#### Air Force Institute of Technology

#### Integrity - Service - E xcellence

#### A SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURAL MODEL FOR MAN-PACKABLE/OPERABLE ISR MINI/MICRO AERIAL VEHICLES



<u>Presented By</u> Maj Joerg Walter AFIT/SY

Air Force Institute of Technology Air Force Center for Systems Engineering

#### **U.S. AIR FORCE**



# **Acknowledgements**

- Advisors
  - Lt Col Eric Stephen
  - Maj Joerg Walter
- Students
  - Capt Cory Cooper
  - Capt Matthew Ewoldt
  - Capt Steaven Meyer
  - 2dLt Edward Talley





#### Introduction

- Research Goal, Scope and Assumptions

#### Background

- User, UAV/MAVs, Systems Engineering

#### Methodology

- DoD Architecture Framework

#### Results

- Architecture Products, and Future Capabilities

#### Conclusion

- Concluding Remarks



# Introduction

#### Research Goal

Apply good systems engineering principles to develop a baseline Mini/Micro Aerial Vehicle (MAV) architectural model describing their use in three separate but closely related Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) mission areas:

- Over-the-Hill-Reconnaissance
- Battle Damage Information (BDI)
- Local Area Defense (LAD)



# Introduction

#### Scope

The Three ISR Mission Areas Define the Application of MAVs for this Thesis

**Scope:** MAV can be thought of a single man-packable and single man-operable system that does not require the carrier to sacrifice normal mission essential gear in place of the MAV system.

#### Assumptions

- Used by small tactical teams synonymous with special operations forces (SOF)
- Primarily used for close-in (~<3km range) tactical reconnaissance</p>



# **Background: Overview**

#### Background


- User
- Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)
- Mini/ Micro Aerial Vehicles (MAV)
- Systems Engineering (SE)



# **Background: User**

- **Special Operations Forces (SOF)** conduct fast, surgical operations at great distances from established bases by using state-of-the-art communications, aircraft, and specially trained forces
- **Responsible for nine principal** missions or core tasks  $\Rightarrow$








**U.S. AIR FORCE** 

# **Background: MAVs**

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) include aerial vehicles that can operate using pre-programmed data and those that can accept mission changes while in flight




- Subsets of Mini and Micro Aerial Vehicles (MAVs) are closely related
  - Mini Aerial Vehicles: scale of hobbyist remote controlled aircraft
  - Micro Aerial Vehicles: scale of small birds and dragonflies
- MAV's introduce new challenges
  - Miniaturization of flight and sensor components






**U.S. AIR FORCE** 



#### Integrity - Service - Excell






# Methodology: Overview

#### Methodology

- DoD Architecture Framework
- Architecture Products



### Methodology: Integrated Architectures



Integrity - Service - Excell



# Methodology: Products

OPERATIONAL (OV)	SYSTEMS (SV)	TECHNICAL (TV)
1: High-Level Operational Concept Graphic*	<u>1: System Interface Description*</u>	. ,
2: Operational Node Connectivity Description*		
<u>3: Operational Information Exchange Matrix</u> *	4: Systems Functionality Description	
4: Command Relationships Chart	5: Operational Activity to System	
<u>5: Activity Model</u> *	Function Traceability Matrix	ALL (AV)
	6: Sys Information Exchange Matrix	<u>Overview</u> <u>&amp; Summary</u> *
6c: Operational Event/Trace Description		Integrated Dictionary*
7: Logical Data Model		* <u>Denotes</u> <u>critical</u> products
	Spreadsheets & Static Models & Graphics	Text Dynamic Models

e 1 1



### **Results: Overview**

#### Results

- Current Baseline or "AS-IS" Architecture Products
- Future Capabilities




**U.S. AIR FORCE** 

- Over-the-Hill Reconnaissance
  - Provide enhanced Situational Awareness
  - Identify enemy location/strength
  - Identify enemy armament
- Battle Damage Information
  - Provide feedback on strike success
- Local Area Defense
  - Locate potential/attacking threats
  - Provide relative position
  - Follow retreating enemy
- All missions assume "close-in" deployment
- MAV flown in auto or manual mode




- Operational Views (OV)
  - Identifies what needs to be accomplished and who does it
- OV Products Completed for ISR MAV
  - OV-1: High Level Operational Concept
  - OV-2: Operational Node Connectivity
  - OV-3: Operational Information Exchange Matrix
  - OV-4: Organizational Relationships Chart
  - OV-5: Operational Activity Model
  - OV-6c: Operational Event Trace Diagram
  - OV-7: Logical Data Model






