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NDIA Joint CBRN Conference & Exhibition March 2012



"Investing in transformational ideas, innovative people, and actionable technology development for Chemical Biological Defense solutions"

DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY

JOINT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OFFICE

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

Dr. Jason Paragas Senior Scientist, DTRA RD-CB



The Threat is Real

Established Bioterrorism Programs

- Al-Qaeda: Kandahar,
 Afghanistan
- Aum Shinrikyo: Tokyo,
 Japan
- Call for BW expertise
 - Al-Qaeda public call for scientists to develop and test biological weapons



Aum Shinrikyo Hq.



Anthrax Spraying, Tokyo

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/ EID/vol10no1/03-0238.htm



Tarnak Farms, *Al Qaeda* training camp, Kandahar, Afghanistan

- Emerging infectious diseases create an unpredictable source of pathogens
- Dual Use Research of Concern
- Proliferation of unsafe bio-containment labs
- WMD Commission: Biological attack more likely than nuclear



http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/ library/imint/images/011031-D-6570C-003.jpg

Evolving Policies Drive Preparedness

HSPD-10, 2004 Biodefense for the 21st Century

"The essential pillars of our national biodefense program are: Threat Awareness, Prevention and Protection, Surveillance and Detection, and Response and Recovery"

HSPD-21, 2007 Public Health and Medical Preparedness

"The United States must develop a nationwide, robust, and integrated biosurveillance capability"

NSCBT / PPD-2, 2009 National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats

"Building Global Capacity for Disease Surveillance, Detection, Diagnosis, and Reporting"



Addressing the Challenge of Preparedness

Our Nation must have the nimble, flexible capacity to produce MCMs rapidly in the face of any attack or threat, known or unknown, including a novel, previously unrecognized, naturally occurring emerging infectious disease The Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise Review Aug 2010

The nation does not yet have adequate capability to meet fundamental expectations during a large-scale biological event. Bi-Partisan WMD Terrorism Center: Bio-Response Report Card October 2011

" If achieving national goals for developing MCMs is likened to climbing a mountain, then most of the mountain remains to be climbed"

WHERE ARE THE COUNTERMEASURES? PROTECTING AMERICA'S HEALTH FROM CBRN THREATS March 2010 A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BIODEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

How Ready Are We For Bioterrorism?

NY Times 10/30/2011

Ten years after the anthrax letters and after billions of dollars of investment in labs and research debate continues over how much safer the country is Science September 2011 Pentagon rethinks bio-terror effort Critics say US\$1.5billion initiative has not delivered results Nature News 477, 380-381 2011



This Requires Global Engagement

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NATO - TEM ZC Sweden-Oxime Cooperation Czech Republic (IEA) PA)—MCM (Tularemia) Poland—TaCBRD,⁷OPWG UK (IEA, TTCP)—DX MCM, Detection M&S, HM Canada (TTCP) DX, MCM, Detection, M&S, HM Israel (IEAPA) M&S and MCM, CPWG France-Biosurveillance

NAMRU-6-Advanced Pathogen Detection and Discovery and Dx RDECOM-Americas-Technical cooperative opportunities within South America Chile-Biosurveillance and M&S Brazil—Technical Cooperation Developing

Sierra Leone—Geo-temporal Information Awareness (GIA) South Africa—Technical Cooperation Developing Nigeria - Test point of care Dx, Biosurveillance, MCM

India (IEA, PA)—CB Defense S&T Workshops, Dx, MCM (Alpha Viruses) Bilateral RD Cooperation Forum Singapore (IEA, PA) - MCM (Burkholderia), M&S, Biosurveillance Republic of Korea—Able Response Excerise, Comparative Genomics, M&S, Detection Japan—CDWG, Decon, M& (Threat Assessment), MCM Thailand—Test point of care Dx, Biosurveillance, MCM Australia (TTCP)—DX, MCM, Detection, M&S, HM New Zealand (TTCP)—DX, MCM, Detection, M&S, HM AFRIMS—Pathogen Discovery, Genomics NAMRU-2—Biosurveillance, Dx

