SSTRO: *The Joint Response*

LTG Bob Wood
Deputy Commander
USJFCOM

"The United States should work with other countries and organizations to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law."

-- National Security Presidential Directive 44

Joint Operating Environment

- ❏ **Rising state powers – economies, militaries, influence**
- ❏ **Rising power of non-state actors – growth of ideological, religious, and identity-based groups, less bound by conventions**
- ❏ **WMD proliferation**
- ❏ **Globalization – transparency, fast-moving information and money, persistent media presence with global audience**
- ❏ **Technology – rapid change, proliferation, "range" and "precision" much more affordable**
- ❏ **Demographics – migration, growth, urbanization, aging, youth bulges**
- ❏ **Scarcity of Natural Resources – energy, food, water**
- ❏ **Disasters – natural disasters, possibly fueled by climate change, pandemics**

Drivers of instability and conflict tend to reinforce one another, creating a vicious, degenerating cycle in which conditions continue to deteriorate, and the feelings of insecurity and the grievances of the local population continue to increase

Strategic Level SSTRO Response

National Security Presidential Directive 44, *"Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization"*
*7 Dec 05*

❑ **Administration's statement of national policy regarding interagency and SSTRO focused on planning, coordination, and contingency response**

❑ **Assigned lead agency responsibility to Department of State**
  - Granted authority to Secretary of State to coordinate and integrate activities of other government (USG) agencies
  - Empowered the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

❑ **Addressed coordination between State and Defense Departments**
  - Integration of stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate
  - Develop a a general framework for fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all levels where appropriate

Strategic Level SSTRO Response

DoD Directive 3000.05, *"Military Support for stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations" 28 Nov 05*

- ☐ **Stability operations identified as a core U.S. military mission to help establish order to advances U.S. interests and values**

- ☐ **SSTRO success will assist in securing lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces**

- ☐ **The Directive tasks DoD to:**

  - *Develop stability operations exercises and training*

  - *Create joint doctrine for stability operations*

  - *Involve USG, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and private sector entities in DoD planning, training, and exercises*

  - *Designate senior military officers in Services and Geographic Combatant Commands to lead stability operations activities*

  - *Develop a variety of military-civilian team concepts to employ in future stability operations*

> **"[Stability Ops] shall be given priority comparable to combat operations…."**

> **DoDD 3000.05 provides a framework for bolstering military and civilian stability operations capabilities**

Recent Operations Illuminate SSTRO Gaps & Seams

❑ **Understanding the joint operational environment**

    - Improving cultural awareness and understanding

❑ **Enabling Economic Development**

    - Linking security & economic lines of operation – quickly resourcing local priorities

❑ **Enabling Organizational Capacity Development**

    - Providing essential government services - - to facilitate HN legitimacy - lead to self-sufficiency

❑ **Building relationships via engagement with local populace**

    - Tribal through provincial levels - - SSTRO version of presence

❑ **Improving Commander's strategic communication plan**

    - Managing Information and expectations - - synchronizing message with reality on the ground

❑ **Using appropriate levels of force**

    - Balance protection of joint forces and population with interdicting causes of sectarian violence

❑ **Enabling effective governance to promote stability**

❑ **Providing military support to provincial/national elections**

    - Set the condition for transition

❑ **Enabling effective reconciliation efforts to positively shape the HN political environment**

Joint & Operational SSTRO Response

❑ **Joint Doctrine**
- JP 3-0 (Operations), JP 3-57 (Civ/Mil Operations), JP 3-08 (Interagency Coordination), JP 3-13 (Information Operations), and JP 3-61 (Public Affairs)
- US Army is working on a Counterinsurgency (COIN) Joint Pub

❑ **Joint Concepts**
- Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, under revision
- Military Support to SSTR Operations Joint Operating Concept (JOC) 2.0, Dec 06
- Irregular Warfare JOC 1.0, Sep 07
- Cooperative Security JOC, awaiting signature
- Strategic Communications Joint Integrating Concept (JIC), awaiting signature