**U.S. AIR FORCE** 





- OV-3 Operational Info Exchange Matrix
- Details info exchanges
  - who, what, why, & how
- Includes AFTL references
- Expands on info associated with OV-2, OV-5, OV-6C and OV-7

			Information Element Description Producer							Consumer							
		Information Element	Name and Identifier	Content		Scope		Accuracy	Language		Sending Op Node Name and Identifier		Sending Op Activity Name and Identifier		Receiving Op Node Name and Identifier	Receiving Op Activity	Name and Identifier
Identifier E	formation Exchange Identifier			ature nsaci				rmance butes			ormat surar				Secu	irity	
		Mission/Scenario UJTL or METL	Transaction Type	Triggering Event	Interoperability Level Required	Criticality	Periodicity	Timeliness	Access Control	Availability	Confidentiality	<b>Dissemination Control</b>	Integrity	Accountability	Protection (Type Name, Duration, Date)	Classification	Classification Caveat






#### **U.S. AIR FORCE**

#### **Baseline ISR MAV**


Operational Activity Model OV-5 External Systems Diagram A-1




Purpose: To provide ground forces with a single-man packable, single-man operable ISR capability. Viewpoint: Operator




**U.S. AIR FORCE** 








**U.S. AIR FORCE** 




Integrity - Service - Excell



- Systems Views (SV's)
  - Relates Systems and Characteristics to Operational Needs
  - Provides Systems that support OV Activities and Information Exchanges
- SV Products Completed for ISR MAV
  - SV-1: Systems Interface Description
  - SV-4: Systems Functionality Description
  - SV-5: Function to Activity Traceability Matrix
  - SV-6: System Data Exchange Matrix







Capability to perform Recon, BDI, and LAD

 SV-5: Operational Activity to System Function Traceability Matrix

> Relationships rated based on support status codes

> > Systems and System Functions (SV)

Information Launch MAV ISR MAV Platform Recover MAV Processing Provides Vehicle Control and Communication Enables Sensor Package **Operational** Provides Flight Controls 9 <sup>p</sup>rovides Flight Vehicle Calculate Flight Plan to Landing Zone Op Activity Jpload Mission Profile Process Information Provide Field Level Maintenance Activities (OV) Fly to Landing Zoi Perform Landing Sequence Calibrate MAV -aunch MAV Recover MAV nitialize MAV System Function System Process Info Human Operator Influence System Route Info Maintain System Transmit ISR Field Communication System Information Receive Directives Modulate ISR Information De-Modulate Directives Human Computer Interface **Relationships** Give Feedback Accept Input Convert/Route Signal/Data Processor Data Process Data Manipulate Data Transmit MAV MAV Ground Communication System Directives Receive Data Modulate MAV Directives De-Modulate Data




#### SV-6: System Data Exchange Matrix

• Specifies characteristics of the system data exchanged between systems

• Focuses on automated information exchanges, however some nonautomated exchanges were included

 Columns that were application specific are not filled in





# **Results: Future Capabilities**

#### **U.S. AIR FORCE**

#### **Future Capability Timeline:**

Short Term	Acquire Precise Target Coordinates Biological and Chemical Sniffer Platform Communication Eavesdropping Mobile Ground Station When Deployed						
Mid Term	Air-to-Air or Anti-MAV Communication Relay Distinguish Facial Features GPS Jamming IR Reconnaissance Small Ordinance Delivery Platform Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Target Painting or Designation Locate Targets Through General Land Obstacles Weather Intelligence Platform Operation in Urban or GPS Denied Environments						
Long Term	Electronic Signal Directional Finding Land or Sea Mine Scout Target Identification and Tracking Localized Deployment with External Control						
TIME	r						




# **Conclusion: Remarks**

- MAVs Represent a New Realm of Capability Enablers
- Architectures are Required in the DoD Acquisition Process
- ISR MAVs Now Have a Baseline Architecture
- Requirements Can Now Be Derived from the ISR MAV Architecture (Interfaces, Information Exchanged, Etc.)



### **Questions?**

#### **U.S. AIR FORCE**



Integrity - Service - Excell



# **Acknowledgements**

We would like to thank the following individuals for their help and guidance in this research:

#### Maj Joerg Walter

(Committee Chair)

#### Lt Col Eric Stephen

(Reader)

**Dr. Dave Jacques** 


(Reader)

#### Lt Col John Colombi

(Architecture Guidance)



# **Background: User**



<u>Special Operations</u> are those operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives.

