

Safety Process For Navy Gun and Ammunition Systems

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Agenda

- Purpose
- Policies
- Define Safety
- Gun System Safety Process
 - Hardware
 - Software
- Ammunition Safety
- Hazards
 - Identification
 - Mitigation
 - Risk Acceptance
- Independent Review
- Summary

Purpose

- Identify safety processes involved in the qualification of all gun systems and their associated ammunition for U.S. Navy
 - Gun System
 - Gun Mount (GM)
 - Fire Control System (FCS)
 - Associated Systems
 - Ammunition Safety
 - Fuze
 - Energetic
 - Transportation and Storage


System Safety Program Plan Developed for all Gun and Ammunition Systems

Safety Process

- All Gun Systems and Ammunition Need to go Through a Rigorous Safety Process Before Deployment
 - Gun Systems for Navy Platforms
 - New Development
 - Previously Developed Systems
 - New Ammunition for New or Existing Gun Systems
 - Updates/Upgrades to Deployed Systems
 - Deployment of Existing Gun Systems on New Platforms



Government and Navy Safety Policy




Implementation of Government Safety Policies Ensures Safety of System Onboard Ship

System Safety Defined

- What exactly **IS** a System Safety Issue?
 - A situation in which own-platform, own-platform personnel, or friendly assets are at risk from onboard equipment / systems.
 - Personnel
 - Own-Ship Damage
 - Friendly Asset
 - Environment
- What exactly **IS NOT** a System Safety Issue?
 - Operational Effectiveness and Survivability Issues
 - Operational Effectiveness
 - Survivability

Gun System Safety Analysis Process





Gun System Hardware Safety

- Apply General Guidelines for Electronic Equipment (*MIL-HDBK-454*).
- Inspect hardware for validation of hardware safety requirements (regardless of design phase).
- Analyze equipment motion
- Identify sources of radiated energy



System Control Software Safety

Main emphasis of gun system safety.

- Analyze Software IAW NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 4404.
- Apply lessons learned from previous like systems.
- Adhere to C++ safety coding guidelines
- Address Safety Concerns with
 - Java
 - Operating System
 - Middleware
 - Firmware
 - Development tools
- Analyze test environment
- Determine the Level of Rigor of Software testing



Ammunition Safety


- Design to Proven Standards
 - Fuze design *MIL-STD-1316*
 - Electronic Safe & Arm Device (ESAD) *WSESRB TM*
 - Ignition Design *MIL-STD-1901*
 - Initiator *MIL-DTL-23659*
- Ensure that the Energetic Compounds are Stable
 - *NAVSEAINST 8020.5* and *STANAG 4170*
- Analyze Design to Mitigate Hazards
 - Eliminate Single Point Failures
 - MIL-STD-882D Safety Analyses
 - Special Safety Analyses
 - Structural Analyses

Ammunition Tests

- Analyze for a variety of environments
 - Transportation (Land, Sea, Air)
 - Storage
 - Handling by service personnel
 - Drop
 - Combat or Terrorist Threats
 - Fire
 - Shock and Vibration
 - Radiation
- Test
 - ESD / HERO: *MIL-STD-464*
 - Insensitive Munitions: *MIL-STD-2105*
 - *Associated STANAG*
 - Shipboard Shock: *MIL-S-901*
 - Fuze: *MIL-STD-331C*
 - Hot Gun Cook-off: *NAVSEA SW300-BC-SAF-010*



Identify and Categorize Mishaps and Causal Factors



CAUSAL FACTORS

Elements within the system design, implementation, or operation that lead to, or contain, a hazard.

Hazard Mitigation

- Mitigation Methods (In order of precedence)
 - Design out hazard
 - Incorporate safety devices
 - Provide warning devices
 - Develop procedures and training

Mishap Risk Acceptance Matrix

FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE	MISHAP SEVERITY CATEGORIES			
	1 CATASTROPHIC	2 CRITICAL	3 MARGINAL	4 NEGLIGIBLE
A – FREQUENT	1	3	7	13
B – PROBABLE	2	5	9	16
C – OCCASIONAL	4	6	11	18
D – REMOTE	8	10	14	19
E – IMPROBABLE	12	15	17	20
Cells:	Risk Level & Acceptance Authority:			
1-5:	HIGH (UNACCEPTABLE) – Acceptance of risk by Component Acquisition Executive.			
6-9:	SERIOUS (UNDESIREABLE) – Acceptance of risk by the Program Executive Officer.			
10-17:	MEDIUM (Acceptable with review) – Acceptance of risk by the Program Manager.			
18-20:	LOW (Acceptable with review) – Acceptance of risk by the Program Manager.			



