


Challenges of a New Capability-Based Defense Strategy: “Transforming US Strategic Forces”



J.D. Crouch II
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Current and Future Security Environment





New Environment and the President's Direction

- Cold War approach to deterrence no longer appropriate
- End relationship with Russia based on “balance of terror”
- Encourage/facilitate Russian cooperation: “new framework”
- Deploy lowest number of nuclear weapons consistent with the security requirements of the United States, its allies and friends
- Achieve reductions without requirement for Cold War-style treaties
- Develop and field missile defenses more capable than the ABM Treaty permitted
- Place greater emphasis on advanced conventional weapons



Transformation of the Department of Defense

- Shape the changing nature of military competition and cooperation
- Through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, processes and organizations
- That exploit our nation's advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities
- To sustain our strategic position, contributing to peace and stability in the world.



Defense Policy Goals

Assure Allies and Friends	Deter Aggressors
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Credible non-nuclear and nuclear response options support U.S. commitments• Defenses protect security partners and power projection forces• Second-to-none nuclear capability assures allies and public	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Nuclear and non-nuclear options provide tailored deterrent• Defenses discourage attack by frustrating adversary's attack plans• Infrastructure improves U.S. capabilities to counter emerging threats
Dissuade Competitors	Defeat Enemies
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Diverse portfolio of capabilities denies payoff from competition• Non-nuclear strike favors U.S.• Infrastructure promises U.S. competitive edge	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Strike systems can neutralize range of enemy targets• Defenses provide protection if deterrence fails




Capabilities-Based Planning in a New Security Environment

Dynamic security environment

Threats to US not wholly predictable



Capabilities-based planning focuses on the means and how adversaries may fight; not a fixed set of enemies or threats



New Triad addresses Uncertainties of Current and Future Security Environment



The New Capabilities-Based Force

Traditional Threat-Based Approach

- U.S. force size primarily reflected response to a specific threat
- Nuclear offensive emphasis
- Some flexibility in planning
- Missile defense considered impractical and destabilizing

Capabilities-Based Approach


- Capabilities for multiple contingencies & new threats in changing environment
 - **Capabilities required not country-specific**
 - **Maintaining capabilities for unexpected and potential threat contingencies are a priority**
 - **Reduce risk to nation as reductions occur**
- Includes active defense & non-nuclear capabilities
 - **Defenses reduce dependency on offensive strike forces to enforce deterrence**
 - **Non-nuclear strike forces reduce dependency on nuclear forces to provide offensive deterrent**
- Effectiveness depends upon command and control, intelligence and adaptive planning



Nuclear Posture Review Calls for New Triad


Existing Triad

Nuclear strike forces: ICBMs, SLBMs, Bombers



New Triad

Strike (non-nuclear and nuclear), defenses, infrastructure; 1700-2200 operationally deployed nuclear weapons




Transition

“Threat-based”

“Capabilities-based”



The Journey to the New Triad





Transforming Strategic Forces

Viewed through the prism of capabilities-based planning:

- Series of important, early NPR waypoints achieved
 - Moscow Treaty; current & future acquisition programs
- Development of New Triad Leg: Missile Defense
- Historic Unified Command Plan Change -- new missions assigned to STRATCOM
 - Global Strike
 - Missile Defense Integration
 - Military Space Missions
 - Command, Control, Communications, Intel integration
 - Information Operations



Transformation

“Building the New Triad”

- Non-Nuclear Strike:
 - Improved capabilities against the most demanding target sets
 - Conversion of four Trident submarines to SSGNs
- Missile Defense:
 - Robust Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation program
 - Deploy limited and effective missile defenses in near-term
- Command and Control, Intelligence, and Planning:
 - Develop secure, wide-band communications between national decision makers, command centers and operational forces
 - Develop advanced technology programs for intelligence, e.g. for hard and deeply buried targets and mobile targets
 - Upgrade STRATCOM capability for adaptive planning
- Infrastructure
 - Expand weapon surveillance, life extension, hardening and technology sustainment programs
 - Re-energize R&D and production capabilities for strategic systems



Illustrative New Triad Leg: Defenses

- Field modest missile defense capabilities in 2004-05
 - Build on test-bed activities and testing program
 - 20 Ground-based midcourse interceptors planned
 - Up to 20 Sea-based interceptors; begin upgrades of AEGIS ships
 - Forward based sensors
 - Continued deployment of Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) units
- Add additional capability as threat and technology develop
- Continue Research, Development and Testing
- Cooperation with allies and friends



Illustrative New Triad Leg: Defenses (cont.)