<u>Special Operations Forces (SOF)</u> conduct fast, surgical operations at great distances from established bases by using state-of-the-art communications, aircraft, and specially trained forces.





# Background: User

#### **SOF Capability Deficiencies**

Domain	Capability Deficiencies
Command, Control, and Communications	-Potential for enemy to monitor or destroy our information systems
	-No real/near-time imagery from national systems
	-No real-time interface between aircraft, planners, and intel systems
Intelligence	-No real-time imagery for target study
	-No all-source threat location data
	-Enhanced target identification and marking capability required
Resupply	-Need resupply of expendables (batteries, food, water, medical, ammo)

Extracted from Maj Stephen Howard's Special Operations Forces and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles


Integrity - Service - Excell



# **Background: UAVs**

#### Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)

- Consist of both Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) and Drones
- Also encompass those vehicles that can operate using preprogrammed data and can also accept mission changes while in flight
- Classifications:
  - Tactical and Endurance
  - Lethal and Non-Lethal
  - Very Low Cost Close Range, Close Range, Short Range, and Medium Range
  - **Expendable** and Recoverable









# **Background: MAVs**

- Mini and Micro Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (MAVs)
  - + Subset of UAVs characterized by their size
  - + Provides new capabilities to small field units
  - + Not as Expensive as larger UAVs
  - + Changeable Payloads
  - + Small Footprint
  - Limited Payload Weight
  - Limited Mission Efficiency (range)
  - Aerodynamics and Stabilization








- Systems Engineering and Policy
  - Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 required the DoD to use Architectures for National Security Systems
  - OMB Circulars A-130 and A-11 directed all federal organizations have architecture frameworks
  - CJCSM 3170.01 "Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)" require the use of Integrated architectures for Acquisition Milestones




#### Methodology: Integrated Architectures





## Methodology: Products









### Methodology: Process

#### **U.S. AIR FORCE**









# Methodology: Languages

- Unified Modeling Language (UML)
  - Object-Oriented (OO) approach
  - Based on data elements and their handling
  - Works well for software-based systems



- Integrated Computer Aided Manufacturing (ICAM) Definition (IDEF)
  - Structured Analysis (SA) approach
  - Based on functions and activities
  - Works well for physical systems




This research uses IDEF languages through the SA approach.



# Methodology: Traceability

#### Traceability

"The ability to describe and follow the life of a requirement, in both a forward and backward direction, i.e. from its origins, through its development and specification, to its subsequent deployment and use, and through periods of ongoing refinement and iteration in any of these phases." [Gotel]






# **Results: Mission Traceability**

U.S. AIR FORCE

#### Missions

- Over-The-Hill Reconnaissance








## **Results: Task Traceability**


**U.S. AIR FORCE** 



46



**U.S. AIR FORCE** 






#### **Results: Measures**

#### **U.S. AIR FORCE**

Task	Criterion	Measure
AFT 3.1.1.1.1 Perform	Time	To conduct adequate, timely, and reliable
Intelligence Activities		intelligence activities for the USAF and
		other agencies.
	Percent	Of accuracy to which adversary COGs are
		identified to accomplish predetermined
		objectives.
	Cost	To Perform tactical intelligence activities.
AFT 3.1.1.1.2 Perform	Time	To systematically observe air, or surface
Surveillance		areas, places, persons, or things by visual,
		aural, electronic, photographic, or other
	Descent	means.
	Percent	Of accruacy to which air or surface areas,
		places, persons, or things can be observed
		by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means.
	Cost	
AFT 3.1.1.1.3 Perform	Time	To perform surveillance. To obtain, by visual observation or other
Reconnaissance	Time	detection methods, specific information
Reconnaissance		about the activities and resources of an
		adversary or potential adversary.
	Percent	Of accuracy to which specific information
	rereent	about the activities and resources of
		an adversary or potential adversary is
		obtained.
	Cost	To perform reconnaissance.






