Evolving Requirements for the Use of Logic Devices in the Implementation of Safety Features

or

An Update to the DoD Fuze Engineering Standardization Working Group’s (FESWG) Technical Manual for the use of Logic Devices in Safety Features

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Disclaimer

• While some logic devices may be viewed as better suited for safety applications, it is important to note:
  – All logic devices can be implemented in an unsafe manner.
  – There are safety issues associated with the use of any type of logic device in safety critical applications.
  – Individual technologies may require additional measures not specifically addressed here.

• This presentation does not contain all the information found within the FESWG Tech Manual

• Presenter does not speak for the Safety Boards. Consult your Safety Authority for current requirements.
Scope

• Increased use of logic devices in safety features has highlighted the need to address safety requirements in more detail.

• Document is intended to clarify the requirements of the current standards (MIL-STD-1316, MIL-STD-1911, MIL-STD-1901 and STANAG-4187, STANAG-4497, STANAG-4368) as applied to Safety Features implemented with logic devices.

• Logic Devices include programmable logic devices (PLDs), complex programmable logic devices (CPLDs), field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), microcontrollers, discrete logic, etc.

• Defines Appendix A (guidelines) and B (definitions)
2. **OLD** -> All logic devices used in the safety feature shall be non-reconfigurable.

2. **NEW** -> While fixed-in-structure devices are acceptable and preferred, to avoid degradation of a safety feature, any logic device used in the implementation of that feature:

   a. Shall not be re-programmable.
   b. Shall not be alterable by credible environments.
   c. Shall not have the SF logic configuration reside on volatile memory.
   d. Should be rated to meet or exceed the lifecycle environments of the system. Shall have engineering rationale provided and associated risk(s) for logic devices not rated to meet or exceed the lifecycle of the system.
2. Cont’d

- If charged based memory is used then following shall apply:
  - Memory validation shall be performed prior to safety function
  - Validation shall have minimum rigor of CRC16
  - Computed result shall be compared externally
  - External devices shall be dedicated, fixed-in-structure, and not contain and be exclusive from any other functions.

- Consult with the appropriate Service Safety Authority for guidance.
Updated Requirements

2. Cont’d - Notional example of memory validation:

- Internal Memory Validation
  - Input(s)
  - μC
  - Charge-based
  - Program Memory
  - Boot Code
  - Register
  - Comp
  - Delay
  - Flip Flop
  - Key
  - Strobe
  - Pass/Fail
  - Reset

- External Memory Validation
  - Input(s)
  - μC
  - Charge-based
  - Program Memory
  - Boot Code
  - Polynomial
  - Divider
  - Key
  - Strobe
  - Flip Flop
  - State Machine
  - CRC-16
5. During and after exposure to power transfers, transitions, and/or transients, logic devices shall not operate in a manner that results in degradation of SF.

- Credible power environments (brown out, surge, spikes, etc) should not cause the loss of a safety feature.
- Logic device power supplies need to be robust.
- Includes reset functions [deleted reset function requirement #13 since it’s covered here]
Updated Requirements

Separated arming delay (new #7) from timing functions

6. Timing functions, excluding arming delay, within logic shall not be susceptible to single point or common cause failures resulting in early arming.
   - Requires independent timing with dissimilar technology or verification of the clocks with a known timed event.

7. Arming Delay single point and common cause failures shall be reduced to a minimum
   - Failures shall exist only at or near the expiration of the intended arming delay
   - Independent timers preferred
   - Shortest arm delay set in hardware should be set to the maximum practical value
   - Transmissions and validations of arm times should be robust (checksum, parity, CRC)
Covered by requirement #5 so verbiage added to A.5

13. Reset functions shall not be susceptible to single point or common cause failures that result in unsafe states.
   – Redundant resets with different implementations.
   – Logic device reset circuitry must be extremely robust.
1. Each Safety Feature (SF) implemented with logic shall use the least complex logic device that can practically perform the required functionality.
   – Minimizes the subversion of SF(s) due to unintentional and/or unrecognized modes of operation, including failure modes.
   – KISS method.
   – Complex devices require more analysis, documentation, testing and more scrutiny by the safety authority.
3. Where all SFs are implemented with logic devices, at least two SFs shall be implemented with dissimilar logic devices.

- Minimizes the potential for common cause failures.
- Where practical, at least one SF shall be implemented with discrete component(s).
- Dissimilar logic refers to distinct methods and/or materials used to develop a particular device that result in devices with minimal common cause failures. Some examples include:
  - Full Custom ASIC
  - Discrete components
  - M2M FPGA
  - OnO FPGA
  - Microcontroller
4. SF logic shall be implemented in accordance with the device manufacturer’s latest specifications and notes.
   - Safety critical details could be buried within data sheets and/or footnotes.
   - Conflicts between manufacturer’s specifications and other requirements shall be reviewed and approved by the safety authority.
   - All programming functionality, testing functionality, used pins, and any other non-operational functionality shall be appropriately disabled and terminated.
8. (OLD #7) Logic implementation shall replicate the documented design.
   - Ensures the intended design is actually implemented.
   - No optimizations or changes to an approved design.
   - Know your design tools.

9. (OLD #8) Where all SFs are implemented with logic devices, the SF logic shall be physically and functionally partitioned from each other.
   - Minimizes the potential for inadvertent subversion such as sneak paths or Single Event Upsets.
10. (OLD #9) All logic and/or functionality available within a device shall be disclosed, documented, and assessed in safety analyses and evaluations.
   - Undocumented functions within a SF can compromise the safety of the design and is unacceptable.

11. (OLD #10) SF documentation shall include the complete logic flow with all inputs and output defined, along with timing and interdependence of events.
   - Assists with design understanding and verification.
12. (OLD #11) Manufacturing documentation and processes shall ensure that logic devices within an approved design are produced with an identical configuration.
   – Assures logic devices are reproduced consistently throughout production.

13. (OLD #12) Development tools shall be documented and controlled via configuration management procedures.
   – Assures logic devices configuration matches the intended design.
   – Know your tools and document them.
Requirements

14. Power for SF logic should be partitioned from other power such as communication or platform power.
   – Minimizes subversion of a safety feature

15. Power for SF logic should be applied as late in the launch sequence or operational deployment as practical.
   – ESAD without power = SAFE
A copy of the technical manual may be obtained via mail from the following:

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Questions??

Comments??