Challenges of a New Capability-Based Defense Strategy: “Transforming US Strategic Forces”

J.D. Crouch II
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Current and Future Security Environment

- Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Missile Proliferation
- Terrorism
- The Unexpected
- Uncertain Deterrence
- Hard Targets
- Cyber Warfare
New Environment and the President’s Direction

• Cold War approach to deterrence no longer appropriate
• End relationship with Russia based on “balance of terror”
• Encourage/facilitate Russian cooperation: “new framework”
• Deploy lowest number of nuclear weapons consistent with the security requirements of the United States, its allies and friends
• Achieve reductions without requirement for Cold War-style treaties
• Develop and field missile defenses more capable than the ABM Treaty permitted
• Place greater emphasis on advanced conventional weapons
Transformation of the Department of Defense

• Shape the changing nature of military competition and cooperation

• Through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, processes and organizations

• That exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities

• To sustain our strategic position, contributing to peace and stability in the world.
# Defense Policy Goals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assure Allies and Friends</th>
<th>Deter Aggressors</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Credible non-nuclear and nuclear response options support U.S. commitments</td>
<td>• Nuclear and non-nuclear options provide tailored deterrent</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Defenses protect security partners and power projection forces</td>
<td>• Defenses discourage attack by frustrating adversary’s attack plans</td>
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<td>• Second-to-none nuclear capability assures allies and public</td>
<td>• Infrastructure improves U.S. capabilities to counter emerging threats</td>
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<th>Dissuade Competitors</th>
<th>Defeat Enemies</th>
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<td>• Diverse portfolio of capabilities denies payoff from competition</td>
<td>• Strike systems can neutralize range of enemy targets</td>
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<td>• Non-nuclear strike favors U.S.</td>
<td>• Defenses provide protection if deterrence fails</td>
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<td>• Infrastructure promises U.S. competitive edge</td>
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Capabilities-Based Planning in a New Security Environment

Dynamic security environment
Threats to US not wholly predictable

Capabilities-based planning focuses on the means and how adversaries may fight; not a fixed set of enemies or threats

New Triad addresses Uncertainties of Current and Future Security Environment
The New Capabilities-Based Force

Traditional Threat-Based Approach

- U.S. force size primarily reflected response to a specific threat
- Nuclear offensive emphasis
- Some flexibility in planning
- Missile defense considered impractical and destabilizing

Capabilities-Based Approach

- Capabilities for multiple contingencies & new threats in changing environment
  - Capabilities required not country-specific
  - Maintaining capabilities for unexpected and potential threat contingencies are a priority
  - Reduce risk to nation as reductions occur
- Includes active defense & non-nuclear capabilities
  - Defenses reduce dependency on offensive strike forces to enforce deterrence
  - Non-nuclear strike forces reduce dependency on nuclear forces to provide offensive deterrent
- Effectiveness depends upon command and control, intelligence and adaptive planning
Nuclear Posture Review Calls for New Triad

**Existing Triad**
Nuclear strike forces: ICBMs, SLBMs, Bombers

**New Triad**
Strike (non-nuclear and nuclear), defenses, infrastructure; 1700-2200 operationally deployed nuclear weapons

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"Threat-based"  "Capabilities-based"
The Journey to the New Triad

Fielded Capabilities

- Eliminate Peacekeeper ICBM
- Four Trident submarines reconfigured
- No requirement to re-role B-1B for nuclear operations

Operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads

= Periodic assessment of International environment, aggregate capabilities, and progress of program

Improved Conventional Strike Capability, Missile Defenses, Command, Control, Intelligence, and Planning, Infrastructure

2003

START I
6,000

Near Term

2007

2007

3,800

Mid Term

Long Term

2012

1,700 - 2,200
Transforming Strategic Forces

Viewed through the prism of capabilities-based planning:

• Series of important, early NPR waypoints achieved
  • Moscow Treaty; current & future acquisition programs
• Development of New Triad Leg: Missile Defense
• Historic Unified Command Plan Change -- new missions assigned to STRATCOM
  • Global Strike
  • Missile Defense Integration
  • Military Space Missions
  • Command, Control, Communications, Intel integration
  • Information Operations
Transformation
“Building the New Triad”

• Non-Nuclear Strike:
  – Improved capabilities against the most demanding target sets
  – Conversion of four Trident submarines to SSGNs

• Missile Defense:
  – Robust Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation program
  – Deploy limited and effective missile defenses in near-term

• Command and Control, Intelligence, and Planning:
  – Develop secure, wide-band communications between national decision makers, command centers and operational forces
  – Develop advanced technology programs for intelligence, e.g. for hard and deeply buried targets and mobile targets
  – Upgrade STRATCOM capability for adaptive planning

• Infrastructure
  – Expand weapon surveillance, life extension, hardening and technology sustainment programs
  – Re-energize R&D and production capabilities for strategic systems
Illustrative New Triad Leg: Defenses

• Field modest missile defense capabilities in 2004-05
  – Build on test-bed activities and testing program
  – 20 Ground-based midcourse interceptors planned
  – Up to 20 Sea-based interceptors; begin upgrades of AEGIS ships
  – Forward based sensors
  – Continued deployment of Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) units

• Add additional capability as threat and technology develop
• Continue Research, Development and Testing
• Cooperation with allies and friends
Illustrative New Triad Leg: Defenses (cont.)