S. AIR FORCE

### **Results: Measures**

#### Measures from Mission Scenarios and Architecture


- Percent of current field pack configuration
- Time to prepare the system for deployment
- · Percent of coordinates properly programmed into the system
- Percent of video received by the user
- Percent of accuracy of visual interpretation
- Percent of accuracy of coordinates through user observation
- Percent of trained personnel fully capable of operating the system
- Percent of Nighttime Mission Effectiveness
- Degree to determine adequately repair needs and properly make the repairs
- · Percent of loiter time that the intended coordinate is being observed
- Degree to which the system is capable of switching to/from automated/manual flight
- Time that the system can stay aloft
- Percent of locations that the system reaches





#### **Results: OV Architectures**

#### **U.S. AIR FORCE**





#### **Results: OV Architectures**


#### **U.S. AIR FORCE**

			Inf	ormation E	lement D	escription		Pro	ducer	Cor	nsumer	N	atur	e of ⊺ra	ansaction			mance outes	Information Assurance					Sec	urity	
Row ID	Needline Identifier	Information Exchange Identifier	Information Element Name	Content	Scope	Accuracy	Language	Sending Op Node Name	Sending Op Activity Name & ID	Receiving Op Node Name	Receiving Op Activity Name & ID	Mission/Scenario UJTL, METL, or AFTL	Transaction Type	Triggering Event	Interoperability Level Required (from C4ISR WG)	Criticality	Periodicity	Timeliness	Access Control	Availability	Contidentiality	Dissemination Control	Accountability	Protection (Type, Name, Duration)	Classification	Classification Caveat
1	Communicate with Headquarters	Information Gathered	Fused Target Information	Enemy Positions and Collected ISR Data	Any information being returned to Headquarters	Information should be able to get from the system to Headquarters		Friendly Ground Unit	Process Information (A11)	Headquarters	Provide Command and Control (A-2)	AFT 3.1 Provide Information Operations Capabilities	Data or Voice Transmission	User wishes to forward gathered ISR information to Headquarters	Level 1 Connected (Peer-to-Peer)	Mission Essential	Depends on mission, may only occur a few times	Depends on level of ISR requested (in minutes)								
2	Communicate with Headquarters	Intelligence Information	Tasking	Regional Intelligence, Possible Enemy Locations	Includes any known enemy positions and geographical information	Can be a best guess but the more accurate the Intel is the higher the chance of mission completeness		Headquarters	Provide Command and Control (A-2)	Friendly Ground Unit	Process Information (A11)	AFT 3.1 Provide Information Operations Capabilities	Data or Voice Transmission	Updated intelligence information is available through Headquarters	Level 0 Isolated (Manual)	Needed to increase Mission effectiveness	Occurs at the beginning of a mission and may be updated during mission	Depends on method of delivery (in minutes)								
3	Communicate with Headquarters	Mission Tasks	Tasking	Type of Mission (Recon/BDI/LAD), Waypoints, Goals	Contains type of mission, goals, and instructions	Users should understand the mission		Headquarters	Provide Command and Control (A-2)	Friendly Ground Unit	Process Information (A11)	AFT 3.1 Provide Information Operations Capabilities	Voice Transmission	Headquarters wishes to assign an ISR task	Level 0 Isolated (Manual)	Mission Essential	Occurs at the beginning of a mission and may be updated during mission	Depends on mission and method of delivery (in minutes)								



#### **Results: OV Architectures**


#### **U.S. AIR FORCE**







### **Results: SV Architectures**

#### SV-1: System Interface Description












### **Results: SV Architectures**


#### SV-4: Systems Functionality Description

#### Documents system functional hierarchies and system functions, and the data flows between them











#### **Results: SV Architectures**

#### **U.S. AIR FORCE**

Γ	Interface Identifier	Data Exchange Identifier		Data De	escrip	otion		Produ	icer	Consu	mer	1	Nature of T	ransaction	ı	Performa	ance Attri	butes		Infor	mati	on A	ssurar	nce	5	Secur	ity	
Row ID	System Interface Name	System Data Exchange Name	Data Element Name	Content	Format Type	Media Type Accuracy	Units of Measurement Data Standard	Sending System Name	Sending System Function Name	Receiving System Name	Receiving System Function Name	Transaction Type	Triggering Event	Interoperability Level Achieved (C4ISR WG)	Criticality	Periodicity	Timeliness	Throughput	Access Control	Availability	Contridentiality	Integrity	Non-Repudiation Producer	Non-Repudiation Consumer	Protection (Type, Name, Duration, Date)	Classification Classification Caveat	Releasability	Security Standard
1	BDI Request and Feedback	BDI Feedback	Fused Target Information	BDI Confirmation and general ISR information gathered				Field Communication System	Transmit ISR Info	Strike Assets	N/A	Voice Transmission	User needs to communicate to Strike Assets	Level 0 Isolated (Manual)	Can increase mission effectiveness	Does not occur often however it depends on the battlefield situation	Depends on method of delivery (in minutes)											
2	BDI Request and Feedback	BDI Request	Tasking	BDI Type, Enemy Positions, Status/Type of Strike				Strike Assets	N/A	Field Communication System	Receive Directives	Voice Transmission	Strike Asset cannot perform BDI therefore request a BDI mission	Level 0 Isolated (Manual)	Mission Essential	Does not occur often however it depends on the battlefield situation	Depends on method of delivery (in minutes)											
3	Feedback and Input Data	Feedback Signal	Decoded Sensor Package Data	Audio and Video Signals				Signal/Data Processor	Convert/Route Data	Human Computer Interface	Give Feedback	Internode Hardware Connection	Processor Sends Feedback Signal	Level 1 Connected (Peer-to-Peer)	Mission Essential	Feedback constantly being supplied	Feedback in seconds											
4	Feedback and Input Data	Input Data	Flight Plan	Keyboard, Mouse, Touch Screen Signals				Human Computer Interface	Accept Input	Signal/Data Processor	Process Data	Internode Hardware Connection	HCI detects input	Level 1 Connected (Peer-to-Peer)	Mission Essential	Varies by user and mission (at least twice)	Input in seconds											