❑ **COCOM & JTF Operations**
- SSTRO focus in training of MNC-I, ISAF, CJTF-HOA
- Expanding support to State Coordinator for Reconstruction & Stabilization (S/CRS)
- Support to increased number of POLADs and PRT manning and training
- Increased interagency involvement in military planning and security cooperation
- USAFRICOM and USSOUTHCOM efforts on moving toward an interagency entity

SSTRO and Joint Solutions

❑ Joint forces are designed, organized, equipped, and trained to execute one or more of four broad types of military activities in varying combination:

 ❑ _Combat_ to defeat armed and organized enemies – regular, irregular, or both

 ❑ _Security_ to protect and control populations – goal is to reduce violence to a level manageable by local law enforcement authorities

 ❑ _Relief and reconstruction_ to assist in the restoration of civil services in the wake of combat operations, a breakdown of civil order, or a natural disaster

 ❑ _Engagement_ to improve the capabilities of, or cooperation with, others to enhance stability, prevent crises, and enable other operations

❑ Any mission that the joint force is assigned will consist of some combination of these activities

"Military Support to SSTRO" Joint Operating Concept

Military Problem: Provide effective assistance to a government (or one in its formative stage) under serious stress, which is often caught in a deteriorating cycle due to a natural or man-made disaster and usually involves the following factors:

- Absence of key government functions
- Poor economic performance
- Ethnic/religious tensions

- Widespread lawlessness
- Pronounced economic disparities

Solution Central Idea: Combine the efforts of the Joint Force, the interagency, and multinational partners to provide direct assistance to a seriously stressed host-nation in order to stabilize the situation and then help build self-sufficient host-nation capacity across the following major mission areas:

- Establish and maintain a safe, secure environment
- Reconstruct critical infrastructure and restore essential services
- Establish representative and effective governance, and the rule of law

- Deliver humanitarian assistance
- Support economic development
- Conduct strategic communication

Supporting Ideas:
- Achieve unified action
- Conduct contingency planning & preparation
- Establish and maintain a safe, secure environment
- Build host nation capability and capacity and reduce the drivers of instability and conflict
- Conduct Strategic Communication

Functional and Operational Capabilities

Risks and Their Mitigation

SSTRO Functional & Operational Capabilities – SSTRO JOC

Examples

❑ **Creating a Safe, Secure Environment**

  - Conduct measured offensive and defensive ops against the leaders and military forces of hostile groups

  - With coalition partners and HN police, train, equip, and advise large number of foreign forces in full range of SSTRO related skills

❑ **Building U.S. Government Institutional Agility**

  - U.S. Government institutions must be able to distribute funds, goods, and services rapidly and efficiently to successfully conduct SSTRO

  - Cdr access and use of flexible and adaptive contingency funds

  - Cdr's ability to rapidly use reliable, expert foreign and domestic contractor support

❑ **Reconstructing Critical Infrastructure and Essential Services**

  - Ability to protect or repair/construct key infrastructure, i.e., roads, bridges, airfields, hospitals, schools, power plants, electrical grids, telecommunications, sewage, et.al

----

❑ **Delivering Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief**

❑ **Enabling Command, Control and Coordination**

❑ **Supporting Economic Development**

❑ **Providing Battle space Awareness/Understanding**

❑ **Establishing Representative/Effective Government and Rule of Law**

❑ **Conducting Strategic Communications**

Merging Functional and Operational Capabilities

Focus

The Civilian Effort

DoD

Expeditionary

Short-term

Transition oriented

Plan centric

DoS/CRS

ACT/ FACT/ RCT

Agencies

Institutional

Long-term

Development oriented

Project centric

The Military Effort

Time

Merging Functional and Operational Capabilities

Focus (vertical axis)

Time (horizontal axis)

