Intelligence Strategies for Persistent Conflict

Konrad Trautman
Director of Intelligence
U.S. Special Operations Command
Agenda

• Intelligence strategy must be intertwined and supporting the operational strategy
• Extrapolate the current intelligence lessons learned
• Two models for providing intelligence support to partner nations under persistent conditions
• Challenges
• Key Factor: Evolving the DoD Intel workforce to Irregular Warfare
Intelligence strategy must be intertwined and supporting the operational strategy

• Enabling partner nations
  – “When possible, U.S. strategy is to employ indirect approaches – primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and their security force – to prevent festering problems from turning into crises… and building their capacity is arguably as important as, if not more so than, the fighting the United States does itself.”
    » Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, December 2008
  – “If this war on terrorism is a global effort, and we rely absolutely on the efforts of our global partners, capacity building for our partners becomes an extremely important – if not the most important – part of the equation.”
    » Robert Grenier, former director CIA Counterterrorism Center, March 2008
Extrapolate the Current Intelligence Lessons Learned

• Constant Collaboration
  – Interagency: CIA, NSA, DIA, DOS, FBI, others
    • From the beginning of planning through mission execution
    • Occurs better overseas than in Washington
  – Operations and Intelligence
  – Forward and Reachback
• “Making Intelligence” – classic recon with modern tools
  – Making vs. Producing
  – The Last 20 Yards
• Persistent Surveillance
  – Aircraft, but also SIGINT and other technical intelligence
• For Irregular Warfare, the need to truly understand the environment
  – History, society, economics, local/regional politics, tribes and clans
Two Models for Providing Intelligence Support to Partner Nations

• US ISR modules provided to enable partner nation operations
  – But, we need to develop the force structure (teams, units) to support this; i.e. airborne ISR, SIGINT

• US Security Force Assistance to train, advise, and equip partner nations with their own ISR activities
  – Today’s efforts are too episodic; need permanent advisors who tailor the necessary training events
Putting Both Approaches Together

• Within the 60-70 high priority or priority countries for Irregular Warfare, assign a US SOF leader with the Country Team
• Within perhaps 6-8 contingency areas, employ small advisory efforts with organic ISR, and embed them Partner Nation forces
• In both cases, establish a reachback network for intelligence and support
  – Need to minimize the US footprint
  – Harness joint intel operations centers and the interagency; i.e. IMINT and SIGINT
  – Build a network of partner nation efforts
Challenges

• Intelligence sharing with partner nations
• Intelligence technology releases
• Force structure to support intelligence train, equip, and advise missions
• Disparate funding mechanisms (1206, 1207, 1208; multi-year efforts)
• Establishing a network of multi-intelligence sources with multiple partner nations
• Evolving the DoD intelligence workforce to Irregular Warfare
Key: Evolving the DoD Intel workforce to Irregular Warfare

• What is intelligence?
• “Lawrence of Wherever”
  – Build Lawrences with career paths that immerse personnel in foreign environments
  – Training in foreign languages and cultures can occur in the U.S., but expertise in a foreign land occurs only from immersion
• Recruit foreigners
  – Foreign Scouts: i.e. Indian scouts, Filipino scouts
  – Recent Immigrants as U.S. intelligence officers
    • Manage the counterintelligence concerns
• Greater use of the internet, open source, academics, and commercial activities
  – Move from information/data to knowledge to understanding
Summary

- Intelligence strategy must be intertwined and supporting the operational strategy
- Extrapolate the current lessons learned
- Two models for providing intelligence support
- Challenges
- Key Factor: Evolving the DoD Intel workforce to Irregular Warfare

“Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions in Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.”

--T.E. Lawrence, August 1917