Navy Safety Review Boards

- **Weapon System Explosives Safety Review Board (WSESRB)**
 - **SECNAVINST 5000.2C**
 - Establishes the WSESRB as the Navy's independent agent for reviewing weapon system safety programs
 - **OPNAVINST 8020.14/MCO P8020.11**
 - Specifies requirements for WSESRB review
 - **NAVSEAINST 8020.6E**
 - Establishes WSESRB policies and procedures
 - **Software System Safety Technical Review Panel (SSSTRP)**
 - Established by WSESRB to review software safety
 - More thorough review by technical experts
 - **Fuze & Initiation Safety Technical Review Panel (FISTRP)**
 - Established by WSESRB to review fuze/initiation systems safety
 - More thorough review by technical experts
 - **Lithium Battery Review Board**
- **Insensitive Munition Review Board (IMRB)**
- **Ordnance Hazard Evaluation Board (OHEB)**
- **Bureau of Medicine (BUMED)**
 - **Laser Safety Review Board (LSRB)**



Safety Process Summary

- **Apply Mandated Policies**
- **Follow System Safety Program Plan**
- **Identify, Mitigate and Accept risk**
- **Present Safety Process to Safety Review Board**
- **Present Analysis to Safety Review Board**

All Gun Systems and Ammunition Need to go Through a Rigorous Safety Process Before Deployment.

BACK UP



Web Site for Further Interest

- Digital Engineering Institute
 - www.klabs.org/DEI/References/Military_Specifications.htm
- System Safety Handbook
 - www.asy.faa.gov/risk/SSHandbook/Contents.htm
- Joint Weapon Safety Review Process for USSOCOM Program
 - www.acq.osd.mil/atptf



Ammunition Qualification Tests

PVAT

Sequential Environment

28-Day Temperature and Humidity (T&H)

Transportation Vibration

Shipboard Vibration

4-Day T&H

Fast Cook-Off

Slow Cook-Off

Bullet Impact

Fragment Impact

Sympathetic Detonation

Shaped Charge Jet Impact

Salt Fog

Sand and Dust

Arena

5-Foot Drop

40-Foot Drop

Shipboard Shock

Waterproof

Energetics Qualification

Function and Casualty

Fuze Function

Fuze Arming Distance

Jumble

Jolt

Missing Interrupter

Thermal Shock

Detonator Safety

Lead Azide

HERO

ESD

EMV

Lightning

Progressive Arming

Primary Explosive Component Safety Test

Bonfire Test

Stack Test

POP

Unit Load




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

Joint Systems

- ***JOINT WEAPON SYSTEMS HAVE JOINT REVIEWS***
- **Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)**
 - **Joint Weapon, Munitions, and Laser SOCOM Weapon Safety Review Process**
 - USD AT&L Memo implementing the Joint USSOCOM Process, 9 November 07
 - MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT AMONG United States Special Operations, Command (USSOCOM), OSD AT&L, OSD Environmental Readiness and Safety, Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, Department of the Air Force
 - **In support of USSOCOM Acquisitions**
 - Collaborative process supported by each Service's CAE and Safety review authorities
 - Convenes as necessary to review Joint USSOCOM Weapon Programs
 - Incorporates the Joint Laser Safety Review Board (JLSRB)
- ***Participants***
 - ***Navy WSESRB***
 - ***USAF NON-NUCLEAR MUNITIONS SAFETY BOARD (NNMSB)***
 - ***US ARMY FUZE SAFETY REVIEW BOARD (AFSRB)***
 - MEMBERS OF EACH BOARD HAVE PARTICIPATED IN MEETINGS OF THE OTHER BOARD

System Acquisition & System Safety



System Safety Management Plan - Guidelines for Conducting the System Safety Program
System Safety Program Plan, updated as required through the life of the program



- Electromagnetic environment effects
- Shipboard bonding and grounding
- Laser safety requirements
- Human engineering
- Hazardous Materials
- Radiation protections and signs
- Radio frequency protections and signs
- Safety colors
- Other safety signs, labels, and barriers
- Safety tags