The Civilian Effort

The Military Effort

DoD
- Expeditionary
- Short-term
- Transition oriented
- Plan centric

DoS/CRS
CRSG / IPC / ACT / FACT

Agencies
- Institutional
- Long-term
- Development oriented
- Project centric

USJFCOM Response to SSTRO Challenges

- ❑ **Concept Development**
  - *Capstone Concept for Joint Operation (Revision)*
  - *Military Support to SSTR Operations*
  - *Irregular Warfare*
  - *Military Support to Cooperative Security*
- ❑ **Experimentation**
  - *Unified Action, Multinational Experiment-5*
- ❑ **Capability Development**
  - *SSTR JTF- HQ Template*
  - *IW Center*
- ❑ **Training**
  - *MRXs, COCOM Exercise Support, PRT Training, Distributed Learning (JKO)*
- ❑ **Force Provider**
  - *Key capabilities, (e.g. Civil Affairs, PSYOP, Engineers, Military Intelligence)*
- ❑ **Lessons learned**
  - *JCOA Studies*
- ❑ **Enablers**
  - *SJFHQ/JECC (e.g. TF Ramadi), JPASE, JCSE, and JWAC*

Summary

Improving SSTRO capabilities by enhancing…

❑ Interagency and DOD operational and intelligence planning

❑ Training, education, and personnel management with focus on key specialized skills such as Foreign Area Officers (FAO), Civil Affairs (CA), global public health, Psychological Operations, and joint public affairs

❑ Rapid demonstration and fielding of urgently needed DOD, USG Agency, multinational, and Service capabilities

❑ Expanded means to build international partner capabilities and capacity for conducting SSTR operations

❑ Improve training and education for DOD, military, and civilian personnel in operations in UN/international environment

❑ Contingency Contract Management/Integration

❑ Strategic Communications

❑ Building Partnership Capacity

The military's ability to conduct stability operations required a cultural change with a focus on new habits of thought and action rather than new technology and weapons systems

Actions Underway →

CJTF-Horn of Africa (HOA)

- **Foster regional cooperation**

- **Build capacity**
  - **Border security**
  - **Coastal/Maritime security**
  - **Counter-terrorism**

- **Erode support for extremism:**
  - **Focused humanitarian and civil assistance**
  - **Isolate virtually and physically**

- **Unified Action Through Unity of Effort**
  - **Coalition Participation**
  - **Interagency, NGO and CJTF-HOA Partnership**

- **Partner Nation Engagement**

CJTF-HOA MISSION STATEMENT

CJTF-HOA Conducts Unified Action in the Combined Joint Operations Area-Horn of Africa to Prevent Conflict, Promote Regional Stability, and Protect Coalition Interests in Order to Prevail Against Extremism

Desired End State

- **Terrorist Networks Destroyed/Isolated**
- **Border/Coastal Security Capacity Established**
- **Regional Nations Able To Prevent Terrorism Resurgence**
- ***Africa solving Africa's problems***

TF Ramadi - SJFHQ, USJFCOM
A Joint SSTR Operation in Action!

Back-Ups

Strategic Level SSTRO Response

- **DoD Directive 3000.05:** *"Military Support for stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations," 28 Nov 05.*

  - CDRUSJFCOM through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will;
    - Explore new stability ops concepts and capabilities as part of the joint concept development and experimentation program, in coordination with USD(P) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    - Develop organizational and operational concepts for the military-civilian teams described in paragraph 4.5 including their composition, manning, and sourcing, in coordination w/relevant DoD Components, U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments, International organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector
    - Establish, design, and conduct experiments to identify innovative ideas for stability ops, in coordination with the Combatant Commanders, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the USD(P), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    - Support Combatant Commanders stability ops training and ensure forces assigned to USJFCOM are trained for stability ops
    - Gather and disseminate lessons-learned from stability ops
    - Participate in the Defense Science and Technology planning process to ensure stability ops requirements are supported by Defense Technology Objectives and Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTDs). Recommend sponsors for ACTDs as appropriate
    - Participate in the Defense Operational Test and Evaluation planning process to ensure stability ops are supported by Joint Test and Evaluations (JT&Es) programs. Recommend sponsors for JT&Es as appropriate
    - Develop Joint Public Affairs capabilities for stability ops
    - Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraph 5.10.1, in coordination with the USD(P)

SSTRO Risks and Their Mitigation
(from SSTRO JOC)

❑ **Risk:** USG Interagency community will not develop sufficient amounts/kinds of deployable civilian capabilities needed to conduct SSTRO. (high risk)
   - ❑ **Mitigation:** work w/NSC, U.S. Departments, Agencies, and Congress to gain the support to build SSTR-related civilian capabilities.

