The Army of the Future

Observations of the Past
Agenda

- Supply and Demand Challenges
  - Forces View
  - Resources View
  - Requirements View

- QDR

- Strategic Context

- Modernization Strategy

- Summary
Forces View

Demand Exceeded Supply Expectations
President’s Budget FYDP Projections vs. Actual Defense Budget FY80-11 (TY$B)

Actual with Supplementals

Actual w/out Supplementals

Supply Projections Missed Demand
Requirements View Over Time

Expect ~$11B per year in emerging requirements

Demand Exceeds Supply
Two Decades of Strategic Evolution

**'93 Bottom-Up Review**
- High
- Moderate
- Low
- Perceived Capability Emphasis
- lesser
- contingencies
- major theater war
- future near peer
- strategic capability
- 2 MTWs
- state-on-state
- cross border conflict
- desert storm
- soviet collapse

**'97 QDR**
- High
- Moderate
- Low
- Perceived Capability Emphasis
- lesser
- contingencies
- major theater war
- future near peer
- strategic capability
- 2 MTWs
- state-on-state
- cross border conflict
- smaller scale contingencies
- industrial age
- near peer
- somalia, bosnia, rwanda, haiti

**'01 QDR**
- High
- Moderate
- Low
- Perceived Capability Emphasis
- lesser
- contingencies
- major theater war
- future near peer
- strategic capability
- 1-4-2-1
- citadel I & II
- ungoverned areas
- asymmetric threats
- future peer

**'05 Defense Strategy**
- High
- Moderate
- Low
- Perceived Capability Emphasis
- lesser
- contingencies
- major theater war
- future near peer
- strategic capability
- GWoT / Ungoverned Areas
- Irregular Warfare
- Low-End Asymmetric
- 1-4-2-1
- future peer
- 11 Sept / GWoT
- OEF / OIF
- 4 Challenges
- disruptive technologies
- superiority in the commons (space, cyber, seas, air)
QDR 2010

• Near Term QDR
  – Wartime QDR
  – Priority on current conflicts
  – Broad focus / Broad portfolio

• Supports rotational readiness

• Consolidates resources to create a 12th AC CAB, procures a 13th AC CAB, and converts an HBCT to an SBCT

• Consolidates USCYBERCOM and creates Service component commands for cyber operations

“Our judgment with regard to the overall capacity of the force reflects in part the heavy demands being placed on portions of the force by ongoing operations. As those demands evolve, so too might the appropriate size and mix of forces.”
Strategic Inflection Point—"...occurs when the old strategic model dissolves and gives way to the new....a point in time...when fundamentals are about to change." Grove, 1996

**Some Perspective**

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**POM 12-17 transformational?** Yes or No

**Are we at a strategic inflection point?** Yes or No

**Answers to these questions impact the Army narrative for POM 12-17**

**Some Opportunities:**

- Opportunity to institutionalize the Army three major initiatives since 2001—Modularity, ARFORGEN, and the RC as an operational force
- Opportunity to continue to gain acceptance of the Army's supply-based ARFORGEN model
- Opportunity to adopt an enterprise approach and reform requirements and resource processes
- Opportunity to restore operational and strategic depth
- Opportunity to meet combatant commander and service-specific requirements while achieving sustainable levels of OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO across all components
Today’s fiscal realities require a resource-informed and integrated modernization strategy.

Our strategy must be flexible and adaptable to changing missions and requirements.

We must leverage lessons learned from current operations.

We must maximize opportunities to incorporate new and emerging technologies.

Facing an era of persistent conflict, the Army must be able to procure new, upgrade, recapitalize, and divest its equipment in accordance with the ARFORGEN cycle.

A comprehensive Army Modernization Strategy provides a sound foundation for the Army to equip and modernize in a flexible, affordable and sustainable manner.
**ENDS**

- Develop and field affordable and interoperable mix of the best equipment available to allow Soldiers and units to succeed in today’s and tomorrow’s full spectrum operations

**WAYS**

- Three major lines of effort:
  1. Develop and field new capabilities to meet capability gaps through traditional and rapid acquisition processes;
  2. Continuously modernize equipment to meet current and future needs through upgraded capabilities, recapitalization, and divestment; and
  3. Field and distribute capabilities in accordance with Army priorities and the ARFORGEN model

**MEANS**

- Predictable fiscal support
- Transparency, fiscal stewardship, and a culture of cost awareness
- Army support, strong industrial base, strategic communication, operational analysis, and leadership
Lines of Effort

- Army Modernization Strategy Lines of Effort
  1. Procure new capabilities
     • BCT Modernization Plan
  2. Upgrade / recapitalize existing fleets
  3. Distribute capabilities using Army priorities and ARFORGEN

- BCT Modernization Plan Elements
  1. Incremental network improvements
  2. Development of Capability Packages
  3. Incorporation of MRAPs
  4. Development of Ground Combat Vehicle
     • Lessons learned
     • Growth potential
     • Cost and sustainability
     • In line with acquisition reform
     • Within 7 years
Summary

• The Army is transforming and prioritizing programs and efforts that show the most promise for today and tomorrow.

• The Army Modernization Strategy will ensure our Soldiers receive the best and most modern equipment we can afford—provided as quickly as possible, so they can do their jobs.

• Transforming the generating force maintains focus of providing trained and ready forces to meet combatant commander requirements.

• Significant challenge is predicting requirements and force structure
Questions?