# Technology Anonymous



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How the Services see themselves







How the COCOMs see themselves



How the Services view the COCOMs

How the COCOMs view the Services

## **Creating Surprise**

Marty Drake Science Advisor U.S. Central Command

#### Surprising Three Domains (Overmatch vs. Capability Surprise)

### The peer, or negligible overmatch

Well studied – analyzed failure points

Predictable behavior / operations

Generally, easier to create surprise

Surprise has the greatest impact


#### The 3<sup>rd</sup> world competitor


More effected by overmatch than surprise Even open-source capability creates 'surprise'

## Non-state sponsored asymmetric threats

Hardest to effect through overmatch or surprise

## AQAM: A Threat in All Realms





#### Two Sides of 'Surprise' (RED disrupting BLUE – BLUE countering RED)

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## A Disruptive Technology Creates 'Surprise' When Employed

Surprise doesn't need to be an action we employ on an adversary.

It can also be removal of an impediment to our operations.

# A sampling of Blue challenges



- Identifying the "combatant"
- Detecting explosive material or assembled explosive devices at tactically significant distances
- Creating C4ISR persistence in underdeveloped
  environments with less resources
- True sharing of information across the entire battlespace, independent of existing infrastructure
- Making sense of the data we obtain, and feeding timely & relevant information to the tactical edge
- Being first with the message ... in the right context

## What if ...


- Virtual presence could replace physical presence ... with the same effect
- Bandwidth was made irrelevant
- Intent could be pre-determined
- Language was no longer a barrier to effective communication
- Warfighter equipment drew its power from the environment – day or night – making power storage devices optional
- Tagants in common-use items, when combined during an attempt to build an explosive device render the device inert
- Force fields existed
- Cloaking worked

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## Where to go for information

- There's the traditional:
  - Integrated Priority List (IPL COCOMs)
  - Warfighter Challenges (WFCs JFCOM J9)
  - Purple Slides (Joint Staff (JS))
  - Joint Quarterly Readiness Review (JQRR JS)
  - . . . To name just a few
- New effort sponsored by OSD to create a S&T IPL
  - DDR&E directed the COCOMs to review their IPLs and feed back their technical challenges
  - Not a comprehensive look at the full spectrum of challenges; but a good start

## Customer – Supplier Interface



## U.S. Central Command Focus

- We focus on the JOINT solution that has the potential to satisfy a JOINT validated need
- Separate from the many technology needs of our customer(s) those technology needs which:
  - Do not have a readily available solution
  - For high-impact needs there is *insufficient activity pursuing a solution*
- Seek out game-changing technologies which our customer(s) don't know they need

#### Some technology areas we "pursue":

- Detection of CBRNE at tactically significant distances; with emphasis on the "E"
- Pre-shot counter-sniper, counter-mortar, counter-RPG technologies; with emphasis on automated systems
- Technologies which enable the transfer of information more securely, more quickly, to a wider set of users, to include the warfighter when it makes sense, with less bandwidth and dedicated support resources, e.g.:
  - Multi-level Security over single architectures
  - Bandwidth compression / reduction techniques
  - Data reduction [data=>info=>knowledge=>understanding=>wisdom]
- Through automation, remote action, new and novel techniques, technologies which reduce risk and / or stress on the force and / or improve the efficiency and effectiveness of our action(s)
- Technologies which allow for greater persistence over the battlespace with fewer platforms; employing improved sensor technology providing greater fidelity of information

#### Common thematic areas of concern

(not in priority order)

- Detect / Defeat:
  - IED initiators / initiator systems
  - Buried / concealed IEDs
  - Production and assembly of IEDs
- HME production standoff detection
- Culvert access denial / alerting
- Persistence in surveillance
- Biometrics
  - Identity dominance
  - Force protection / access
- Non-lethal vehicle / vessel stop
- Reduce stress on the force:
  - Force Protection requirements
  - Increased automation
- Anti-swarm lethal / non-lethal
- More efficient / effective / timely training
- Predictive analysis techniques
- Voice to text technologies

- C4ISR systems:
  - Info sharing between system
  - Multi-level security
  - Cross domain solutions
  - Faster ... Better sorting / retrieval
  - On the move w/ GIG access to tactical edge
    - SATCOM, WiFi, WiMax, etc.
- Tagging, Tracking, and Locating (TTL)
- Lightweight "x" with greater "y"
- More power per unit of weight
- Scalable effects non-lethal to lethal
  - Directed Energy
  - Kinetics
- True SA for Blue ... Fused Red
- Sustaining the force reduced size, weight, amount, and retrograde
- Holding all targets at risk
- Any sensor ... any shooter; the Soldier as a sensor; any adversary ... any battlespace ... anytime






## Charter

Conduct *discovery, research, analysis,* and *sponsor development* of new and emerging technologies which have the *potential to provide material solutions* to Headquarters and Component validated Joint needs.


**Review** USCENTCOM and Component **plans**, **operations**, programs, policies and activities for areas where technology will improve efficiency and effectiveness.

*Integrate* across USCENTCOM headquarters and Component staffs for transformational, integrating, and experimentation activities.



## CCJ8 Directorate

#### [From the Technology Perspective]



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