Joint Capabilities to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction

DoD Chemical and Biological Defense
Advance Planning Briefing for Industry
4 April 2007

Presented by:
Colonel Patrick J. Sharon, USA
Deputy Director, Joint Requirements Office for CBRN Defense
Directorate for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment (J-8), The Joint Staff
Overview

- Strategic Environment
- Policy / Guidance
- CBRN Defense Organization
- JCIDS Process
Today, the United States faces a greater danger from an expanding number of hostile regimes and terrorist groups that seek to acquire and use WMD. These actors may not respond to traditional tools and concepts of deterrence.

- Hostile states seeking means of regional hegemony and intimidation; willing to transfer technology and know-how to others
- WMD-armed states losing control
- Rapid spread of technology and knowledge

It is extremely difficult to collect reliable intelligence on WMD programs and activities, which are closely guarded secrets. The prevalence of dual-use technologies and legitimate civilian applications means nuclear, chemical and biological research efforts are easy to conceal and difficult to detect and monitor. Based on the demonstrated ease with which uncooperative states and non-state actors can conceal WMD programs and related activities, the United States, its allies and partners must expect further intelligence gaps and surprises.
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction articulates a strategy built upon the three pillars of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management.

National Security Strategy (NSS) - “Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction.”

National Military Strategy to Combat WMD (NMS-CWMD) amplifies the strategy in the NSS and provides a framework for combating WMD to DOD Components.

2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report identifies four priorities: Defeat Terrorist Networks, Defend the Homeland, Shape Choices of Countries at Strategic Crossroads, and Prevent Acquisition or Use of WMD.
National Military Strategy - CWMD Architecture

**Strategic Goal**
Ensure that the United States, its Armed Forces, allies, partners, and interests are neither coerced nor attacked by enemies using WMD

**End States**
Standards by which we can measure effectiveness towards the Strategic Goal

**Military Strategic Objectives**
Defeat, Deter – Protect, Respond, Recover – Defend, Dissuade, Deny – Reduce, Destroy, Reverse

**Strategic Enablers**
Intelligence – Partnership Capacity – Strategic Communication Support

**Eight Mission Areas**
QDR Objective – Shift in Focus

Irregular

Defeat Terrorist Networks

Catastrophic

Counter WMD

Defend Homeland

"Shifting Our Weight"

Traditional

Today's Capability Portfolio

Disruptive

Shape Choices

Continuing the reorientation of military capabilities and implementing enterprise-wide reforms to ensure structures and process support the President and the warfighter.
DoD Responses – Implementing QDR

- Commander USSTRATCOM as lead Combatant Commander for combating WMD
- Defense Threat Reduction Agency as primary Combat Support Agency – STRATCOM Center to Combat WMD
- Designate US Army 20th Support Command as Joint Task Force WMD Elimination
- Expand render safe capability & capacity
- Develop ability to locate, tag & track WMD shipments
- **$1.5B investment in advanced medical countermeasures**
DoD Responses – Beyond QDR

• **CB Defenses - ~350% increase in investments since 1996**
• Consequence Management – 55 WMD Civil Support Teams
• Defense Nuclear Detection Office – supporting Department of Homeland Security
• NATO Multinational CBRN Defense Battalion – 2002 U.S. initiative; now 17+ Allies contribute
• Maritime Interdiction exercises – in support of National agenda
CBDP Management Structure

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Director, J-8

Joint Requirements Office CBRN Defense

Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs)

Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)

Joint Science & Technology Office for CB Defense (JSTO-CBD)

Secretary of the Army (Executive Agent)

Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (Operations Research)

Army Chief of Staff

Army Acquisition Executive

Joint Test and Evaluation Executive

Program Analysis and Integration Office

Joint Program Executive Officer CB Defense
JRO – CBRN Defense Charter

- Single office within DOD responsible for the planning, coordination, and oversight of joint CBRN defense operational requirements
  - Develop and maintain the CBRN defense overarching operational concept and the CBRN Defense Modernization Plan
  - Represent the Services and Combatant Commanders in the requirements generation process and act as their proponent for coordinating and integrating CBRN defense operational capabilities
  - Develop DOD CBD POM with acquisition community support
  - Facilitate the development of joint doctrine and training and sponsor the development of multi-service doctrine
- Serve as the CJCS’ single source of expertise to address all issues involving CBRN defense within passive defense, consequence management, force protection, and homeland security
Joint CBRN Defense Operational Capabilities

