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RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE

MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE

**New IM issue on naval platforms:
Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) pneumatic explosion risk.
Effects prediction methodology
French MoD: N.Duval, E.Faucher, Y.Garcia**


**2009 Insensitive Munitions and Energetic Materials Technology Symposium
Tucson, Arizona May 11-14**



DÉLÉGATION GÉNÉRALE POUR L'ARMEMENT

DGA and CAEPE

- DGA = Armament Procurement Agency of the French MoD
- DGA missions:
 - Preparing the future of defence systems
 - Equipping the armed forces
 - Promoting defence equipment export
- DGA operates its own test centres for “Testing and evaluating materials”
- CAEPE is the DGA Propulsion Testing and Missile Safety centre
 - Located near Bordeaux
 - 330 people
 - 10 ground testing facilities
 - 3000 ha
 - 2000 tests carried out in 35 years





CAEPE: DGA Propulsion Testing and Missile Safety centre

- Our missions:
 - Testing and expertise:
 - Performance of propulsion systems for either strategic or tactical missiles
 - Ageing of propulsion systems
 - Safety assessment for propulsion system, ammunition and complete weapon system
 - Contractors support:
 - Assembling of propulsive stages for the French ballistic missiles
- Safety assessment:
 - Safety testing areas: all IM tests
 - Expertise division: simulations, technical support, IM tests interpretation




Introduction: Solid Rocket Motor explosion, The new risk of naval safety studies

- IM munitions suppress ~~mass detonation~~ risk
- Naval hazard analysis highlight a new risk considering the high density of ammunition on board:
Solid Rocket Motor explosion risk
- Consequences of the risk: catastrophic (death of personnel, loss of the ship if sympathetic reactions)
- Different causes of explosion:
 - at ignition
 - during firing
 - due to accidental or combat threats
- Accurate assessment of explosion consequences necessary to:
 - Mitigate the risk
 - Meet system requirements


Introduction: Solid Rocket Motor explosion, The new risk of naval safety studies

- Specific configuration: SRM explosion in Vertical Launch System: SRM ignition in the ship → explosion in the VLS magazine
- Two main issues:
 - Sympathetic reaction?
 - ↳ Ammunition reaction scenario
 - Ship integrity threatened?
 - ↳ Thermal and pressure loadings
- Development of a new methodology based on simulations to deal with this ship confined configuration.
- Explosion effects divided and studied in 3 steps:
 - I. Fragments projection
 - II. Blast overpressure
 - III. Fire due to scattering of burning propellant fragments



I. Fragment projections

Study of fragment impacts on adjacent munitions and risk of initiation associated


- Fragmentation computed thanks to CRONOS (in-house analytical code) 
- CRONOS: designed to delimit hazard areas generated by SRM explosion. Calculates:

Fragment size distribution	} Probabilities of hitting or killing	} 5 hazard areas	
Initial velocities			} Heat fluxes
Flight trajectories			} Air blast overpressure

- CRONOS used in our study to determine fragment size distribution and evaluate initial velocities

I. Fragment projections

- CRONOS fragmentation: input of Ls-Dyna code study to predict initiation risk
- Fragment impacts directly adjacent missile




*Fragment impact – Fragment position for
 $v=0m/s$*

- Conclusion on initiation: casing perforation or energy criteria




Effects prediction methodology




II. Blast overpressure effect Effect on donor canister

Study of blast effect on donor canister resistance

- Blast overpressure propagation simulated by CFD code Fluent
- Explosion modeled by a shock tube phenomenon: a pressurised hot gas volume released in its environment
- 3D model computes pressure loadings on the internal canister surface:
 - $P_0 = P_{\text{structure failure}}$
 - $V_0 = V_{\text{free}}$
 - Gas production amplified by the sudden enlargement of the combustion surface. This gas production is injected in the initial hot gas volume
- Conclusion on canister resistance:
Comparison with canister failure value



Effects prediction methodology




II. Blast overpressure effect

Effect on VLS magazine and adjacent munitions


Study of the non-stationary pressure loadings on bulkheads and on adjacent canisters and determination of canister resistance