- No fixed, final architecture
- Initial capability building on test-bed
- Integrates new technologies for continuous product improvement
- Number, type, and location to change over time
- Modest initial interceptor inventory and investment provides useful defense capability
- Incorporates warfighter in development and operation
- Fields capability quickly: employs test assets if necessary



Enduring Challenges

- Break down stovepipes, yet preserve expertise
- Fund New Triad programs through 2012 and beyond
- Produce and deploy new capabilities being funded
- Detail work on deployment, concepts of operations
- Examine additional capabilities for the New Triad as concepts are developed and needs are established
- Periodic evaluation of international environment will inform decision-making on size and capabilities of the New Triad:
 - Several periodic assessments between now and 2012



Q & A



Defense Operational Goals

“Shaping and Directing Transformation”

- Protecting the homeland and other critical bases of operations
- Denying enemies sanctuary; providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement with high-volume precision strike
- Projecting and sustaining force in distant “denied areas”
- Leveraging information technology and innovative concepts
- Assuring information systems and conducting effective information operations
- Enhancing the capability of space systems

Goals must be integrated into military concepts of operations



Strategic Command and the New Triad

- Consolidation of missions under one command is consistent with need for highly-integrated capabilities of New Triad
- Unified Command Plan changed to give STRATCOM new missions:
 - Global Strike (supporting or lead role)
 - Missile Defense integration (Northern Command defends U.S. territory)
 - Military Space missions
 - Command, Control, Communications, Intel integration



Over The Past Year

- Began to implement the Nuclear Posture Review
 - Presidential decisions to move ahead with missile defenses
 - Moscow Treaty: 1700-2200 US operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons by 2012
 - Series of planning and acquisition programs to realize the New Triad are in the 2003 and 2004-2009 DoD budget.
 - Missions & Capabilities of Strategic Command (STRATCOM) aligned with Nuclear Posture Review concepts.



Security Environment

- More diverse, unfamiliar, threats (e.g., regional opponents, proliferation of WMD, terrorism)
 - Surprise likely
 - Deterrence unpredictable
- Risks of unexpected crisis and conflicts involving one or a combination of adversaries
 - Offense alone inadequate for deterrence
 - Need balance of offense and defense

Reassess and adapt strategic concepts and defense policies to reflect fundamental changes



Security Environment: Yesterday vs. Today

Cold War

Context

- Enduring hostility of Soviet Union
- Known ideological, peer opponent
- Prolonged conflict, defined blocs, limited number of contingencies
- Survival stakes



Implications

- Emphasis on deterrence
 - Required high confidence
- Reliance on offensive nuclear forces exclusive of other forces
- Nuclear planning reflected continuities
 - Threat-based
 - Some flexibility for a few contingencies
 - Arms levels fixed by elaborate treaties; verification

New Era

Context

- Multiple potential opponents, sources of conflict, and unprecedented challenges
- New relationship with Russia
- Spectrum of contingencies
- Varying and unequal stakes



Implications

- Assure, dissuade, deter, defeat
 - Uncertainties of deterrence
- Synergy of nuclear/non-nuclear & offense/defense
- Nuclear planning
 - Capabilities-based
 - Greater flexibility for range of contingencies
 - Reductions that preserve flexibility; transparency



Nuclear Forces and Contingencies

**Operationally
Deployed Force**

**Responsive
Capability**

On Alert (or available within days)	Quick (within weeks)	Moderate (within months)	Lengthy (year or more)
ICBMs, SLBMs, Bombers	Bombers mated with weapons from Central Storage	SLBMs uploaded	Upload one ICBM squadron per missile wing per year

**For Immediate and
Unexpected Contingencies**

For Potential Contingencies



Sizing the Nuclear Force

- **A new approach to U.S. nuclear requirements to address the spectrum of immediate and potential contingencies**
 - **Operationally deployed force for immediate and unexpected contingencies**
 - **Responsive capability for potential contingencies and technical challenges**
 - **Preplanning is essential for immediate and potential contingencies**
- **Goal of 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed warheads by 2012 to meet requirements of new defense policy goals**
 - **Force sizing not driven by an immediate contingency involving Russia**
- **Force structure and downloaded warheads provide responsive capability in near term**



Sizing the Nuclear Force (cont.)

- Most Nuclear Platforms Maintained; operationally deployed warheads to decrease
 - 500 Minuteman III ICBMs
 - 14 Ohio-class submarines, 12 deployable, each with 24 D5 SLBMs
 - 21 B-2 (16 operational), 76 B-52 (56 operational) Bombers
- Peacekeeper ICBM eliminated
- Four Ohio-class submarines reconfigured
 - Initial capabilities will include cruise missiles and special operations forces.



Nuclear Posture Review: Basics

- Nuclear Posture Review required by U.S. Congress: Delivered December 2001
- Written report from Secretary of Defense
- Review Co-chaired by senior DoD and DOE officials
- Constitutes a fundamental review of U.S. nuclear policy
- Linked to U.S. nuclear force reductions that reflect the changed security environment



Conclusions of Nuclear Posture Review

- Shift from threat-based to capabilities-based planning
- Reliance on nuclear offense to deter threats is no longer sufficient
- New Triad is needed:
 - 1. Strike forces including non-nuclear as well as nuclear capabilities.
 - 2. Active and passive defenses.
 - 3. Responsive infrastructure: to enable design, development & production of new capabilities as needed.
 - Effectiveness of New Triad depends on robust Command and Control (C2), improved intelligence, and ability to plan adaptively.
- The New Triad will provide:
 - flexibility and a broad range of capabilities to meet U.S. defense policy goals —assure, dissuade, deter, defend and defeat—in a dynamic security environment.
 - Multiple options to mitigate risk from reductions of nuclear forces