Joint CBRN Defense Concept

**SENSE**
- Point Detection
- Stand-off Detection
- Reconnaissance
- Medical Diagnostics

**SHAPE**
- Integrated Early Warning
- Battle-space Management
- Battle-space Analysis

**SHELDT**
- Respiratory and Ocular Protection
- Percutaneous Protection
- Expeditionary Collective Protection
- Medical Prophylaxes

**SUSTAIN**
- Individual Decontamination
- Equipment Decontamination
- Fixed Site Decontamination
- Medical Therapeutics

**SENSE** – The capability to continuously provide the information about the CBRN situation at a time and place by detecting, identifying, and quantifying CBRN hazards in air, water, on land, on personnel, equipment or facilities. This capability includes detecting, identifying, and quantifying those CBRN hazards in all physical states (solid, liquid, gas).

**SHAPE** – Provides the ability to characterize the CBRN hazard to the force commander - develop a clear understanding of the current and predicted CBRN situation; collect and assimilate info from sensors, intelligence, medical, etc., in near real time to inform personnel, provide actual and potential impacts of CBRN hazards; envision critical SENSE, SHIELD and SUSTAIN end states (preparation for operations); visualize the sequence of events that moves the force from its current state to those end states.

**SHELDT** – The capability to shield the force from harm caused by CBRN hazards by preventing or reducing individual and collective exposures, applying prophylaxis to prevent or mitigate negative physiological effects, and protecting critical equipment.

**SUSTAIN** – The ability to conduct decontamination and medical actions that enable the quick restoration of combat power, maintain/recover essential functions that are free from the effects of CBRN hazards, and facilitate the return to pre-incident operational capability as soon as possible.
Required Capabilities, S&T, and Acquisition
The Functional Capability Boards (FCB)

JROC:
* Charters FCBs
* Directs FCB efforts
* Identifies FCB lead

FCBs:
* OSD Co-chairs
* Bring all stakeholders together for common review and issue resolution
* Prioritize/assess capability gaps and proposals annually

- Combating WMD Working Group
  - Maj Gen Simpson
  - JFCCOM J-8

- Battlespace Awareness Working Group
  - Brig Gen Dettmer
  - JS J-2

- Protection Working Group
  - RDML Harnitchek
  - JS J-4

- Integrated Air and Missile Defense Working Group
  - Brig Gen Woodward
  - JS J-8

- Force Protection
  - Maj Gen New
  - JS J-8

- Force Application
  - Brig Gen Hunt
  - JS J-8

- Net-Centric
  - MG Moran
  - JS J-6

- Joint Training
  - BG Bartell
  - JS J-7
  - Tri-chair
JRO Accomplishments

• Strategy and Planning
  – Joint Protection Functional Concept
  – Joint Strategy for Biological Warfare Defense (CJCSI 3112.01)
  – 14 CBRN documents approved in the last year
  – Joint WMD Elimination Coordinating Element (JECE) DOTMLPF Change Recommendation
  – Combating WMD Joint Integrating Concept
  – CBRN Defense Modernization Plan 2007

• Programming and Resourcing
  – CBRND Capability Joint Priority List
  – CBDP Program Objective Memorandum FY08-13
JRO Accomplishments - Feedback and Assessment

• Analytical Studies
  – Expendable Equipment Combat Consumption (E2C2)
  – Point and Standoff Sensor Mix
  – Threat Agent Challenge
  – CBRN Installation Force Protection PDM III
• Experiments
  – Split MOPP
  – Sensitive Equipment Decon
• Capabilities Based Assessments
  – Passive Defense
  – WMD Elimination
  – WMD Interdiction
  – Consequence Management (in progress)
• Radiation/Nuclear Defense Quick Look Study
• Consequence Management Quick Look Study
JRO Accomplishments – Doctrine, Training & Experiments

• NORTHCOM, PACOM & EUCOM

• Joint CBRN Familiarization Course

• Joint Senior Leaders Course

• Intermediate & senior service colleges war games
Questions?

Contact me:

COL Patrick J. Sharon  
Deputy Director, JRO-CBRND  
patrick.sharon@js.pentagon.mil  
(703) 602-0843