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- Lessons from the Past
  - United States, 1865 to 1877
  - Haiti, 1915 to 1934
  - Germany (1945-)
  - Japan (1945-)

Conclusions and Observations
Dying is easy but comedy is hard

A. For American armed forces, military victory against conventional fighting foes is (relatively) easy

B. But stabilization and reconstruction operations—AKA—nation building—are hard

C. Remember books on counterinsurgency from the 1960s prescribing the way to victory in Vietnam?

- We all know how that turned out.
- Similarly, today, books on stabilization and reconstruction often oversimplify complexities and underestimate difficulties.
III. Conventional Wisdom.

A. Successful reconstruction takes five to seven years—BUT:

- We were in the ex-Confederacy 12 years and failed
- We occupied Haiti 19 years and failed
- We were in the Philippines for 45 years and failed
- Post World War II Germany and Japan are models, but:
  1. Both still American troops still stationed there
  2. Both are under the American nuclear umbrella
  3. Both devote much less of their gross domestic product than United States to defense because they are protected by America
III. Conventional Wisdom. . .

B. Bosnia and Kosovo are not stable after more than a decade
C. Korea can be counted a success—but it took more than three decades
D. United States is not unique
   - Papua New Guinea is a failing state
   - Solomon Islands no better
   - East Timor is failing
   - Fiji has had a series of military coups
   - The Congo under a series of names is hyper unstable and has been
   - Nigeria is problematic to say the least
   - Uganda is in trouble
   - Rwanda and Burundi are trembling
   - Zimbabwe is close to hopeless

E. We must examine carefully all nation-building generalizations
IV. Relevant touchstones

A. “Four Pillars of Reconstruction” (Orr/CSIS)
   - Security
   - Governance and participation
   - Economic and social well-being
   - Justice and reconciliation

B. Defining stability operations (DOD Dir. 3000.5)
   - Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in states and regions
V. Reconstructing the American Union (1865-1877)

A. Traditional Paradigm – Reconstruction of American South (1865-1877)
   - Reconstruction considered distinct from Civil War

B. Fully Integrated One Hundred Year Struggle (1860-1964 and beyond)
   - Secession-War-Reunion-Nationalization
V. Reconstruction

C. Indigenous resistance (unrepentant Confederates)
   ▪ Question of hearts and minds
   ▪ Harsh war, soft peace

D. Ethnic/racial dimension: Legal equality versus racial discrimination

E. Lack of overwhelming military presence (US Army)
V. Reconstruction

F. Nation reunited but no national settlement

G. Civil War generation proved the adage – easier to win a war than to impose and maintain peace
VI. Focus on Haiti and Post World War II
Germany/Japan

A. Haiti

- America in Haiti 19 years (1915-1934)
- BUT by 1900 United States Marines had landed in Haiti 8 times
- 1900-1914 United States gunboats in Haitian waters
  1. American banks and entrepreneurs engaged in Haiti
  2. By 1910, United States had dominance in Haitian affairs
  3. In 1913, President Wilson wanted control of Haiti to reform it

  Motivations for occupation (motivations matter)
  (a) Wilsonian idealism
  (b) American Imperialism
  (c) Security of Panama Canal
  (d) Racial paternalism
A. Haiti

- Americans disarm Port-au-Prince; arrest/kill Caco rebels
- United States installs client president, who is given a treaty he must sign
- United States seizes custom houses, fights Caco rebels, declares martial law, controls Gendarmerie
- Americans create new Haitian constitution
  1. Overturns Haitian prohibition on foreign ownership of Haitian land
  2. Extend martial control over entire country igniting rebellion
  3. Americans turned to forced labor to build roads over entire country—reignites rebellion
A. Haiti

- From 1918 to 1922 Marines fight an insurgency
  1. United States is criticized overseas and also domestically, Senate studies claims of torture and other atrocities
  2. Relative tranquility 1922–1929 with new puppet president
     - Haitian press censored
     - Opponents of occupation jailed by United States
  3. Fall 1929 renewed protests, student strikes, general strike
     - Hoover appoints commission, finds: “unless measures are taken to meet” the public’s “demands for a legislature that can elect a president in the near future . . . grave public disorder will arise.”