❑ **Risk:** DOD force structure and force management policies will not facilitate the recruitment, development, rotation, sustainment of sufficient military personnel for extended duration and manpower intensive SSTRO operations (high risk)
   - ❑ **Mitigation:** Develop/experiment niche and surge capabilities within total force, longer tours to maintain force structure. (medium risk).

❑ **Risk:** The American public and its elected representatives will not allow the United States to get involved in a major SSTR operation, or should such involvement be permitted, will prove unwilling to sustain their support for the conduct of a lengthy, costly SSTR campaign. (high risk).
   - ❑ **Mitigation:** focuses on having DOD and its IA partners develop the rapidly deployable and sustainable capabilities that will be needed to rapidly initiate effective operations within and across the major mission elements (MMEs) of a major SSTR operation - - e.g. strategic communication strategies and means that complement other SSTR operations. SSTR strategic communication strategies must include a strong focus on keeping the American public accurately informed prior to and during the course of the SSTR operation.

❑ **Risk:** Multiple external actors, including the U.S. military and interagency elements, will prove unable to integrate their efforts across the SSTR operation's multidimensional mission elements with those of the existing or new host nation government during a high end SSTR operation and thus the operation will not succeed in creating the new domestic order or a viable peace. (low risk)
   - ❑ **Mitigation:** give priority to developing and exercising integration mechanisms for the planning and conduct of SSTR operations.

Department of State (Sep 07)

Interagency Management System for R&S Planning, Policy, and Operations

**Country Reconstruction & Stabilization Group (CRSG)**

• Washington-based, decision-making body

• Planning and Operations Staff

• Co Chaired by:
Regional A/S
S/CRS Coordinator
NSC Director

Integration Planning Cell (IPC)

• Integrates with relevant Geographic Combatant Command or with equivalent multinational headquarters

• Assists in harmonizing the civilian and military planning processes and operations

• Consists of interagency planners, regional and sectoral experts

Advance Civilian Team (ACT)

• Interagency field management coordination team(s)

• Support Chief of Mission in the field to coordinate and execute plans

Field Advance Civilian Team (FACT)

FACT

FACT
Decentralized ACT

DOS In-Country Elements to Support Embassy for Phases IV and V

19

"Secure the Victory"

Emerging Contexts of Future Conflicts and War

❑ **Cooperation and conflict among conventional state powers will remain a primary driver.**

❑ **Increasing cooperation and conflict with and among non-conventional, non-state powers will increase as a driver.**

❑ **Some adversaries will use both conventional and non-conventional power as it advances their aims (e.g. Iran, N. Korea – both a "state" and a "network"). Non-conventional activity will be difficult to attribute.**

❑ **There will be more WMD / nuclear-armed states.**

❑ **Persistent media presence, coupled with instant global distribution, will bring the general populations more directly in touch with joint force operations.**

❑ **Technology proliferation (distinct from WMD) among conventional powers and non-conventional powers will increase their "reach" into the sea, air, and space.**

❑ **There will be more large, sprawling cities at home, near home, and abroad, in which the joint force will operate.**

These contexts will increasingly intersect and overlap contributing to added complexity in Joint Operations and specifically Security, Stability, Transition & Reconstruction Operations

Civil Affairs: Key Joint Force Enabler for SSTRO

FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

OFFENSE · **DEFENSE** · **STABILITY**

ARMY STABILITY TASKS

- ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY
- ESTABLISH CIVIL CONTROL
- RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES
- SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE
- SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECTORS

- SECURITY
- JUSTICE AND RECONCILLIATION
- HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL WELL-BEING
- GOVERNANCE AND PARTICIPATION
- ECON STABILIZATION/INFRASTRUCTURE

Traditional CA Missions

Army White Paper Stability Operations in An Era of Persistent Conflict (DRAFT / Predecisional)

Doctrinal CA Capabilities Alignment
FM 3-05.40 (Sep 06)
GTA 41-01-001 (Jan 08)

GCC — TSOC
CA Command Theater-Level CMOC

Corps
CA Bde HQ CMOC

Division
CA Bn HQ CMOC

JSOTF
CA Bn HQ CMOC/CATs

BCT
CA Company CMOC/CATs

RGR
CA Company CMOC/CATs

NOTE: CA capabilities are attached to supported commanders IAW force generation cycle.

