Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP)

Purpose: Provide an Operational Overview

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**Agenda**

- Who We Are (1 slide)
- Photos (3 slides)
- CJSOTF-AP Operational Reach (1 slide)
- Foreign Internal Defense (1 slide)
- Operational Vignette (4 slides)
- Non-Kinetic Vignette (2 slides)
- Summary (1 slide)
Goal: Self-Reliant and Self-Sustaining
Strength: Tactical Confidence
Focus: Inculcating Values – Nation over Self, Tribe, or Religious Interests
- CJSOTF-AP Trains, Advises, and Assists:
  - 39 Iraqi Army Battalions
  - 13 Iraqi Police Units
  - 99% of operations are by, with, & through Iraqis

- CJSOTF-AP Engages local residents, tribes, city and provincial government officials to gain influence

- CJSOTF-AP Leverages PAO, CMO and PSYOP for non-kinetic targeting/influencing.
How the CJSOTF Fights

Foreign Internal Defense in combat

FID activity

Physical output

Effects output: messages to target audiences

Accentuate Positives

Informations Operations

Mitigate Negatives

Training ISF

Targeting

Combined Ops

Effective Cohesive Values Based

Vigilant Precise Culturally attuned

Competent Evenhanded ISF in the lead

Capable ISF

Precision collection
Find the enemy

Precision operations
Fix & finish the enemy

UNCLASSIFIED
Operational Vignette

Baghdad

Sadr City
Operational Vignette

Objective
Operational Vignette
Operational Vignette

Sadr City
Non-Kinetic Vignette

SYRIA

IRAN

UNCLASSIFIED
Non-Kinetic Vignette
CJSOTF-AP’s role in Iraq is three-fold:

– Develop ISF capability to conduct COIN
– Neutralize insurgent capability through intelligence-driven, precision operations
– Employ non-kinetic enablers to achieve desired and lasting effects
TASK FORCE LEGION

JSOTF-AP

STRENGTH and HONOR
Back-up Slides
CJSOTF-AP “EKG” Model

Effective Targeting Through Time

HVI

- Facilitators
- Financiers
- Enablers
- C2
- Cell Leaders
- Network Critical Path

Soldiers
Cell Members
Infrastructure

Network

Network Subset

Focus on cell leaders and high level facilitators IOT isolate network subsets and effectively disrupt networks

Prosecution of mid-level targeting develops actionable intelligence on network leaders

Continue CJSOTFAP Targeting Methodology

Once triggers are exhausted, target cell members IOT drive intelligence for follow on operations

Soldiers
Cell Members
Leaders
Facilitators
Technicians

Cell 1

Cell 2
AQIZ moves in new leadership, facilitators and soldiers to rebuild the network subset. New group lacks sophisticated GSM IEDs, despite increase in IEDs detonated, significantly lower casualties; effectiveness is 1 in 9.

Prior to CJSOTFAP Operations, Abu Ghurayb had high levels of IED activity, with 1 in 3 IED's effective against CF/ISF. Due primarily to advanced IED devices.

Follow on ops isolate and destroy remainder of this AQIZ network subset.

CJSOTFAP Targeting Results:
- 16 ops over 5 months
- 37 detainees
- Disruption of Abu Ghurayb AQIZ affiliated IED network subset.

Follow on ops target new AQIZ IED network subset, immediate reduction in detonated IEDs.

CJSOTFAP continues to develop and action targets.

Intel-driven ops disrupt AQIZ cells, dramatically reduced IEDs detonated. Key captures of technicians decreases IED effectiveness.
CJSOTF-AP Operations to disrupt Extra-Judicial Killings (EJK)

232 total CJSOTF-AP Operations to disrupt Extra Judicial Killings netted 158 PCs, 570 Detainees, 149 EKIA
Operational Vignette
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