The Joint Capabilities Integration & Development System (JCIDS)

Demonstrating Relevance to Decision-Makers

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Disclaimer

• The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily representative of DOD, the Joint Staff, or the Air Force
Why JCIDS?

• 2002 SecDef Memo
  – “... clear it [the requirements system] is broken ... inevitably continues to require things that ought not to be required, and does not require things that need to be required.”
  – Priority theme ...

• Change to Dynamic, Unpredictable Environment
  – Previous -- Cold War focus, singular threat source
  – New world order – threat is a “Hydra”
    • State and Non-State sources
    • Threats in every corner of the world

• What is the basis for saying “yes” to Program X, and “no” to Program Y?
“Capabilities-based planning focuses more on how adversaries may challenge us than on whom those adversaries might be or where we might face them. It focuses the Department on the growing range of capabilities and methods we must possess to contend with an uncertain future. It recognizes the limits of intelligence and the impossibility of predicting complex events with precision. Our planning aims to link capabilities to joint operating concepts across a broad range of scenarios. The Department is adopting a new approach for planning to implement our strategy. The defense strategy will drive this top-down, competitive process. Operating within fiscal constraints, our new approach enables the Secretary of Defense and Joint Force Commanders to balance risk across traditional, irregular, disruptive, and catastrophic challenges. We will operationalize this strategy to address the spectrum of strategic challenges by setting priorities among competing capabilities.”
"... the Department is shifting its portfolio of capabilities to address irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges while sustaining capabilities to address traditional challenges."
The DOD Missions

Steady State

Homeland Defense

Surge

Global Deterrence

Consequence Management

Interdiction

Counterinsurgency

Stability Operations

War on Terror / Irregular Warfare

Information Operations

Foreign Internal Defense

WMD Elimination

Active Partnering & Tailored Shaping

Train & Equip

Information Operations

Regional Deterrence

Active Partnering & Tailored Shaping

Forward Presence.

Major Combat/Strike

Stability Operations

Reconstruction Support

Cons. Management

Conventional Campaign(s)

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## The Analytic Agenda

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Steady-State</th>
<th>Surge</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current</strong></td>
<td>Plan (OPLANs, CONPLANs, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mid-Year (+7 years)</strong></td>
<td>Steady State Security Requirements (SSSPs)</td>
<td>Major Combat Operations Scenarios (MCOs)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Out-Year (+20 years)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Swiftly Defeat the Efforts</td>
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- Scenario Level – broad outline developed by OSD(P)
- Multi-Service Force Deployment (MSFD) data – detailed CONOPS, developed by Joint Staff with all relevant DOD organizations
- Analytic Baselines – specific details approved for DOD use, approved by OSD/PA&E
Finding a “need” for Program X is not enough ...

Need should be evaluated FIRST
  – Assess utility against (many) potential threats
  – Is the threat “grave”? How important is the need?
  – When do we need it?

Potential solutions need careful attention
  – Alternative solutions (to include non-materiel)
  – Offset consideration

Is doing nothing a reasonable alternative?
FAA and FNA

- FAA defines the military problem being addressed and specifies evaluation criteria as tasks, conditions, and standards (i.e. scope)
  - Determine what will be evaluated (tasks), the relevant operational environments (conditions), and how well, or to what degree the joint force must do them (standards – proficiency and sufficiency)
  - Analogy: What are the course objectives; prepare final exam

- The FNA assesses how well DoD achieves the military objectives
  - Evaluate how well the war fighter will do the tasks, to include with non-traditional means. Results should specify gap impact on objectives (e.g. minor inconvenience, ‘we lose the war’, or something in between)
  - Analogy: How did the students do? Exam results?

- “Capability gaps” come in two flavors:
  - Proficiency – the ability to do the task in the specified conditions and to the specified standards
  - Sufficiency – the ability to do the task as much/often as DoD needs
Given that a gap exists (from FNA), what are the most promising solution paths available?

