Strike – from an OSD Perspective

Keith Sanders

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Outline

• Department’s Precision Engagement Vector
  – Guidance from the Secretary of Defense
  – Operational emphasis and CONOPS
  – What does it all mean?

• Business Practice Changes
  – Acquisition policies
  – Cost and schedule control
  – Program governance and Legislative initiatives

• Implications
“When we are at war, I believe the overriding priority of the Defense Department and military services should be to do everything possible to provide troops in the field everything they need to be successful.”

“The question I keep coming back to is, why did I have to go outside the regular Pentagon bureaucracy in order to build MRAPs and to get additional ISR?”

“The problem is there are two different mentalities involved. The one is the typical culture in the Defense Department, which is 99-percent, exquisite solutions over a five- or six- or 10-year period, and the other is a 75-percent solution in weeks or months. And people approach problem-solving in very different ways when they have that different kind of experience. We’ve got to figure out how to be able to walk and chew gum at the same time.”
“Chief among institutional challenges facing the Department is acquisitions.”

The current situation is “one of those rare chances … to critically and ruthlessly separate appetites from real requirements, those things that are desirable in a perfect world from those things that are truly needed in light of the threats America faces and the missions we are likely to undertake in the years”

“Our procurement and preparation for conventional scenarios must, in turn, be driven more by the actual capabilities of potential adversaries, and less by what is technologically feasible given unlimited time and resources.”

“I will pursue greater quantities of systems that represent the ‘75 percent’ solution instead of smaller quantities of ‘99 percent’ exquisite systems.”
“I feel that many programs that cost more than anticipated are built on an inadequate initial foundation. I believe the department should seek increased competition, use of prototypes – including competitive prototyping – and ensure technology maturity so that our programs are ready for the next phases of development.”

“We must freeze requirements on programs at contract award and write contracts that incentivize proper behavior.”
The Department’s Strike Vector
Operational Emphasis

• Increased emphasis on ISR
  – New sensors
    • MP-RTIP
    • LSRS
    • ESM
• Increased emphasis on Irregular Warfare
  – Armed UAVs
  – Hostile Fire Indication – and responses
  – New, more versatile gunship
• Increased emphasis on persistence
  – Reaper / Sky Warrior
  – C-12s
The Department’s Strike Vector
ISR and Intel Focused CONOPS

- Signals intercepts via high demand, low density platforms
- Airborne ISR to establish long term tracks
- Targeting at remote site(s)
- Authority to engage established during lengthy track periods
- Engage from
  - onboard sensor aircraft
  - third party shooter with targeting data transferred from CAOC or Forward Air Controller
The Department’s Strike Vector
ISR and Intel Focused CONOPS (Cont’d)

• Prior rush to establish broad net-centric warfare capabilities has been refocused toward penetrating aircraft

• Deliberate, Selective, Time-of-our-choosing CONOPS are the order of the day
  – Time sensitive engagements but with all the ‘a priori’ checks and approvals
  – Little delegation of responsibilities
  – Lots more watching; Lots fewer lethal engagements
Business Practice Changes

• Acquisition Policy
  – New DoDD 5000.02
    • Mature designs prior to Milestone B
    • Competitive Prototyping
    • Business Case Certifications prior to Milestones A & B
  – Peer Reviews for major source selections

• Cost and schedule control
  – Renewed emphasis on Fixed Price Type contracts
  – Configuration Steering Boards to scrub requirements
  – Invigorated emphasis on Earned Value Management
Business Practice Changes (Continued)

• Program governance
  – Increased emphasis on technical maturity within a program phase
    • Minimal risk in proceeding to next phase
    • Frequent ‘In Process Reviews’
      – At least annually with Milestone Decision Authority (MDA)
      – Additional event-based reviews
  – Independent assessments to advise MDA
    • Third-party teams for Operational Test Readiness Reviews
    • Joint Analysis Teams, Defense Support Teams & Ad hoc specialty teams
• Legislative initiatives
    • To address unreasonable cost and schedule estimates, performance expectations, immature technologies and repeated program changes that have led to explosive cost growth and costly schedule delays

  – HASC: The Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform
    • To address fundamental issues that lie behind the Pentagon’s continuing problems in acquiring goods and services on time and on budget
    • Targeting NDAA of FY10 / FY11
Implications to Precision Strike

• Fewer New Starts of major programs
• Renewed interest in upgrade/modification efforts
  – Expand number and variety of sensor platforms
  – Expand capture and analysis of existing sensor data
• Renewed interest in growing system reliability, system persistence and endurance
• Possible interest in better matching sensors, comms and weapons to ‘needs’ of ISR platforms
  – Small size, weight, power
  – “Agile” with short engagement times
  – Low collateral damage
Implications to Precision Strike (Continued)

• For the few major acquisition programs
  – Competitive prototyping
  – Down-selects based on test results, EVM performance and management proficiency
  – Go slow in the early program phases
    • Design maturity before Milestone B
  – Go fast through formal Test & Evaluation and initial production
  – Expect lots of outside scrutiny, schedule risk analyses, second-guessing by well-informed third parties
  – Expect careful decision-making by MDA
JDAM / Laser JDAM
Questions?

Comments?

Rebuttals?