60



- DOTMLPF Considerations
  - JCIDS places emphasis on addressing a capabilities' impact in the areas of DOTMLPF
  - Doctrine

Real-Time Situational Awareness will influence mission decisions and possibly increase force employment to areas of unknown conditions.

Organization

Changes can occur in the tactical realm and developmental/sustainment realm



#### DOTMLPF Considerations

#### Training

Original requirement of 'operable by trained personnel' remains. Types of training can include classroom, field, virtual, verbal, written, on-the-jobtraining, etc.

#### Material

The ISR MAV architected serves as a material solution to the capability gap identified



#### DOTMLPF Considerations

- Leadership and Education
  - Increased local area situational awareness can impact leaders decisions in the field
  - The units education would need to include this new tactical capability.

#### Personnel

- Impacts depend on manner in which the ISR MAV is employed
- Tactical Specialty Codes could emerge



#### DOTMLPF Considerations

#### Facilities


- Should be minimal
- Largely dependent on how their development, sustainment and logistics are managed



## **Results: Future Capabilities**

#### **U.S. AIR FORCE**

#### **Future Capability Timeline:**





	Capability - Acquire Precise Target Coordinates
Short	Enabling Technologies
Term	Improved Precision Of MAV GPS Sensor
	Range Finder For Use With EO Or IR Sensors
	Possible Height Above Ground Sensor or DTED
Mid Term	Architecture Impacts
	Range/Height can morph into the "Raw Sensor Package Data" link to the ground station
Long	Minimal Changes To OV and SV Products
Term	New Hardware Impacts System Design
	Ensure Tx/Rx Can Process The Data
	Target Coordinates Calculated by Ground Station



Short Term	<ul> <li>Capability – Mobile Ground Station When MAV Deployed</li> <li>Enabling Technologies</li> <li>Geolocation Capability For The Ground Station</li> <li>Improved Human Interface Enabling Mobility</li> </ul>
Mid Term Long Term	<ul> <li>Architecture Impacts</li> <li>Minimal Changes To OV Or SV Products As Information Flows To And From The Ground Station Are The Same</li> <li>New Hardware Impacts System Design And Ground Station Requirements</li> </ul>



**Capability** – Night Or IR Reconnaissance Short Enabling Technologies Term Modular Payload Bay In MAV Miniaturized Night Or IR Sensor Possible Sensor Fusion Mid Architecture Impacts Term Minimal Changes To OV Or SV Products If Only One Camera Is Used At A Time New Hardware Impacts System Design And Modular Lona Payload Bay Impacts MAV And Payload Requirements Term ΓΙΜΕ



	Capability – Target Tracking Or Following
Short	Enabling Technologies
Term	<ul> <li>Image Recognition Hardware/Software In MAV Or High Data Rate Communication If Processing In Ground Station</li> </ul>
Mid Term	<ul> <li>Improved Loiter Time Via Fuselage Improvements Or Improved/Better Power Source</li> </ul>
	Architecture Impacts
Long	Changes To OV Products Due To New Operational Activities
Time	Changes To SV Products Since The Target Dictates The Flight Plan Not Just The GPS Waypoints
	New Hardware Impacts System Design