- 3D model of the magazine operated to model the pressure wave propagation
- Shock tube phenomenon:
 - Canister break-up effects are neglected
- Simulation computes time-dependent blast overpressure in every point in the magazine
- Important influence of the donor missile site in the magazine
- Conclusion:
 - Blast overpressure time-dependent mappings on bulkhead and adjacent canisters
 - Adjacent canister resistance: Comparison with canister failure value or Ls-Dyna simulation



Blast overpressure time-dependent mappings on the magazine bulkheads


Effects prediction methodology



III. Fire due to scattering of burning propellant fragments


Study of quasi-static pressure evolution and heat flux from propellant fire to canister and magazine bulkhead

- 3D model runs with Fluent, taking into consideration venting systems.
- Choice of Fluent: possibility to compute heat radiation and to take into account sonic outflow by venting systems.
- Choice of 3D model: necessity to identify local maxima of heat transfer (important for adjacent munitions initiation risk)
- Gas flow rate during fire determined thanks to CRONOS fragmentation combustion surface and pressure-dependent combustion velocity.
- Geometry considered:
 - Fire area limited next to the exploded missile: overvalue of pressure and heat flux → safety at stake
 - Simplified geometry to limit calculation time: gas do not flow between canister, exchange volume and surface reduced → conservative




III. Fire due to scattering of burning propellant fragments

- Results: Quasi-static pressure quickly uniform in the magazine
- Quasi-static pressure evolution:
- Result shows efficiency of venting device




- Heat flux mapping on bulkhead (shows 3D aspect of thermal phenomenon):



- Conclusion:
 - Quasi-static pressure evolution: adequation of venting device implemented
 - Heat fluxes to determine bulkhead and adjacent missile temperature evolution

Effects prediction methodology




IV. Adjacent missiles reaction risk evaluation

Study of adjacent missiles temperature evolution and reaction risk associated

- 1D model is used:
 - Conduction in canister
 - Radiation between canister and missile
 - Convection between air in canister and missile and canister walls
 - Conduction in different missile materials
- Inputs of 1D model: heat fluxes computed thanks to the 3D fire model
- Reaction missile criterion: reaching fast cook-of ignition temperature in the propellant.

IV. Adjacent missiles reaction risk evaluation

- Outputs: adjacent missile ignition delay. Real difference between immediately adjacent munitions and others.
- To state on sympathetic reaction risk: comparison between ignition delay and fire fighting device initiation delay, taking into account its efficiency.
- If adjacent munitions reaction acknowledge, FCO SRM response: new missile reaction.
- Conclusion: construction of the whole reaction missile scenario.



Conclusion

- Methodology explores the large range of SRM explosion effects.
- Tackles the 3 types of threats associated to SRM explosion:
 - Mechanical threats:
 - Fragment projection
 - Blast overpressure
 - Thermal threats:
 - Fragment burning
- Use of CFD code: relevant choice for this confined magazine configuration. Good approach of blast wave with reflection phenomenon and thermal effects with local maxima identification
- Study outputs various:
 - To assess reaction risk of adjacent munitions. Whole reaction scenario in VLS magazine consequently to SRM donor explosion can be drawn up
 - To assess VLS magazine and ship integrity. The on-board consequences: object of another study conducted by CTSN (DGA centre)

The methodology provides strong elements to achieve an accurate assessment of the safety level of VLS integrated on board.



Any questions ?

DUVAL Nadège

DGA/DE/CAEPE/SDT/EXP

Tel: +33 5 56 70 55 93

Fax: +33 5 56 70 57 99

nadega.duval@dga.defense.gouv.fr

GARCIA Yanick (CRONOS)

DGA/DE/CAEPE/SDT/EXP

Tel: +33 5 56 70 58 02

yanick.garcia@dga.defense.gouv.fr

FAUCHER Eric (Aerothermal study)

DGA/DE/CAEPE/SDT/EXP

Tel: +33 5 56 70 61 40

eric-n.faucher@dga.defense.gouv.fr