Dx—Diagnostics M&S—Modeling and Simulation

MCM—Medical Counter Measure TTCP—The Technical Cooperation Program IEA—Information Exchange Annex **PA**—Project Agreement

HM—Hazard Management



Return on Investment:

Leverage/Harvest Technologies

Access to Diseases of Interest

• Building Partner Capacity

Biosurveillance

Rapid Response to Outbreaks: *E.coli* 0104:H4 Characterization Efforts

- To exercise real world challenge to rapidly explore deep genomic information for a emerging infectious threat agent using a combination of three 2nd-generation sequencing systems coupled with conventional finishing techniques.
- Correlate physical, clinical, and phenotypic observations to the improved genome using the suite of phenotypic assays available to a DoD/CDC lab consortium
- Link Laboratory Response Network (LRN) to Defense Lab Network (DLN)

Also part of an ongoing organic DoD process for enhancing therapeutic and diagnostic countermeasures







Bielaszewska, et.al. Lancet. 2011.



Strategic Thrusts and Enablers

Disease Surveillance, Threat Detection and Point of Need Diagnostics

Broad-Spectrum Detection Fieldable Dx Sequencing Molecular Recognition Host Response Exposure Prediction Functional Consequences



Adaptive Medical Countermeasures and Technologies

Vaccines

Immune Modulators Bio-Prophylaxes Bio-Therapeutics Regulatory Sciences Mfg Technologies

Systems Biology





Individual Protection Nanostructured Materials Smart Materials Simulation and Analysis Decision Support Decontamination





Applied Math Tools

Multifunctional Materials

Flexible Design & Manufacturing

Rapid Response and Restoration Science and Technology

Point Detection Agent Characterization Mathematical Recognition Transport & Dispersion Risk-Based Hazard Plots Agent Fate

Threat Activity Sensing and Reporting



Strategic Thrust: Disease Surveillance, Rapid Threat Detection, and Point of Need Diagnostics



Delivering Diagnostic and Biosurveillance Solutions Across Three Key Areas



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Link Highly Distributed Affordable Point of Care Diagnostic Devices to Cloud Network

- Levels 0-1 provide rapid, in-field data capture to support biosurveillance and/or medical decision-making
- Common use assay panels, including biodefense-specific agents, can accept different panels congruent with end user needs
- FDA-cleared or on pathway for clearance
 - Used in open architecture format for non-FDA-cleared detection
 - Clinical use with FDA clearance
- Sample-to-Answer systems, CLIA-waived





* Also includes uses with non-human samples (e.g. insect vectors, livestock, food, environment), which will be performed by technical operators



Provide Early Warning and Diagnosis to Ensure Successful Countermeasures



•Key prototype elements for Device, Biosurveillance and Information Management will be demonstrated in the next 24 months •** Data clouds are pervasive information sources that do not need to be developed or maintained by DTRA 12

Strategic Thrust: Adaptive Medical Countermeasures



Translational Medicine S&T Responsibility and Risk Reduction

Establish early criteria and translational teams for robust transition

Team 1: S+T ad Team 2: S+T AD

Team 3: AD + s+t

<u>Minimum Criteria</u>

PK/PD in Relevant Animal Models Pre-clinical Safety & Efficacy (NHP) Therapeutic Index for Military Utility Route of Administration Standard of Care Comparisons Biomarker Utility Phase 0 exploratory IND

Robust Decision to Human Phase I studies



"FIRST IN HUMAN" TRIALS

- Recombinant vaccine antibody molecule (RVEc) binding to Ricin toxin
 Pre-Clinical RVEc experiments
 - Tested parenteral and aerosol challenge
 - 6+ month protection following last vaccination
 - Passive transfer studies against lethal subcutaneous challenges (i.e., 2.5, 5 or 10 LD50s) indicate antibody-mediated immunity

 Clinical Phase 1 escalating, multipledose study (June - Sept 2011)

- 9 first vaccinations w/ only minor adverse events; those vaccinated producing antibodies directed against the Ricin toxin
- PI: USAMRIID investigators
- Transformational Medical Technologies Division funded the early stages