	Capability – Air-to-Air or Anti-MAV/UAV
Short	Enabling Technologies
Term	Miniaturized Friend or Foe Sensor
	Onboard sensors to locate enemy MAVs
	Development of Anti-MAV tactics/doctrine
Mid	Offensive Anti-MAV capability via MAV or ground unit
Term	Architecture Impacts
	Changes To OV Products Due To New Operational Activities
Long Term	Changes To SV Products Due To New Intranodal Communication and Interfaces
TIME	<ul> <li>System Design Impacted By New Hardware For MAV And Software Changes To Ground Station</li> </ul>



	Capability – Communication Relay
Short	<ul> <li>Enabling Technologies</li> <li>Miniaturizing A Ground Station Receiver Into The MAV</li> <li>Improved Loiter Time Via Fuselage Improvements Or</li></ul>
Term	Improved/Better Power Source <li>Ability To Send Either Raw Or Processed Sensor Data</li>
Mid	<ul> <li>To External Users</li> <li>Architecture Impacts</li> <li>Changes To OV Products Due To New Operational</li></ul>
Term	Activities And A New Communication Node
Term	<ul> <li>Changes To SV Products Due To New Intranodal Communication And Interfaces</li> <li>System Design Impacted By New Hardware For MAV And Software Changes To Ground Station</li> </ul>



**Capability** – Operation In Urban Or GPS Denied Environments Enabling Technologies Short Term Non Line-of-sight Communications Autonomous Navigation Aided By DTED, Collision Avoidance Sensors, Environment Map, Etc. Communication Relay To Other MAVs Mid Architecture Impacts Term Changes To OV Products Due To New Operational **Activities** Changes To SV Products Due To New Intranodal Lona **Communication And Interfaces** Term System Design Impacted By New Hardware For MAV And Software Changes To Ground Station ΓΙΜΕ



Capability – Target Painting or Designation Short Enabling Technologies Term Acquire Precise Target Coordinates Target Tracking or Following Sufficiently Powered Laser for the MAV Mid Architecture Impacts Term Changes To OV Products Due To New Operational **Activities** Changes To SV Products Due To New Intranodal Lona Communication and Interfaces Term System Design Impacted By New Hardware For MAV And Software Changes To Ground Station ΓΙΜΕ



Capability – Target Identification And Tracking Short Enabling Technologies Term Target Tracking Or Following Either Onboard Or Ground Station Based Identification Increased Resolution Cameras Mid Architecture Impacts Term Changes To OV Products Due To New Operational **Activities** Changes To SV Products Due To New Intranodal Long **Communication And Interfaces** Term System Design Impacted By New Hardware For MAV And Software Changes To Ground Station ΓΙΜΕ



Capability – Localized Deployment with External Control Short Enabling Technologies Term Network-centric control structure Ability to transmit sensor data and receive control direction beyond current system boundary Mid Architecture Impacts Term All Products Require Changes Due to New Nodes, Communication Lines and Functions System Design Impacted By New Hardware For MAV Long And Hardware/Software Changes To Ground Station Term IME



## **Results: Future Techs**

#### Future MAV Technology Capabilities

- Enhanced Optical Sensor Capabilities
- GPS Integration into Ground Station
- Integrated Ground Station
- Low Light Emitting Display
- Low Probability of Intercept Communications
- Modular and Swappable Payloads
- Multiple Sensor Payload
- Non-Line-Of-Sight Communications
- Reduce DTED Level 2 in Real-Time
- Sensor and/or Image Stabilization





**U.S. AIR FORCE** 

## **Results: Future Techs**

#### Other Future MAV Technology Capabilities

- Common Power supply system for all ground based systems
- Communications Intelligence (COMINT) sensors
- Daylight Imaging System (DIS)
- Diesel Powerplant
- Enhanced Aerodynamics for increased lift and power efficiency
- Enhanced Battery Power
- Enhanced Field of View optical sensors or sensor array
- Fuel Cells
- Forward looking infrared (FLIR)
- HF/VHF/UHF Directional Finding Equipment
- Increased Data Processing Onboard Air Platform (lightweight, low power)
- Infrared line scanner (IRLS)
- Reduce DTED Level 5 data in near real time
- SATCOM
- Small, Low Power Lasers (for range finding, target designation)
- Small, Low Power Optical Sensors for Night Vision
- Solar Power (alternate fuel or in flight recharge)
- Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)





- Swarming MAV Detailed Architectures
- DoD Integration Of MAV Use
- MAV Observation/Targeting Stabilization Study And Analysis
- Fully Develop Future Architectures



- Recommendations
  - Accept And Update This As The Baseline ISR MAV Architecture
  - Expand This Architecture Into The Dynamic Realm To Look At Performance Comparisons Of Proposed Systems