• No fixed, final architecture
• Initial capability building on test-bed
• Integrates new technologies for continuous product improvement
• Number, type, and location to change over time
• Modest initial interceptor inventory and investment provides useful defense capability
• Incorporates warfighter in development and operation
• Fields capability quickly: employs test assets if necessary
Enduring Challenges

• Break down stovepipes, yet preserve expertise
• Fund New Triad programs through 2012 and beyond
• Produce and deploy new capabilities being funded
• Detail work on deployment, concepts of operations
• Examine additional capabilities for the New Triad as concepts are developed and needs are established
• Periodic evaluation of international environment will inform decision-making on size and capabilities of the New Triad:
  – Several periodic assessments between now and 2012
Q & A
Defense Operational Goals

“Shaping and Directing Transformation”

• Protecting the homeland and other critical bases of operations
• Denying enemies sanctuary; providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement with high-volume precision strike
• Projecting and sustaining force in distant “denied areas”
• Leveraging information technology and innovative concepts
• Assuring information systems and conducting effective information operations
• Enhancing the capability of space systems

Goals must be integrated into military concepts of operations
Strategic Command and the New Triad

• Consolidation of missions under one command is consistent with need for highly-integrated capabilities of New Triad

• Unified Command Plan changed to give STRATCOM new missions:
  • Global Strike (supporting or lead role)
  • Missile Defense integration (Northern Command defends U.S. territory)
  • Military Space missions
  • Command, Control, Communications, Intel integration
Over The Past Year

• Began to implement the Nuclear Posture Review

-- Presidential decisions to move ahead with missile defenses

-- Moscow Treaty: 1700-2200 US operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons by 2012

-- Series of planning and acquisition programs to realize the New Triad are in the 2003 and 2004-2009 DoD budget.

-- Missions & Capabilities of Strategic Command (STRATCOM) aligned with Nuclear Posture Review concepts.
Security Environment

• More diverse, unfamiliar, threats (e.g., regional opponents, proliferation of WMD, terrorism)
  --Surprise likely
  --Deterrence unpredictable

• Risks of unexpected crisis and conflicts involving one or a combination of adversaries
  --Offense alone inadequate for deterrence
  --Need balance of offense and defense

Reassess and adapt strategic concepts and defense policies to reflect fundamental changes
| **Security Environment: Yesterday vs. Today** |
|---|---|
| **Cold War** | **New Era** |
| **Context** | **Context** |
| • Enduring hostility of Soviet Union | • Multiple potential opponents, sources of conflict, and unprecedented challenges |
| • Known ideological, peer opponent | • New relationship with Russia |
| • Prolonged conflict, defined blocs, limited number of contingencies | • Spectrum of contingencies |
| • Survival stakes | • Varying and unequal stakes |
| **Implications** | **Implications** |
| • Emphasis on deterrence | • Assure, dissuade, deter, defeat |
| – Required high confidence | – Uncertainties of deterrence |
| • Reliance on offensive nuclear forces exclusive of other forces | • Synergy of nuclear/non-nuclear & offense/defense |
| • Nuclear planning reflected continuities | • Nuclear planning |
| – Threat-based | – Capabilities-based |
| – Some flexibility for a few contingencies | – Greater flexibility for range of contingencies |
| – Arms levels fixed by elaborate treaties; verification | – Reductions that preserve flexibility; transparency |
# Nuclear Forces and Contingencies

## Operationally Deployed Force

<table>
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<tr>
<th>On Alert (or available within days)</th>
<th>Quick (within weeks)</th>
<th>Moderate (within months)</th>
<th>Lengthy (year or more)</th>
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<tr>
<td>ICBMs, SLBMs, Bombers</td>
<td>Bombers mated with weapons from Central Storage</td>
<td>SLBMs uploaded</td>
<td>Upload one ICBM squadron per missile wing per year</td>
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## For Immediate and Unexpected Contingencies

## For Potential Contingencies
Sizing the Nuclear Force

• A new approach to U.S. nuclear requirements to address the spectrum of immediate and potential contingencies
  – Operationally deployed force for immediate and unexpected contingencies
  – Responsive capability for potential contingencies and technical challenges
  – Preplanning is essential for immediate and potential contingencies

• Goal of 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed warheads by 2012 to meet requirements of new defense policy goals
  – Force sizing not driven by an immediate contingency involving Russia

• Force structure and downloaded warheads provide responsive capability in near term
Sizing the Nuclear Force (cont.)

• Most Nuclear Platforms Maintained; operationally deployed warheads to decrease
  – 500 Minuteman III ICBMs
  – 14 Ohio-class submarines, 12 deployable, each with 24 D5 SLBMs
  – 21 B-2 (16 operational), 76 B-52 (56 operational) Bombers
• Peacekeeper ICBM eliminated
• Four Ohio-class submarines reconfigured
  – Initial capabilities will include cruise missiles and special operations forces.
Nuclear Posture Review: Basics

• Nuclear Posture Review required by U.S. Congress: Delivered December 2001
• Written report from Secretary of Defense
• Review Co-chaired by senior DoD and DOE officials
• Constitutes a fundamental review of U.S. nuclear policy
• Linked to U.S. nuclear force reductions that reflect the changed security environment
Conclusions of Nuclear Posture Review

• Shift from threat-based to capabilities-based planning
• Reliance on nuclear offense to deter threats is no longer sufficient
• New Triad is needed:
  – 1. Strike forces including non-nuclear as well as nuclear capabilities.
  – 2. Active and passive defenses.
  – 3. Responsive infrastructure: to enable design, development & production of new capabilities as needed.
  – Effectiveness of New Triad depends on robust Command and Control (C2), improved intelligence, and ability to plan adaptively.
• The New Triad will provide:
  – flexibility and a broad range of capabilities to meet U.S. defense policy goals—assure, dissuade, deter, defend and defeat—in a dynamic security environment.
  – Multiple options to mitigate risk from reductions of nuclear forces