- Shape fleet size and mix to ensure long-term affordability; reduce fleet size approximately 15%
- Replace vehicles on average every 40 years and recapitalize them midway

Protection
- Accept three tiers of armor protection: unarmored, B-Kit/Frag Kit and MRAP/JLTV
- Provide armor-capable vehicles to equip Available force pool and contingency forces (≥ 50% of fleet)
- Provide armor kits to equip Available force pool (≥ 30% of fleet)

Industry Strength/Technology Advancements
- Through competition, promote healthy industrial base, including government depots
- Improve fleet fuel economy by 10-15% for new/recapitalized vehicles
- Implement reliability/maintainability improvements, design commonality and competitive support strategies to reduce total ownership costs

As of 27 JAN 2012
Facts:

- Current fleet on hand inventory is 160,691.
- MRAP and M-ATV are additive to the fleet ~17,000 and will remain as capability set.
- MRAP and M-ATV will require RECAP beginning in FY27.
- Light Fleet requirement could go below 100K.
- FY10 REQ was 153,244, FY12 REQ is 139,527, FY18 REQ is 136,758.
- Will divest excess legacy HMMWVs as requirements are reduced.

Average Age in 2012:

- 8 years

with MRAPs

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Average Age in 2012
9 years
- FY10 Requirement: 77,014, FY12 Requirement: 74,380, FY18 72,906 (Previous FY18 Requirement 84,738) : 4K requirement reduction
- Force Structure changes will most likely remove majority of M900 series in the POM Cycle.
- ~22K M900 series will be divested by FY16; ~3.6K FMTV A0s will be divested by FY16.
- Conduct depot sustainment repair (Reset) of armored MTVs as they are retrograded from theater.
- Requirement could drop 20-30K within this upcoming POM Cycle

**Average Age in 2012**
7 years
• Fleet has grown from 10K in requirements in FY00 to FY18

• Anticipate HTV fleet could drop to 30K

• Recapitalize vehicles to modernize and extend service life (when economically feasible)

• Modernize:
  • Engineer formations by replacing the M916 Line Haul Tractor with the M983 LET
  • PLS Trailers by recapitalizing them to integrate the Container Transfer Enhancement (CTE) onto the trailer
  • CHUs with new procurement of Enhanced Container Handling Unit (ECHU)

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In the aggregate, we are 50% Armor Capable for the HTV Fleet!

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Average Age in 2012
7 years
Re-examining Modularity

FROM: 18 Divisions
10 AC / 8 ARNG

Trades efficiencies of the task organized division for increased strategic flexibility and depth created by BCTs capable of independent operations.

Affordable?

Modularity + Structure Growth Increased the Army’s TWV Requirement

TC: 73 Brigade Combat Teams
45 AC / 28 ARNG

Brigade Based Modular Army Provides:
- 30% increase in AC combat power
- 50% increase in rotational pool
- Deployable, joint capable HQ
- Standardized AC & RC designs
- Designs compatible with future force
- Increased AO
- Increased Mobility, Versatility and Sustainability

As of 27JAN 2012
Equipping vs. Modernization?

Age of the Fleet: 7 to 9 years → Improving

Requirements: 262K → 233K → >200K Decreasing

EQUIPPING → OKAY!

Protection/Mobility/Lethality → Iron Triangle

Development Funding → Decreasing

MODERNIZATION → CHALLENGING

MRAP LESSONS
Cost? Time? Performance?
You can get two out of three which do you choose?

Cost: Over $50B for ~29K vehicles (All Services)

Time:
- Speed of production and integration phenomenal
- Speed of production and delivery, sacrificed overall performance and cost

Performance:
- based on blast protection - outstanding
- first LRIPs of MRAPs didn’t provide off road mobility
- reliability sacrificed for speed of delivery
- continuing to work non-standard fielding issues

The Army needs to maintain MRAP level protection for future vehicles, while controlling cost, improving performance and integrating the network of the future!
The Army will continue to buy vehicles into the future. The buys will be for less vehicles, more often to reduce the increment costs and to infuse new technology into the vehicle. Performance and affordability are more important now than ever!
Buying Less, More Often

With the outlook of fiscal austerity in future Defense Budgets:
We will need to buy less, more often!

- Will not be able to buyout entire fleets; will require multiple purchase cycles
- Multiple buys will allow technology be integrated into the platforms during manufacturing, rather than ECPs
- Continue to leverage Industry investment into research and design of prototypes

JLTV Tech Demonstrators

- BAE JLTV Tech Demonstrator
- Lockheed Martin JLTV Tech Demonstrator
- GTV JLTV Tech Demonstrator

As of 27 JAN 2012
THANK YOU FOR SUPPORTING THE SOLDIER!