- August 1934 occupation ends, BUT direct supervision of Haiti’s economy continued through 1942
- Constant coups, revolts, crime, disorder virtually ever after
B. Germany and Japan

- Focus will be on why/how occupations succeeded
- Germany:
  1. Unlike Haiti, Germany utterly defeated, initial number of troops in Germany 100/1000, fell to 10/1000 (still, much more than Haiti)
  2. Germany’s nation building program much greater United States effort than others
     - External reasons—Cold War tensions—promote greater concern by America
     - German fear of Soviets encourages German cooperation
     - United States had two cooperative allies
     - Most German neighbors supported America
     - First goal was security—a constant in nation-building
C. Germany

- Military administration was central
- United States had a transformation plan
- German army demobilized war crime tribunal held, substantial humanitarian and economic assistance provided
- American constabulary force established (30,000); that trained German police
- German police largely take over by 1949
- Total denazification proved impractical if Germans were eventually to run state
- There were 3,600,000 Nazis left in 1945
- German special courts tried 900,000 Nazis convicting 120,000
C. Germany

- Sovereignty gradually returned beginning in 1947
- Elections held in 1949, ultimate authority in occupation forces
- Education completely reformed, freedom of press/discussion ensured
- General Clay, commander of occupation went far beyond authority to reconstruct German economy
  1. American sector economic output 4th quarter 1946, 2.5 times same quarter 1945
  2. German Gross Domestic Product grows double digit rate 1947 to 1952
C. Germany

- Lessons learned by Jim Dobbins:
  1. Democracy can be transferred
  2. Enforced accountability for crimes can facilitate transformation
  3. Divided states/authorities are headaches
  4. Money from everywhere is essential
  5. Immediate reparations are counterproductive
  6. “[M]ilitary force and political capital can . . . successfully . . . underpin . . . [enduring] societal transformation.” BUT
     (a) Planning is essential
     (b) Security is essential
     (c) Economic recovery is indispensable
     (d) Establishing democracy is valuable
D. Japan

- Allies agree on terms for Japan:
  1. Unconditional surrender
  2. Purge World War II Japanese leadership
  3. Allied occupation until a new order was established and Japan’s war-making power destroyed
  4. Disbandment of Japan’s empire
  5. Military disarmament
  6. Prosecution of war criminals
  7. Establishment of freedom of speech, religion, thought, respect for human rights
  8. Reduction of economic capacity to prevent rearmament.

- Emperor was preserved, but forced to deny his deity
  1. MacArthur whitewashed emperor, used him
  2. MacArthur also ruled through Cabinet/Diet
  3. Unlike Germany’s occupation, United States essentially solely in charge; MacArthur ruled
C. Japan

- Humanitarian problems:
  1. 3,000,000 unwelcome Japanese civilians in former colonies; 3.5 million military too
  2. Many Japanese cities destroyed, 9 million homeless

- Security from insurgency almost guaranteed because Emperor and civilian cabinet cooperated in ensuring indigenous forces disarmed
  1. End 1945, 354,875 American troops in Japan
  2. War crime tribunals were held
  3. Militaristic politicians and bureaucrats purged from government—but few politicians and fewer bureaucrats
  4. New Constitution hastily written under MacArthur’s supervision
    - Japanese argue, but accept
    - Constitution never amended!
    - Article 9 of constitution forswears war
D. Japan

- Elections held April 1946!
  1. 363 parties, 2770 candidates for 466 seats
  2. 78.52% men/66.97% women vote
  3. 377 new members
  4. Conservatives win (and have done so nearly ever since)

- MacArthur demanded food to prevent Japanese hunger; despite objections from United States government, got it
  1. Saved millions from malnutrition
  2. Earned respect/admiration for United States

- By 1947 Cold War tensions induce United States to consider Japan as ally; promote rearmament
  1. Korean War convinces most Japanese to get onboard
  2. Korean War also sparks vast economic boom
D. Japan

- MacArthur fully understood nexus between economic security, prosperity and democracy
  
  1. MacArthur pulled in opposite directions in democratizing economy
     
     (a) Many demand zaibatsu eliminated, but reform less than thorough
     (b) Labor unions sanctioned, encouraged, but many communists in union leadership
     (c) In end foundation for sound economy laid
  
  2. Land Reform to see that farmers owned land they worked instead of renting, broke the back of landlords who had been a major prop of hyper nationalism and militarism—may be MacArthur’s most profound reform

- April 1952, Japan gets sovereignty
  
  1. United States gets bases for guarantee of Japanese security by America
F. Germany and Japan Summary

- There is no substitute for planning
- Security is the *sine qua non* for nation building
  1. Obviously easier said than done
  2. And many paths can be taken to achieve security, but antagonizing the people is self-defeating
  3. One cannot fight an insurgency and build a nation simultaneously
  4. Physical security is not enough
- Economic security is the next prerequisite
  1. Another easier said than done and many paths can be followed
  2. No nation can be built without people employed constructively
  3. Democracy is impossible without economic security
  4. Establishing economic security is necessarily a multilateral effort