NDIA Tactical Wheeled Vehicles (TWV) Conference
8 February 2010
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Purpose: To provide an overview of the Army’s TWV fleet and discuss how it supports Army senior leader’s vision

Our goal is to build a versatile mix of tailorable and networked organizations, operating on a rotational cycle, to provide a sustained flow of trained and ready forces for current commitments and to hedge against unexpected contingencies, at a tempo that is predictable and sustainable for our All-Volunteer Force.

Agenda:

• Strategic Orientation
• New Army Equipping Strategy
• Evolving TWV Investment Strategy
• TWV Fleet Overview
• Evolving TWV Capability Requirements
Period of Continuous Change

- Shifting Operational Landscape
- Restructuring materiel modernization strategies
- Fielding “incremental” vs. “big bang” solutions
- Transitioning to support the establishment of the Materiel Enterprise
- Diminishing resources and simultaneous increases in requirements
- Facing difficult choices in a fiscally constrained environment

The War:

- Executing a responsible drawdown from Iraq
- Building capacity in Afghanistan to achieve U.S. objectives
- Fielding improved Soldier capabilities
- Resetting redeploying units to meet ARFORGEN full spectrum requirements

New Army Equipping Strategy

• An **affordable** strategy

• Ensures Soldiers have the **right equipment** to meet **mission requirements**:
  - whether in combat
  - training for combat
  - operating as part of generating force
  - conducting Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities missions

### Old Strategy

- Tiered readiness
- Equip 100% units, 100% of the time
- Minimal recognition for Reset
- Homeland Defense requirements not recognized
- Equipment normally remained in one unit
- Equip to unit design
- Requirements approved, then resourcing considered

### New Strategy

- Cyclic readiness
- Equip to mission and ARFORGEN Phase
- Recognizes necessity for Reset
- Homeland Defense capabilities recognized/resourced
- Equipment in constant motion
- Equip to unit mission
- Requirements life cycle costs considered upfront
• **Adapting** based on operational demand, cognizant of fiscal realities

• Planning to **integrate** 12,291 MRAP + 3,391 M-ATV into the force

• Emphasizing a **mixed fleet** that spans protection, payload, and performance

• Accelerating our plans to **stop** HMMWV procurement for Army only needs

• **Equipping to mission** per ARFORGEN cycle

• **Modernizing** while we fight

• Planning to **restore** Army Prepositioned Stocks

• **Recapitalizing** and **divesting** selected variants

• Planning to **integrate** Joint Light Tactical Vehicle when ready

• **Scrutinizing** new and existing TWV requirements

**Tactical vehicles must be protected, mobile, and networked**
TWV Capabilities Restored

- A0 Series (1985-93)
- A1 Series (1991-95)
- ECV M1114; M1151/52/65 (1995-Present)

**Restored Performance drivers have been Force Protection, Increased Armor, and Soldier Safety.**

- Significant survivability improvements
- Higher horsepower engine
- Electronic Transmission
- Higher efficiency power train
- Integrated AC
- Improved hot weather performance
- B-Kit Armor
- Optimized Maintenance Ratio
- Collision Warning System

- Improved Power Generation
- Improved Wheels and Tires
- Improved Seat Belts
- Fire Suppression
- Improved Suspension
- Blast Seats
- Anti-lock Brakes / Traction Control
- Air/Hydraulic Brake System
- Increased Axle Load

Capabilities common to all.
• Stopping HMMWV procurement for “Army-only” needs – sustaining current HMMWV requirements through RECAP

• Exercising option for over 2,000 HMMWVs by 1 Mar 10 (e.g., final buy for “Army needs”, acquisition objective met)

• Funding not requested in FY11 for Army-only HMMWV procurement

• Seeking approval to use a portion of the FY10 HMMWV Procurement funding for other Army priorities

• Reviewing options to sustain 160K on-hand HMMWV fleet by shifting acquisition strategy to RECAP and/or Reset

• Replacing over 3,000 Light Tactical Wheel Vehicle requirements with the MRAP/M-ATV

• Supporting development of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
• Majority of requirements are “modern,” and 69 percent of Medium Trucks on hand would be classified as modern

• Current investment has resulted in healthy fleet that is well distributed relative to requirements

• Aging fleet – 30 percent of fleet is being filled by M35, M809, and M939 series trucks whose average age exceeds 20 years

• Moving Army to a fleet with scalable protection (e.g., FMTV investment strategy procures armor capable vehicles to support Long Term Protection Strategy objective to provide scalable protection by using the A cab/B-kit concept, to replace older models, and to fill current Modified Table Of Organization & Equipment (MTOE) shortages

• Divesting M35 series trucks by end of FY11 and M809 series trucks by end of FY15

• Planning to maintain capability to sustain M939 series trucks through FY22
• Majority of requirements are “modern,” and 98 percent of Heavy Tactical Vehicles on hand are modern

• Equipment well distributed across COMPOs 1-3. COMPO 6 (APS) low due to decision to source operational needs

• Divesting oldest M915/M916 HEMTT variants NLT FY11 – replacing with M983 Light Equipment Transporter

• Investing in HEMTT RECAP and new procurement of HEMTT Load Handling System and Light Equipment Transporter

• Modernizing Heavy fleet primarily thru RECAP, Reset, and Product Improvement
• Speed of modernization/divestiture depends on how fast we want to achieve our LTPS and replace older model trucks – LTPS target is 47% approved “armor available”.

• Current HTV armor on hand is ~22% (LTAS “B” Kits and AoA sets)

• HEMTT A0/A2, PLS A0, HET A0 8V92 engine obsolescence FY18
Evolving TWV Capability Requirements

- Provide Soldiers **protected mobility**
- Provide increased **off-road mobility**
- Increase **platform capacity** to accept evolving technologies
- Obtain better **Command and Control on-the-move** capability
- Use **incremental approach** to vehicle development

A culture of innovation is needed to address continuously evolving warfighter capability gaps