



Perspectives on Acquisition, Test, and Early Fielding of UAV Systems

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Perspectives

- **ACTD legacy:** Departure from the intent of ACTD process in most UAS programs set stage for numerous negative consequences affecting the systems' performance and pace of maturity.
- **Dual-program problem:** Development of the intended program continued concurrent with early fielding of immature systems. This created a dual-program problem (a deployed system and an intended system, both under development).
- **Limited meaningful testing:** As acquisition programs of the intended system took shape, service acquisition leadership and program management demonstrated an aversion to end-to-end, mission level OT&E (excepting few programs).
- **Performance:** The single most important performance characteristic for unmanned systems should have been high reliability--this has not been the case.




What should be done now?

1. Fielded systems: Invest in reliability growth and improvements to suitability.
 - Any other performance improvements must positively contribute to improved reliability and availability of the overall system.
 - Defend costs for spares, maintainability improvements, and deployability of systems.
 - Improve initial CONOPS: Document and spread the word on what worked, what didn't work, and what needs to be fixed in the integration of UASs with ground and air combat units.
2. Systems under development: Accomplish the fundamentals necessary for a successful program:
 - Ensure sufficient requirements traceability
 - Re-evaluate requirements for reliability and maintainability
 - Complete and validate concept of operations and support
 - Plan, resource and complete adequate developmental and operational testing




Probability of Completing a 24 Hour Mission Without a Failure





Effect of Air Aborts on Effective Time On Station




Assumes:

- 100 percent availability
- Relief on Station (unlimited aircraft simultaneously airborne)
- Instantaneous launch on request (no start up time)
- No ground aborts
- Exponential air abort distribution

Shows upper bound on ETOS imposed by air aborts

FY01				FY02				FY03				FY04				FY05				FY06				FY07				FY08				FY09				FY10				FY11			
1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q				



Feb 01
 63 RQ-4A air vehicles, 14 ground segments
 12 w/ basic EO/IR + basic SAR (Block 5)
 26 w/ imp EO/IR + RTIP SAR (Block 10)
 25 w/ SIGINT (Block 10)
 \$85.6M PAUC, \$70.8M APUC (excludes ACTD \$574M and 7 a/c)
 LRIP approved: 6 Blk 5 air vehicles, 2 ground segments

Mar 02
 9 RQ-4A, 42 RQ-4B, 10 ground segments
 9 RQ-4A w/ various configurations: basic or improved EO/IR, basic or improved SAR
 4 RQ-4B w/ various configurations
 38 RQ-4B w/imp EO/IR + RTIP SAR + SIGINT
 \$134.2M PAUC, \$86.0M APUC
 LRIP approved: 17 air vehicles, 4 ground segments

Dec 02
 7 RQ-4A, 44 RQ-4B, 10 ground segments
 7 RQ-4A w/ various configurations
 7 RQ-4B w/ various configurations
 12 RQ-4B w/ MP-RTIP only (RTIP a/c start in 09 instead of 07)
 25 RQ-4B w/ imp EO/IR + imp SAR + SIGINT
 \$114.0M PAUC, \$64.2M APUC
 LRIP approved: 19 air vehicles, 4 ground segments

Mar 05
 Same production plans as 2nd restructure, with cost increase, later delivery
 Reduce capability of RQ-4A (no <12hr mission planning)
 Field 2 production aircraft/sensors to replace deployed ACTD assets (\$20M unfunded)
 Delay tests b/c of late development (OA ~1 year, IOT&E 2+ years)
 Est. \$125M PAUC, \$64M APUC, (based on 11% over Dec02 APB threshold.)
 Delayed IOT&E/BLRIP delays FRP decision
 LRIP approved: 40 air vehicles, 12 ground segments

\$12M

Global Hawk Evolution

UNIT FLYAWAY COST ESTIMATE

acceleration

affordability

cost and schedule overruns

\$120M

\$100M

\$80M

\$60M

\$40M

\$20M