- “Banded” solutions encouraged!
- Solution maturity (tech, manufacturing, etc.) must be evaluated
- Cost effectiveness, risk must be evaluated

Two potential documentation paths

- Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) – Materiel “heavy”
- DOTMLPF Change Request (DCR) – Non-materiel “heavy”

ICD may lead Analysis of Alternatives (AoAs), two documentation paths:

- Capabilities Development Document (CDD), if material development required
- Capabilities Production Document (CPD), if solutions is “off-the-shelf”
Concept Decision (CD)

- **Critical Decision Point**
  - Gap Identified
  - Potential Solution Paths Identified
  - Question: Should DOD apply resources to pursue a solution?
    - Viable answers require three big DOD tribes to agree!

- **The CD Experiments**
  - GS-Raid (Global Strike Raid)
  - JLTM (Joint Lightweight Tactical Mobility)
  - IAMD (Integrated Air-Missile Defense)
  - JRSG (Joint Rapid Scenario Generation)
  - JAGM (Joint Air-to-Ground Missile)

- **The Evaluation of Alternatives (EoA)**

- **Tri-Chair Review/Decision**
Focus

Capabilities Based Assessment

- Capabilities
- Tasks
- Attributes
- Metrics
- Gaps
- Shortfalls
- Redundancies
- Risk areas
- Non-materiel solutions
- Materiel solutions
- S+T initiatives
- Experimentation

- Refined concept
- Analysis of Alternatives
- Technology Development Strategy
- SoS System Engineering
- Affordable military-useful increment
- Technology demonstrated
- Initial KPPs
- SEP
- Revise KPPs
- LRP
- Detailed design
- System integration
- DT&E

Services

Policy
Capabilities Definition
Concept Refinement
Acquisition and Test

OSD (AT&L, PA&E), Services and OSD (DOT&E) ~ Joint Staff (JROC)
Capabilities Based Planning – The Big Picture

**SOURCES**

**Strategic Guidance**
- National Security Strategy
- National Defense Strategy
- National Military Strategy
- Quadrennial Defense Review

**Analytic Agenda**
- Defense Planning Scenarios
  - Current
  - Mid-Year (+7 years)
  - Out-Year (+20 years)

**Doctrine & Concepts**
- Joint Doctrine
- Joint Concepts

**Why**
- Requirements
  - JCIDS
  - CJCSI 3170

**What, Where, When, Who**
- Acquisition
  - DOD 5000 Series

**How**
- PPBE
  - POM Builds Program/Budget Review

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### JCIDS Critiques

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criticism</th>
<th>Response</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Not Responsive Enough</td>
<td>Transition from RGS (3+ years)</td>
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<td>• Ties to “effects-based operations” and/or</td>
<td>JRAC</td>
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<td>Joint Concepts</td>
<td>Increasingly flexible (rules)</td>
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<td>– Capabilities can’t be tied to specific</td>
<td>Scrutiny will remain</td>
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<tr>
<td>adversaries or places</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>– Too ethereal to substantiate real-world</td>
<td>“Effects” and EBO not the same</td>
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<tr>
<td>application</td>
<td>Focus on need, not solution-based</td>
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<td>• Ineffective Prioritization</td>
<td>Guilty!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– First attempts tied to “gaps” as proposed</td>
<td>Way-Ahead TBD – hopefully based</td>
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<tr>
<td>by COCOMs, Services</td>
<td>on mission priority, objective</td>
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<tr>
<td>– Impact of DOD mission objective</td>
<td>attainment, and time of need</td>
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<td>attainment minimal, subjective</td>
<td>Useful for trades</td>
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<td>– Current efforts to prioritized Joint</td>
<td>Not helpful in roll-ups</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capability Areas (JCAs)</td>
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Prioritization Concept

• 1 to N, or Trades?

