U.S. Navy Mine Countermeasures

National Defense Industrial Association 12th Expeditionary Warfare Conference

October 2007


CAPT Bruce Nichols, USN Director, Mine Warfare Branch



Agenda

- Mine Threat
- Vision, Concept and Missions
- Present and Future Capabilities
 - Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and MIW Mission
 Modules
 - Organic Mine Countermeasures (OMCM)
 - Unmanned Systems
 - Assault Breaching System
 - Mine Warfare Environmental Decision Aids Library (MEDAL)
- Summary

The Threat Across the Littorals



- •The real goal of the minefield is Sea Denial, NOT the damage or destruction of a specific ship.
- •Navy goal is Assured Access to defeat the minefield, NOT counter every mine.

Sea Mines: The Unique Weapon



- Over 300 Types
- Over 50 Countries Possess
- Over 30 Countries Produce
- More than 20 Countries Export
- Low Cost
- Simple to Deploy
- Increasing Sophistication
- Lots of Bang for the Bucks









MCM Vision



•Slow
•Heavy
•Large footprint
•Stovepiped
•Primarily CONUSbased
•Manpower Training
Intensive

Accelerate the MCM Timeline

Concept of Operations

Unmanned Operations

Distributed and Netted

Cooperative Behavior

Common Operational Picture (COP)

Sea Warrior Transformation

MCM VISION:

Field a <u>Common</u> Set of <u>Unmanned</u>, <u>Modular</u> MCM Systems <u>Employable</u> from a Variety of Host Platforms or Shore Sites that can <u>Quickly Counter</u> the <u>Spectrum of Mines</u> to Enable <u>Assured Access</u> with <u>Minimum Risk</u> <u>from Mines</u>



•Precise
•Lethal
•Modular
•Organic
•Optimitized
Manpower
Requirements

Remove Sailor/Marine From the Minefield

VISION -----> ROADMAP ----> MCM PLAN

CONOPS

- National Defense Strategy
 - Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action
- MIW is an enabling capability throughout the range of military operations (ROMO)
 - MIW assures;
 - the ability of joint and naval forces to achieve strategic access and global freedom of action in areas of U.S. strategic interest
 - Protect U.S. and multinational forces, Sea Line of Communications (SLOCs), and commercial shipping.
 - MIW requires;
 - the ability to operate in complex oceanographic environments against a variety of high-tech and improvised weapons
 - C5ISR from strategic through tactical level enabling support to the decision makers, planners and warfighters

Mine Countermeasures(MCM) Missions

U.S. Navy MCM Forces ensure: SPEED, ACCESS, and PERSISTENCE to our Defense Forces by providing a maritime sea shield around our global and vital homeland operating areas.

•Ranging in size: 100 to 900+ NM²

DDG FLT

MS Operators)

RMS

CONUS


•Covering the water column: 200+ ft of mineable waters to the beach exit zone in support of Joint Force Entry **Operations**

MH-60S Aircrew

SSN Crew (PUMA, LMRS) MH-53E


Aircrew

MCM-1 MHC 51




MCM Science and Technology UNCLASSIFIED


Addressing Capability Gaps in Maneuver and Capacity



Present Fleet Capability



Delivering Future Force




Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) & UNCLASSIFIED Mine Countermeasures Mission Package


Remote Mine Hunting System & AN/AQS-20A




Airborne Laser Mine Detection System




Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance & **Analysis System**










Airborne Mine Neutralization System




SWORDFISH Unmanned **Underwater Vehicle**



Battlespace Preparation Autonomous Underwater Vehicle




Unmanned Surface Vehicle & Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep



Organic Mine Countermeasures Systems

Distributed Expeditionary Mine Countermeasures Capabilities



MH-60S Based Systems:

- •Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System (RAMICS) - (FY10)
- Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) - (FY09)
- •Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep (OASIS)- (FY10)
- Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) - (FY09)
- •AQS-20A Minehunting Sonar (FY07)

DDG based system:

- Remote Minehunting System (RMS) - (FY07)
- SSN Based System
 - Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (MRUUV) - (FY16)

Mine Countermeasures Unmanned Vehicles

Leading the Way towards MIW Vision





USV-based Minesweeping



Acoustic Sweep Device

SWORDFISH Unmanned Underwater

Vehicle



Remote Minehunting System



Surface Mine Countermeasures Unmanned Underwater Vehicle and Low Frequency Broadband



Battlespace Preparation
Autonomous
Underwater Vehicle



Submarine Launched Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned Underwater Vehicle



Post Test

Post Test

ASSAULT BREACHING SYSTEM (ABS)

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance


Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis (COBRA) and Littoral Remote Sensing (LRŚ)

Countermine-Counterobstacle (CMCO)

Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) Assault Breaching System








MEDAL:

MIW Common Operational Tactical Picture



Summary

- Provide Strategic Access
- Protect National Interests and Commerce
- Enable Joint and Coalition Forces
- Leverage Near and Far Term Future Technology
 - Field mutually supportive systems to provide full threat coverage
 - Remove Man from the Minefield
 - Reduce the Detection to Engagement Timeline
 - Single Pass Detection and Classification (via PMA/CAD-CAC)
 - Rapid Reacquisition and Neutralization

U.S. Navy Mine Countermeasures Capabilities



Lessons of War – WW II

World War II - 1942 - 1945

- U.S. able to adapt to changing circumstances to conduct MCM ops
 - Organic MCM ships and forward bases for non-organic ships
- Massive MCM numbers vs. determined resistance
 - 65 Ships Lost to mines
- Okinawa 75 Minesweepers, 45 assisting ships swept 3,000 nm²
 - Largest MCM task force in U.S. Navy History

Post War Downsizing

- 500 Mine craft (33,000 men) at the end of the war
- Majority decommissioned







Lessons of War - Korea

Korean War - 1950 - 1953

- Only 22 Minesweepers in the Pacific Fleet
- Threat underestimated little mining during early hostilities
- Navy unprepared to conduct MCM operations early in the war
 - Too few MCM assets
- 5 U.S. Navy ships sunk − 5 destroyers damaged − 43 KIA
- Enemy use of influence mines delayed effective sweeping ops

Republic of Korea YMS-516 is blown up by a magnetic mine during mine sweeping operations west of Kalma Pando, Wonsan Harbor, 18 Oct 1950.

Unloading at Wonsan

Photo # 80-G-421388 LSTs unloading at Wonsan, 26 October 1950



"The U.S. Navy has **lost control** of the seas to a nation without a navy, using **pre-World War I weapons**, laid by vessels that were utilized at the time of the birth of Christ"

Admiral Allan E. Smith's message to the CNO, 1950

In 1950, North Korea laid a **400 square mile minefield** during a **3 week** period consisting of **3,000 mines** of various types (using fishing boats with simple navigational instruments and working only at night) delaying the amphibious assault of Wonsan (250 US ships and 50,000 men) six days.

Lessons of War – Modern Era

Cold War 1954 - 1990

- MCM capabilities largely outsourced to Allies NATO
- Minesweepers could not operate organically with battle force
- Operation Earnest Will 1987
 - Escort of tankers with no organic MCM forces
 - USS SAMUEL B ROBERTS (FFG 58) and 3 tankers struck by mines
 - Minesweepers Forward Deployed (1987-1990)

Persian Gulf War 1990 – 1991

- Navy not prepared to conduct MCM operations
 - No coordination with CTF's
 - 6 Active minesweepers
- MCM Force ill-equipped
 - Lack of Readiness
 - Lack of operational expertise
- 2 Mine Casualties
 - USS PRINCETON (CG)
 - USS TRIPOLI (LPH)