Structure of RVEc with deletions at 33-44 and 199-267 in parent RTA



CBDP Medical Countermeasures Biological Therapeutics

Bacterial Therapeutics

Strategies •

- 1. Discovery of unprecedented compounds (not necessarily a new target)
 - antimicrobials targeting bacterial biosynthetic pathways, virulence factors, resistance mechanisms, & host factors
 - antibiotic potentiators and immunomodulators
- 2. Evaluation/re-purposing of FDA-approved antibiotics against select agents of interest

Technical Highlights

- > 90% protection from death in mice after aerosol Y. pestis exposure with moxifloxacin
- Greater than 90% survival in mice treated with GSK0944 after F. tularensis infection
- ACHN-975 provides 100% protection from aerosolized Y. pestis

Fast Track Initiative to Accelerate Programs to First in Human Trials

USAMRIID/Bayer



GSK0944 F. tularensis:Survival proportions (n=20)



of ACHN-975 in a model of inhaled plague using control Cipro 30 mg/kg/day CHN-975 - 20 ma/k CHN-975 - 40 mo/ko/day, old ACHN-975 - 80 mg/kg/day, gid ACHN-975 - 160 mg/kg/day. 10 20 30 Days Achaogen

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New Medical Countermeasures Initiative: S&T Into Advanced Development Capability



Developmental Path

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Rapid Design of Medical Countermeasures

Novel Computational Design

Demo to inhibit influenza hemagglutinin infective potency Promoting energetically-favorable clustered interactions between disembodied amino acid residues and target surface area patches to anchor *de novo* designed interfaces Incl. proxies to Negative Design: design for binding *and* precluding of binding to off-target molecules May 13 issue of <u>Science</u> PI: Dr. David Baker, University of Washington

DTRA Transition of DARPA Protein Design Program

"Computational design of proteins targeting the conserved stem region of influenza hemagglutinin" Fleishman, Baker, et al <u>Science. 332(</u>6031), 816-21.

Viet04/

Platforms & Research Tools Thrust Area Strategy

 Invest in enabling technologies required to develop candidate vaccines against known and emerging threats

Rapid Response & Recovery S&T: INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION PROGRAMS

Goals:

- Reduced thermal burden target thermal burden to Fire Resistant Army Combat Uniform (FRACU)
- Integrate CB ensemble with warfighter ensemble to reduce cognitive burden
- Demonstrate network integration

Rapid Response and Recovery S&1 WIDE AREA DECONTAMINATION

B. anthracis is virulent, persistent, and resistant to decontamination

- Spores a threat for decades
- Current decontaminants corrosive or hazardous
- Large volumes of decontaminant needed
- Seeking Innovative approaches to mitigate the effects of wide area dissemination of spores
 - Fast-acting and robust Low-cost
 - Logistically acceptable
 - Long shelf & pot life
 - Environmentally-friendly

Breakthroughs will be leveraged for new innovative solutions

CwlJ1 germination enzyme germination of B. Cereus spores faster than L-Alanine

- Restorational Decon < 2 weeks • 4-6 log reduction
 - of spores
- Improved Logistics
- 6+ hour pot life (if applicable)
- 3+ year shelf life
- Tarmac, buildings, soil, veg
- Min environmental impact

How We Are Addressing The Challenge

- Establish S&T Imperatives that emphasize urgency and accountability surrounding knowledge creation and translation into robust pipeline of CBRN capabilities and products
- Create New Opportunities For Sourcing and Managing
 Innovation
 - Sourcing new Investments through Poracttive Scouting and Competition
 - Managing investments to Milestones and Ceasing unproductive investments
 - Addressing the pipeline of products and capabilities needed for enhanced preparedness
 - Focusing investments into critical mass programs Focused Innovative Technology Programs (FITs)
 - Measuring performance of knowledge products and holding ourselves accountable

"Those who have knowledge, don't predict. Those who predict, don't have knowledge." Lao Tzu

