S&T Stakeholders Conference

What Needs Attention/ The Way Forward:

Bugs (Chemical, Biological, Agriculture Security)

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What Needs Attention

- S&T should find appropriate ways to increase information sharing with industry:
  - Understand S&T long term vision
  - S&T needs to more clearly define the business case for industry opportunities
    - Industry needs to make the ROI case to their leadership
    - By time a BAA comes out it is often too late for industry to have invested in up-front research/development
  - Access to S&T developed capability gaps
  - Insight and/or access to S&T 5 year plans
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What Needs Attention

• S&T should evaluate ways to integrate information and data found in multiple DHS platforms (websites, portals) – FEMA example of working with first responders

• S&T should develop more interactive sessions with Industry in future Stakeholder meetings.
  • Give S&T presentations first day with second day reserved for discussions, interactions, recommendations
  • Evaluate holding separate Stakeholder meetings by Capstone IPT Divisions/Offices

• S&T should consider the development of more dual use technologies for increased ROI (DHS/HHS)
• S&T and CDC should pursue development of process to test and validate biosensor technologies installed in private sector facilities as “public health actionable”.
• Engage “cleared” industry partners to assist with, or receive selected information from, CBD, S&T Risk Assessments (BTRA and CTRA)
• Address perception that S&T primarily utilizes the National Laboratories rather than private industry for systems, technologies and/or methodologies.
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Key Take Aways

• S&T should further engage and inform Industry via:
  – Long-term vision
  – Capability gaps
  – 5-year plans
  – Participation in IPT process as appropriate
  – Information access platforms

• S&T should explore expanding Chemical Security Analysis Center capability for use by state and local governmental entities. (CSAC is a centralized reachback facility for Chemical threat awareness, assessment and analysis)

• S&T should consider the development of more dual use technologies for increased ROI
Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC)

Mission: To provide analysis and scientific assessment of the chemical threat against the American homeland and American public.

Objectives

• Chemical threat awareness, assessment and analysis

• Integration and analysis of chemical threat information and data

• Reachback capability to provide expert analysis support

• Science-based risk assessment

Payoffs

• Centralized repository of chemical threat data

• Comprehensive S&T based assessments of chemical threat materials

• Centralized reachback capability for chemical threat information

• A prioritized assessment of chemical threats to provide guidance to Interagency activities
Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA) vs. Material Threat Assessments (MTAs)

### Bioterrorism Risk Assessment:
- Relative risk assessment of biological agents with thousands of scenarios
  - Provides breadth over depth
  - Includes consequence modeling
- Relative risk and tailored assessments provided to White House Homeland Security Council
- Informs bio-defense strategic investment

### Material Threat Assessments:
- In-depth assessment of plausible, high-consequence scenarios on a specific CBRN agent
  - Includes “excursions” to bound results
- Detailed human exposure estimates provided to HHS; HHS performs detailed consequence modeling
- Informs BioShield investments

**National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC):**
Perform studies to better understand *Traditional, Enhanced, Emerging and Advanced* threat agent properties in terms of processing, stability, decay rates, dissemination efficiency, etc. to close key knowledge gaps