Overall CA Sourcing for GWOT
Capability versus Capacity

GPF Civil Affairs (USAR)	SOF Civil Affairs (AC)	USARC (USAR other than CA)	IRR	USN	USAF	Unfilled

OEF:	87% / 13	416	
OEF/OIF1:	94% / 6%		
OEF/OIF2:	93% / 7%	1195	2559
04-06:	87% / 3 / 2 / 8	1108	
05-07:	68% / 3 / 7% / 15% / 7	1089	
06-08:	43% / 4 / 3 / 23% / 18% / 2 / 7	1282	
07-09:	14% / 5 / 38% / 21% / 14% / 7% / 1	1129	
SURGE:	100% / 160	(SOF FILL / GPF BACK FIL	
FY08:	46% / 8% / 13% / 9% / 11% / 4 / 9	1455	

▲ PAST & CURRENT ROTATION SOURCING
▼ PROJECTED FUTURE SOURCING

FY08.2:	67% / 12 / 20 / 1	289
FY09:	70% / 24% / 7	1146
FY09.2:	Sourcing Solution TBD	1146

❑ **Key Points:**
❑ **Force levels required at start of OIF were not sustainable**
❑ **Surge sourcing (addition to 07-09) employed SOF CA "bridge" mission**
❑ **FY08 mission requirements increase (global Requirements and PRTs)**
❑ **Impact: Current dwell ratio for GPF CA is approximately 1:2, for SOF CA 1:0.8**

CA Way Ahead

- ❑ **Draft POM FY 10 recommendation to OSD - - accelerate CA MOTE Conversion (JFP issues).**
- ❑ **Draft POM FY 10 recommendation to OSD - - accelerate CA growth (e.g. USACAPOC by 904 spaces - - FY 2010-2012).**
- ❑ **Implications/Findings as per SECDEF (IW) Action Memo 2.3.4, dated 7 May 08, asking CDRUSSOCOM and CDRUSJFCOM to look at AC/RC re-balance.**
- ❑ **Implications as per final draft DOD 2000.13, Civil Affairs, currently in staffing (CA Proponency impact).**
- ❑ **Implications/Findings as per 5 Jun 08 Senior Readiness Oversight Council Meetings SROC (subject: Civil Affairs/ILO Policies).**
- ❑ **SECDEF decision as per CDRUSSOCOM Memo, dated 25 Apr 08, asking for DOD/Joint Proponency w/requisite authorities over Services.**
- ❑ **Implications/Findings as per HASC "Agency Stovepipes vs Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan" Report, dated Apr 08.**

Joint Forces Command Mission

The United States Joint Forces Command provides mission-ready Joint Capable forces and supports the development and integration of Military, Government, and Multinational capabilities to meet the *present* and *future* operational needs of the Joint Force.

Commander's Guidance

❑ Jointness is not a natural state – deserves our best effort

❑ Our enemy means every word it says

❑ We will fight future wars with partners

❑ Our military must improve capability in the irregular fight

❑ Maintain our conventional dominance

> **_Reshape our forces to fight a new way of war_**

The Military Problem – Finding Balance
## Reducing Future Risk to Meet the Evolving Threat

Where we were

IW/SSTR   Conventional

Deterrence

Where we are operating today

IW/SSTR   Conventional

Deterrence

Where do we want to be tomorrow?

IW/SSTR   ?   Conventional

OR

IW/SSTR   Conventional

Deterrence

Deterrence

**What are the discriminators?**
What are the game changers?

The Challenge

- ❑ **Build the right numbers**
- ❑ **Provide the right equipment**
- ❑ **Provide the right guidance**
- ❑ **Be able to operate together with Partners**
  - ❑ **US and Multi-national**
  - ❑ **Military and Civilian**

Deconflicted — Coordinated — Integrated