• Gap “grades”
  – Time
  – Impact to scenario
  – Scenario importance
    • How many scenarios?
    • Weighted importance?
  – Evaluation time – updates?

• Previous concept issues
Future

• Good bet
  – Emphasis on “Interdependence”
    • Beyond interoperability
    • Conflict with some established doctrine/concepts, particularly when “organic” solutions are offered to address enterprise-wide capability gaps
      – Logistics (e.g. airlift)
      – C4ISR (e.g. Intelligence collection, Information dissemination)
      – Electronic Warfare
    • More reliance on Service-based analysis (within natural domains)
    • Lower tolerance for organic capabilities beyond Service core-competencies (e.g. stovepipes, Service-unique programs)
  – Format changes (ACAT or JPD level views)

• Probable
  – Clarified “roles and missions” for COCOMs, Services, and especially Reserve Components
  – More focus on prioritization of individual capability gaps, enabling “trades” – requires “top-down” weighting of DOD missions
  – Less focus on prioritization of capability areas
QUESTIONS?

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BACKUP
LtGen (Ret) Van Riper (11 Dec 05)

- “... today JCIDS evidences all the signs of an overly bureaucratic and procedurally focused process ...”
- “... damaged the military lexicon ...”
- “... a truly useful military operating concept only results when there is a need to solve a significant problem ... perform some military function better or in a new way.”
- “a ‘revolution in military affairs’ or a ‘military transformation’ ... now serve as a mantra for those advocating advanced technologies”
- “... concepts to justify directly ... every programmatic decision ...”
- “seem to serve more as a means to slow innovation”
- “lack of intellectual content in emerging joint concepts ... assigning our best thinkers to infuse content into vacuous slogans ... none more egregious that the idea of ‘effects-based operations’”
- “Effects-based Operations ... not useful against ‘interactively complex systems’” (e.g. economic and leadership systems)
- “... senior joint and service leaders must clearly identify the most significant problems ...”
The Munitions Requirements Process (MRP)

- Tied to PPBE
  - Two-year effort
  - Process: A Simple View
    - OSD Policy and AT&L determine scenario list for enhanced review/analysis
    - DIA develops threat (near-term and future)
    - COCOMs develop near-term plans for listed scenarios
    - Joint Staff develops future plans for listed scenarios
    - Services develop individual munitions requirements
    - Risk Assessments by Services, COCOMs, Joint Staff, and OSD

- Tied to QDR’s Force Planning Construct
  - Traditional surge scenarios tend to be munitions “drivers”
  - Service munitions investments driven by needs in defined scenarios

- Munitions are typically not bought to full requirement
  - Shorter lead-time than many other needs, but not insignificant
  - Lesser impact on other force elements (force size, readiness, etc.)
QDR: Operationalizing the Strategy

• Defend the Homeland
  – Steady-state – detect, deter, and if necessary, defeat external threats to the U.S. homeland, and enable partners to contribute to U.S. national security.
  – Surge – contribute to the nation’s response to and management of the consequences of WMD attacks or a catastrophic event.

• Prevail in the War on Terror and Conduct Irregular Operations
  – Steady-state – deter and defend against external transnational terrorist attacks, enable partners through integrated security cooperation programs, and conduct multiple, globally distributed irregular operations of varying duration.
  – Surge – conduct a large-scale, potentially long duration irregular warfare campaign including counterinsurgency and security, stability, transition and reconstruction operations.

• Conduct and Win Conventional Campaigns
  – Steady-state – deter inter-state coercion or aggression through forward deployed forces, enable partners through theater security cooperation, and conduct presence missions.
  – Surge – wage two nearly simultaneous conventional campaigns (or one conventional campaign if already engaged in a large-scale, long-duration irregular campaign), while selectively reinforcing deterrence against opportunistic acts of aggression. Be prepared in one of the two campaigns to remove a hostile regime, destroy its military capacity and set conditions for the transition to, or for the restoration of, civil society.